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The day of September 11, 2001 has been widely acknowledged as a day on which a 
major historical event took place. The reason behind the grandiosity of this certain date 
was the ‘unexpected’ terrorist attacks against the US, causing the death of almost 3,000 
people and the following wars as well as the changing social and political policies in 
one direction: War on Terror.  
Post-September 11 did not only cause literal wars but also domestically ruined the so-
called balance between freedom and security in favour of a more powerful, 
unaccountable, interventionist, lawless and violent state. This was nothing but the sign 
of sovereign power at work in many states, which does not only opportunistically utilise 
the post-September 11 conditions to gain more power and weaken their opponents but 
also use it as a government technique sometimes against their own society.  
Nearly two decades after the event, this research tries to look at post-September 11 
responses and how those responses changed our world. In this regard, this is a research 
about near history; not a historical research but a theoretical one about a continuing 
past, a past that is present in several ways: either as a residual or an active wound. It’s 
about the history of the present. 
  
 





As far as I can understand, writing a doctoral thesis is not only about countless 
lonesome reading times and long ‘writing scenes’ but a complex process which requires 
the devotion of many people in one way or another. It is so difficult now to classify, 
scale and rank all those generous people. Just to put it beforehand, I am grateful to all of 
those people for being there with me in this long and hard road. 
I would like to start with my mother and father who grew me up with the ideal of 
becoming a scholar one day. Even if I am still on the way, they are the starters of this 
story as hardworking, humble people idealising education and scholarship. Thanks to 
them, I crazily decided to pursue a doctoral education and write a doctoral thesis. With 
his support, my brother is the secret hero of this process and I would like to thank him 
once again. My aunties and cousins were always with me, with their prayers. My aunt 
Seher Kapan is a second mother to me and her deceased husband Mehmet Kapan to 
whom I dedicate this work was not only a protector, a confidant but a real elder brother 
for me whom I will never forget his efforts anytime. 
My days in Lancaster were unique. Ebru Thwaites, Müzeyyen Pandır, Hasan Yılmaz 
and Sertaç Demir are witness to this. They helped me a lot and made what they could do 
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when I was there. I am grateful to all of them. Lancaster also has a unique Turkish 
community who are mostly working in take away shops and restaurants. Tekin, İlyas 
and Mehmet literally fed me when I was in Lancaster. Their friendship is invaluable for 
me and turned to a life-time friendship thanks to their sincerity and generosity. I feel 
myself so lucky for encountering them in an unknown land for me. From the first days 
of my stay in Lancaster to the last ones, they were with me. Thank you, guys! It would 
not be possible to finish my studies without your support. 
Bülent Diken is an amazing, hard-working and critical scholar. Being an admirer of his 
work, I consider myself so lucky to have a chance to work with him. Indeed, he did not 
only become an exemplary figure for me scholarly but with his discipline and rigour. I 
found myself admiring his own working plans and programme. His comments about my 
work were always critical, to the point and helpful. Keeping such a sensitive balance as 
an advisor, he helped me a lot both with his interest and tolerance. 
Pursuing an academic career with a mental health disorder is not easy all the time. I 
would like to thank Lancaster University, Counselling and Mental Health Service and 
my counsellor Alev Çavdar for their kind support. Dr. Hale Yapıcı Eser was also always 
with me during this sometimes-difficult process. I would like to thank her for her 
understanding, kind and generous support.  
I was a full-time worker in a creative industrial company during my research and this 
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thesis would be impossible without their kind support. I would like to thank Ahmet 
Gürbüz particularly for his self-sacrificial efforts to help me to finish my research. He is 
not only a colleague but a confidant whom I will trust for a lifetime. I really don’t know 
how to thank him for his gracious support. 
If there was a way, I would unblinkingly share all the proceeds of this research with my 
wife Tuba Barca. She witnessed the first day I applied to Lancaster University for a 
PhD study and now she is with me when I am writing those lines. In each moment from 
day one to now I felt her encouragement, support and devotion. She is another half, 
invisible side of this research and she deserves an appreciation I am not able to give. My 
mother-in-law Saime Akın was like a guardian angel in each phase of this research and I 
am grateful to her. Last but not least, I want to thank my little daughters Ayşe and 
Meryem. I hope they will find their naïve question’s answer one day: “What are you 
writing, daddy?” 
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For Jacques Derrida, it is impossible to detect an exact starting point for a writing since 
that point cannot simply be the moment when the practical writing process starts. The 
text should have a longer and deeper history for it starts being written some time even 
before the conscious decision of writing. This also paves way to claim that a writing is 
not only the product of consciousness and intention, but the unconscious is always at 
work in the text including the starting decision. Therefore, the ‘real’ starting point of a 
text is undecidable for several reasons, some empirical and some textual. I believe that 
this is true not only for the literary texts but also for the so-called ‘scientific’ or 
scholarly writings. In this regard, I consider it is possible and worthwhile reflecting on 
and telling ‘the story’ of a research.  
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One of the beginnings of the story of this research is the encouragement of a colleague 
who more than one and a half decade ago in Yapı Kredi Publishing (Istanbul) insisted 
that I should translate Giovanna Borradori’s Philosophy in a Time of Terror into 
Turkish. The book was consisted of two long interviews on September 11, made with 
Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, and two commentaries written by Borradori, 
accompanying the dialogues. I was particularly anxious about translating Derrida’s 
meticulous, inventive and difficult language but at least I have finished the translation 
and it was published in 2007 in Turkish.  
It must be obvious that being the translator of Habermas and Derrida’s interviews on 
September 11 had certain impacts in my following studies and research. This is not only 
about a thematical similarity between that translation and the research at hand. 
Translating that book also led me to make an implicit choice about the analytical-
continental divide of contemporary thought. Writing my MA thesis on Jacques Derrida 
(not Habermas) and autobiography in the Cultural Studies department, I finally decided 
to pursue a doctoral research on post-September 11. 
In this research, my preliminary readings were again Jacques Derrida’s and his devoted 
and hardworking disciples’ works. I was quite sure that Derrida will be at the centre of 
my research; but I must have not considered the fact that this was not only a theoretical 
‘work’ but a ‘research.’ I discovered that in a real research, in pursuit of new questions 
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and answers, you cannot exactly know where you are heading to and where you will 
find yourself. Or to put it more paradoxically, you have to know and unknow it at the 
same time.  
In the course of this research, I had the chance to read and review several other 
philosophers like Giorgio Agamben, Judith Butler, and Michel Foucault, to name a few. 
And surprisingly enough, as I was approaching to some conclusion, if there is one, I 
found myself walking with Michel Foucault instead of Jacques Derrida whom I started 
thinking post-September 11 with. There are many reasons of this ‘new’ companionship 
which the reader will hopefully appreciate but perhaps the most significantly, it will be 
seen once again that Foucault is the most suitable if not most brilliant guide for the 
“history of the present.” 
1.1 History of the present 
The day of September 11, 2001 has been widely acknowledged as a day on which a 
major historical event took place; major, not only in terms of the history of politics but 
also for the world history in general. The reason behind the grandiosity of this certain 
date was the ‘unexpected’ terrorist attacks against the US, causing the death of almost 
3,000 people and the following wars as well as the changing social and political policies 
in one direction: War on Terror. If it were mistakenly asked whether the attacks or the 
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War on Terror as a whole created a greater change all around the globe, the answer 
would be more likely the latter. That is, what developed as responses to September 11 
attacks did not only consist of military operations but also of serious social and political 
changes.  
Nevertheless, it is impossible to clear-cut separate the post-event responses from the 
‘original’ event itself. In the first view, it would seem that the question of what 
happened after September 11 as a response -chronologically as well as historically and 
to a certain extent, logically- would follow the question of what happened on September 
11. The simplistic causal understanding would proceed from the previous to the latter in 
a before-after timeline. Yet, what allows us to construct and give a meaning to the 
‘original event’ has something to do with the later responses. Indeed, what we will call 
as post-event, and in this case post-September 11 is the real home for the narrations, 
actions, justifications as well as criticisms, resistances and counter-narratives about the 
original event. This is a point where ‘post-event’ memorises, re-inscribes the event and 
makes it a realm of knowledge/power: a point where a linear conception of eventuality 
becomes more circular and much more complex.  
Nearly two decades after the event, this research tries to look at post-September 11 
responses and how those responses changed our world. At least it is possible to say that 
this is the first step towards a proper research question and delimitation of the scope of 
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the research at hand. “Sovereign Power After September 11” is not about the attacks of 
September 11 but the world after the attacks. In this regard, it is a research about near 
history, not a historical research but a theoretical one about a continuing past, a past that 
is present in several ways: either as a residual or an active wound. It’s about the history 
of the present.  
1.2 The Scope: Post-September 11 
In the aftermath of September 11, it was widely discussed that if the attacks were 
unexpected and unforeseeable or not. This is important from different perspectives but 
most significantly, it would give an idea about how much the world is prepared to such 
an event, not from a military or security perspective but in terms of ethics and politics. 
Looking from now, even if it was not expected by the ordinary people, it appears that 
the US intelligence had some information about a possible attack against the US in its 
own territory. For Jacques Derrida, this practical information as well as the Cold War 
past and ongoing “mondialisation” do not allow one to define the September 11 attacks 
unexpected and unforeseeable event in a philosophical sense. (Derrida, 2003, pp. 91-2) 
That is, September 11 was not an ‘event’ par excellence, an unforeseeable as well as 
unappropriable occurrence, or a pure rupture or break in history. Jean Baudrillard, 
however, offers the contrary in his book dedicated to September 11 and defines the 
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attacks as “the mother of all events”. (Baudrillard, 2002, p. 4) Echoing those 
philosophical discussions, the global public, too, sought for an answer since the early 
days of the aftermath: Is it true that ‘Nothing will be the same again’ or ‘Nothing is 
going to change’? Alongside some other questions that will be introduced throughout 
this chapter, this research tries to approach that question of change after a certain date, 
that is, September 11. 
It was indeed obvious for many that September 11 -or 9/11 as most of the English-
speaking world name it- signs a break in the course of history. The generally accepted 
narrative confirming ‘the theory of break’ tells us that the event took place right after 
the announcement of ‘the end of history’ following the resolution of the bipolar world 
of post-World War II with the collapse of the USSR. That is, September 11 took place 
in a kind of celebratory atmosphere where the victory of liberal democracies -at least 
against the communism threat- was seemingly assured. At the time, globalisation was 
seen as the major trend of the world’s state of affairs with a new conception of nation-
states’ borders porous to goods and services as well as finances and cultural products. 
Even if it was not a heaven yet, those were the times when the all-time winners of the 
game were optimistic about the globe’s future.  
There is no doubt that there were varying criticisms against this narrative dominating 
the mainstream media and academy. Yet, neither of the 
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violent and spectacular terrorist attack targeting the symbolic headquarters of global 
economy politics, that is, World Trade Centre, New York. Four US passenger airliners 
were hijacked targeting the North and South towers of the World Trade Centre in 
Manhattan; the US Department of Defence, Pentagon in Virginia; and finally, White 
House in Washington D.C. arguably —which turned to be a failed attempt. While the 
first three planes hit the target, causing great damage, the other plane was forced down 
by its passengers, in the vicinity of Pennsylvania. This prevented further damage from 
the intended attack strategy. 
No matter one follows the ‘theory of break’ or else, the ‘theory of continuum’, 
September 11 is a definitive date that caused a series of other events and responses, 
which are the foci of the research at hand. In this regard, our intention is not to approach 
and question the reasons or underlying conditions preparing September 11, but to 
reconsider the post-September 11 responses of the attacked US as well as the other 
states which were allies of the US in the War on Terror.  
With the participation of an extensive coalition, the US launched a global War on Terror 
with the priority of deposing the Taliban from Afghanistan that was held responsible for 
the birth and development of Al-Qaeda, the real perpetrator of September 11 attacks. 
The invasion of Iraq (2003) with the accusation of harbouring terrorism and possessing 
nuclear weapons followed the Afghanistan War (2001), not to mention other military 
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operations executed all around the world. Finally, War on Terror was said to be over in 
the Presidency of Barack Obama, leaving the troops as well as civilian deaths and 
injuries behind. 
Nevertheless, the only fronts of the War on Terror were not overseas lands: Following 
the US, most of the states reconfigured their domestic security policies by legislating 
new laws, first of all expanding the definition of terrorism, enlarging national and 
foreign surveillance, and explicitly limiting the civil rights of both citizens and 
immigrants in the name of security. Subsequently defined as and criticised for becoming 
‘security states,’ the US and European democracies preferred to keep their borders 
tighter against the refugees, ignore the rights of migrants and allow a serious dose of 
Islamophobia and xenophobia performed by either extreme right or ordinary officials 
and citizens. Forgetting the pre-September 11 winds of globalisation and unsurprisingly 
ignoring the inheritance of democracy and human rights rooted back in Ancient Greece 
and the Declaration of Human Rights, European democracies addressed the September 
11 problem with extraordinary measures of security, including the state of exception.  
All in all, even if everything has not changed as the famous post-September 11 motto 
predicts, something dramatically changed and left a disgraceful mark in history. This 
mark is the main problem of the research at hand. Indeed, this is not the mark left by the 
terrorists planning and executing the September 11 attacks but rather, the mark of the 
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democratising forces waging a “just war” for the sake of bringing democracy to “rogue 
states.” If the War on Terror is the code name for the responses performed in the 
international realm, then the domestic responses of nation-states were securitisation, 
limitation on civil rights and even, state of exception.  
For that very reason, Judith Butler stated that “the United States was missing an 
opportunity to redefine itself as part of a global community when, instead, it heightened 
nationalist discourse, extended surveillance mechanisms, suspended constitutional 
rights, and developed forms of explicit and implicit censorship” (Butler, 2004, p. xi). 
Indeed, that opportunity was missed not only by the US but also by other liberal 
democracies that responded the original violence of terrorism with a competing 
violence. Thus, creating a spiral of violence both domestically and internationally, post-
September 11 responses did not only leave a mark in near history but also in the current 
state of affairs. 
1.3 The Scope II: States and Sovereignty  
One of the beginnings of this research was the intention to critically approach the 
sovereign states’ responses to September 11 in a period called post-September 11. 
Those responding states would possibly be classified in several ways and in a 
suppositional classification, the US would be the first-degree responder as the attacked 
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while the second-degree responding states would be its possible allies, and then, the 
neutral states would follow the enemy or enemies. This hypothetical classification, 
however, was invalidated in a most rapid way with the declaration of the US President 
George W. Bush when he repetitively asserted, “You’re either with us or with the 
terrorists.” The meaning and feeling this sentence conveyed did not only eliminate a 
probable neutral stance but also became the spirit of the fight against terrorism. Indeed, 
the “either/or” announcement meant that ‘You have to join, follow, obey, approve and 
support our response without any condition and reserve.’ 
Following the aftermath, the first response was nothing but waging war against an 
enemy. But which one? War on Terror started with an aggression against Afghanistan’s 
Taliban regime, even though the US originally held Osama bin Laden and his ‘network’ 
organisation Al-Qaeda responsible from the attacks. No matter how much it is 
impossible to detect and capture those terrorist fighters who were scattered around the 
different parts of the Middle East, North Africa, Middle Asia, Afghanistan, Pakistan as 
well as Europe and the US, that is, the whole world, Afghanistan was chosen as the first 
target and the first major front of the War on Terror. Whatever the reasons of this 
decision were, there was no time for mourning in any case, let alone reflection or 
forgiveness, as philosophers Jacques Derrida and Judith Butler would invite the US as 
well as the whole world (Derrida, 2003, p. 120). 
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In the War on Terror, the other major front was the own territories of the US and its 
allies. Even if the anti-terror measures taken by each state vary, the agenda was 
common if not the same. The pattern in those security policies definitely ruined the so-
called liberal balance between freedom and security in favour of a more powerful, 
unaccountable, interventionist, lawless and violent state. It could easily be observed that 
the main aim of the new security measures was nothing but empower the state against 
its own society. Any citizen was a suspect and could be the invisible enemy, the 
monstrous and the spectral terrorist so much so that the apparatuses of security as well 
as the other executive branches of the state should be equipped with extraordinary 
authorisation, bypassing any necessary recourse to law, international agreements or 
international law. The immunity of security forces, continuous surveillance, indefinite 
detention and an official language feeding hatred and xenophobia were some of the 
common features of the time. 
What directed the gaze of this research on the concept of sovereignty was all those 
reappearing characteristics of sovereign states and the same pattern encompassing 
almost all over the globe, which has formed after September 11. In an encyclopaedic 
sense, in old French, sovereignty means “to rule over” while first of all it denotes the 
“supreme authority within a territory” (Philpott, 2020). This simple definition seems to 
cover ancient, medieval and modern states and historically speaking, the sovereign can 
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be a God, a king, the church, a council, a party, a dictator and in democracies, demos, 
that is, people. In this regard, R.B.J. Walker reminds us that sovereignty can be 
simultaneously understood as “a principle, an institution and a practice” (Walker, 2004, 
p. 242).  
What was at stake after September 11 was the crisis of sovereignty in all three senses: 
sovereignties were in crisis and there was a crisis of sovereignty in the sense that the 
uses and abuses of power (sovereignty as a principle) under the guise of a reckless 
empowerment of state (sovereignty as an institution), and irresponsible authorisation 
and securitisation of executive branches (sovereignty as a practice). How did the attacks 
of September 11 cause such a crisis of sovereignty, then? First of all, the US and its 
allies felt their sovereignties threatened in the face of attacks, since unlike the ordinary 
crimes, terrorist attacks and threats seemed to target not only one or several person(s) or 
place(s) but also the raison d’etre of the state, that is, as Thomas Hobbes claimed, the 
protecting, ordering power of the state.  
Revealing the vulnerability of the US, the so-called super-power and gendarmerie of the 
world, September 11 caused the world order to be felt under threat. Even the Cold War 
with its bipolar structure had a certain predictability and balance in itself. The feeling 
September 11 created was, however, of a catastrophe threatening not only one state but 
the ‘Western civilisation,’ as the US President George W. Bush argued that what is 
Sovereign Power After September 11 
 
 
22  Emre Barca - June 2020 
 
 
under attack is not one country, but the civilisation achieved in thousands of years. Yet, 
this so-called engagement with the civilisation did not withhold the US and its allies 
from undermining the international law and institutions, and disregard other countries’ 
sovereignties with violence, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Unilateralism thus became the keyword to understand the international relations of the 
period of post-September 11. In their relationship with the others, however, sovereign 
states constitute a network-like relation, swinging with mostly small movements, 
tactical or strategic. This restrained and conditioned but always in change relation 
network is like a constellation of stars, in which all parties take a position towards or 
against the movements of the others. Even though the familiar courtesy of foreign 
affairs seems to leave the scene with the rise of populisms from the US to Russia, and 
from Turkey to Hungary, the basic structure of the constellation is preserved.  
For our purposes, there are two significant aspects in this analogy of constellation: First 
of all, September 11 attacks were felt from the very deep by all the sovereign states, like 
a meteoroid threatening the biggest and central star of the constellation, which would 
definitely affect them in one way or another. And secondly, it created a harmony in the 
moves of those stars which are not in the periphery of the constellation itself. That is, 
they did not only become the ‘natural’ allies of the US in the War on Terror but also 
made similar regulations in their domestic affairs. To demarcate the scope of our search 
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more clearly and leaving the constellation analogy aside, however, it is necessary to 
focus on those countries closer after giving the first clue of centre and periphery.  
Simply put, well in the centre of the system, those states are the real parts of the world, 
always in line with “the worlding of the world.” Those states are sometimes called as 
“Western countries”, sometimes “the US and the EU countries”, or “Western liberal 
democracies” in accordance with the writer’s priorities. For several reasons, however, I 
prefer not to use those definitions, for instance, to include countries like Turkey and 
Russia, or to simply avoid orientalism by automatically differentiating East and West. 
In any case, to speak about the countries outside the box (that are not ‘part of the 
world’) may help us defining the states that are inside, that are the major part. 
It is a fact that some countries are isolated from the world, embargoed and labelled such 
as “rogue,” “failed” or part of “axis of evil” as is experienced after September 11. 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, Syria, Sudan, North Korea and so on are some of those 
countries that are not parts of the world. In one way or another they are in conflict with 
the “central” states, not respectable members of the UN or IMF, and frequent villains in 
the global media machine. Indeed, all these countries have a history of being counted as 
anti-world and political, economic and even, military interventions seen required from 
time to time.  
Apart from those countries mentioned, it is probably much more striking that a whole 
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continent, that is, Africa is not indeed part of the world. Even if Africa is not anti-world, 
it is out of the game, ignored by the global political and economic agenda, and forgotten 
and left alone with its severe problems such as famine. China, on the other hand, 
presents an interesting exception in the recent decades: Even though it is not counted as 
“rogue,” “failed” or part of “axis of evil” in terms of domestic politics it is obviously 
outside “the democratic world”. Yet, it is also more and more inside the world system 
because of its expanding economic and political power. In a different way, Saudi Arabia 
and some other Gulf states, too, present such a paradoxical view with their theocratic 
and authoritarian regimes providing huge amounts of oil for the world.  
To sum, the research at hand takes into account the sovereign states which we tried to 
delimit above by being the member of the ‘world’ and War on Terror coalition. 
Admittedly again, it should be stated that this is not an analytical distinction, putting 
various sorts of states and sovereignties in one box. This box, however, collects the 
sovereignties which do not only opportunistically utilise the post-September 11 
conditions to gain more power and weaken their opponents but also use those conditions 
as a government technique, strategically utilising their sovereign power against their 
own society. Utilising securitisation as well as the state of exception, sovereign power 
signs the uses and abuses of sovereign privilege in ‘abnormal’ times and at this very 
point, it becomes a more relevant and convenient concept than sovereignty.  
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1.4 The Focus: Sovereign Power 
It must have been already noticed that the title of this research prefers the term 
“sovereign power” instead of sovereignty. There are certainly some reasons behind this 
choice, but in any case, this is not to make a kind of analytical distinction between the 
two. Rather, reminding R. B. J. Walker’s wise triune definition, one of the reasons is to 
prefer a focus on the practice of sovereignty while the other is keeping a sociological or 
social theoretical perspective more than an international relations approach. In this 
regard, it can be stated that the research at hand does focus more on the domestic abuses 
of sovereign power and conceptual discussions around them than the abuses of 
sovereignty in the international realm after September 11.  
As a matter of fact, the concept of sovereignty signifies both the international and 
domestic authority of the sovereign, and since the ever-increasing interaction in the 
world after the waves of globalisation following the end of the Cold War it is quite hard 
to isolate domestic power relations from the international relations. In other words, the 
influence of more powerful countries over the weak ones, the relatively thin but still 
binding authority of international institutions, the existence of an international law, and 
the financial and economic influence of international corporations and global finance as 
well economy, all damage the supposedly absolute sovereignty of states over their own 
territories.  
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As it is impossible to speak about an isolated domestic relations or sovereignty, the 
research at hand tries not to neglect the inter-national aspect relevant in this research. 
There are already common points between the performances of the sovereign states of 
the world: In very brief, the main strategy seems to be increasing the control over 
society (security state) on the one hand and silencing the inner opposition (Turkey and 
Russia using anti-terror laws against their “internal enemies”) on the other. Another 
powerful apparatus for the consolidation of sovereign states has also become the 
declaration of state of emergency. In 2016, “at least 203 million people were living in a 
national state of emergency every minute” according to Quartz (Mohdin, 2016). It 
should also be added that a great effort was invested for the coordination and 
cooperation of sovereign states against terrorism. Even if at least some part of this effort 
was wasted because of the conflicting interests of states, they altogether invested in their 
sovereign muscles against their own society. This is why the title of this research 
includes sovereign power as the ‘subject’.  
Apart from these preliminary comments, it should be highlighted that the concept of 
sovereign power is used in a very enlightening and specific way in the works of French 
philosopher Michel Foucault. For Foucault, sovereign power is one and the first of the 
three modalities of power in the history of Western politics. The others being 
disciplinary power and governmentality, sovereign power is the pre-modern one, 
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through which the power relations of the society rely on a ‘transcendental’ ruler who is 
above and beyond the law himself while his main sovereign performance is his decision 
over the subject’s life and death. Defined as discursive-legal by Foucault, sovereign 
power works through law and in particular, prohibition. In this regard, sovereign power 
is defined “negative” by Foucault while he insists on “positive” versions of power 
(disciplinary and biopower) that are modern and contemporary (Foucault, 2007, p. 11).  
Even this brief account which will be elaborated in the final chapters of this research 
reflects how Foucault approaches the question of power. Throughout his writings and 
Collège de France lectures, Foucault focuses on power both institutionally and as a 
practice, just like his very famous concept “discourse” signs not only texts and words 
but also any material and practice from architecture to bodily discipline. Nevertheless, 
the very brief account of sovereign power above describes the sovereign power as pre-
modern, that which belongs to the princes of medieval times and the question arises as 
to how post-September 11 can be understood with this older form of power. Indeed, the 
predominant modality of power in post-September 11 is not sovereign power but 
governmentality. Nevertheless, what this research specifically offers is the seemingly 
‘anachronic’ ‘revival’ of sovereign power in post-September 11 even if the 
governmentality is predominant at the time.  
For Foucault, the three forms of power successively follow each other in the history of 
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the West. Nevertheless, a form of power does not replace the other but all those forces 
does not exist in peace but with serious conflicts over the change. “So we should not see 
things as the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a society of discipline, and then 
of a society of discipline by a society, say, of government. In fact we have a triangle: 
sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management, which has population as its 
main target and apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism” (Foucault, 2007, pp. 
107-8). Yet, Foucault warns about these successive forms which actually do not cancel 
the previous one(s) consumingly. Instead, all these forms of power can survive together 
even though one of them is the definitive, identified with that particular period of time 
in history. It is in this regard possible to speak about the sovereign power in post-
September 11, which is originally defined with an era governed by the kings and 
princes.  
Even if governmentality is the dominant modality of power in the age of September 11 
sovereign power is still there. Nevertheless, this is not simply a theoretical affirmation: 
sovereign power was already there well before September 11 but what happened after 
September 11 was its strategic use particularly under the guise of War on Terror. It was 
the sovereign power that allows the states acting outside and above the law, 
unrecognising the law; damaging the check and balance between legislation, jurisdiction 
and execution in favour of execution as well as securitisation, the state of exception and 
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the rebirth of citizen as a potential enemy. Those were nothing but the work of the use 
and abuse of sovereign power and all these post-September 11 governance trends are 
also the symptoms of sovereign power at work in the contemporary.  
After defining the spatio-temporal scope of the research (sovereign states - after 
September 11), and an introduction to Foucault’s relevance to this research, a research 
question can be introduced: ‘How did September 11 change the power relations within 
the state and society in the globalised world?’ No doubt that this preliminary question 
will guide us throughout our research but still there is much to clarify about it. First of 
all, the type of question, the ‘how’ of the research question draws attention, particularly 
with its unclarity, extensiveness and lack of focus. Nevertheless, considering that 
Foucault is known as the philosopher of power, who asks ‘how’ of power, the question 
makes more sense and loses its unclarity to a certain extent. Since Foucault offers a 
genuine theoretical toolbox from methodological devices to useful concepts, the 
question ‘how’ also acquires a critical characteristic.  
The second point needs to be clarified is the phrase of “power relations within state and 
society,” which has the risk of being interpreted more like the liberal supposition 
positing a contradictory relationship between state and society. First of all, sovereignty 
does not only consist of state sovereignty. Even if the state has the leading role in post-
September 11 sovereign performances, for Foucault state is neither at the centre of 
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power relations nor power relations are dictated from the heights of the state, from top 
to bottom. State, however, is a practice rather than a sublime institution at the heart of 
power. In any case, it is possible to speak about a state which gains more and more 
power and control after September 11 and this is a power that is punitive, corrective, 
exclusionary and marginalising; that is sovereign power. And society must be defended 
against the violence of this power. 
The third point is the expression of “the globalised world” which does not mean that 
‘World is globalised as a whole’ but ‘the part of the world which is globalised’. A 
further explanation about this approach was given above in the states and sovereignty 
part. Leaving behind all those remarks, throughout this text we will be focusing on 
media and spectacle, globalisation and the world, democracy and law, biopolitics and 
life, power and society, and so on. To end this introduction with the beginning, we can 
claim that “Sovereign Power after September 11” tries to focus on near history in order 
to approach more and more to the history of the present: “The problem of sovereignty is 
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2 Spectacle after “9/11” 
What happened in September 11? Was it just a matter of security or terrorism, or a clash 
between civilisations and barbarism, good and evil, and so on? The psychosocial 
tendency that obliges us to find an explanation in the series of dichotomies seemed to 
leave both the “absolute” security measures following the attacks and the enigmatic 
attacks of September 11 themselves unquestioned. What still keeps this enigma alive 
after nearly twenty years is not only the shock or the resulting trauma but also the media 
spectacle spreading all over the globe. Nevertheless, by imposing us “the impression of 
being a major event,” global politics of the twenty-first century seems to be partly 
shaped or even, regulated by the shadow of what is peculiarly called 9/11 (Derrida, 
2003).  
Securitisation of everyday life and the sovereign violence at work both in domestic 
  
 
Emre Barca - June 2020   33 
 
 
realm and international arena following the attacks entail us to question what “really” 
happened in September 11, 2001 and what is still happening after the attacks. Even if it 
is impossible to separate the attacks from their mediatisation, it is at least necessary to 
critically reflect upon the ways in which the event is constructed through image and 
discourse on a global scale. The focus of this chapter is the spectacle that “cannot be 
understood as a mere visual deception produced by mass-media technologies,” but “is a 
worldview that has actually been materialised, a view of a world that has become 
objective.” (Debord, 2005, p. 7)  
2.1 9/11 as a Work of Art 
On September 16, 2001, five days after the September 11 attacks, the famous avant-
garde composer Karlheinz Stockhausen held a press conference in Hamburg on a series 
of concerts featuring some of his works. In response to a question about the attacks, 
Stockhausen described the attacks as “the greatest work of art that has ever existed” 
(Hänggi, 2011). His remarks paved the way for a very rapid decision on cancellation of 
his upcoming shows by the sponsor of the concerts. Stockhausen eventually became a 
persona non grata and gained an unexpected notoriety in a day following his infamous 
remarks about September 11 (Hänggi, 2011). Comparing his and other composers’ and 
artists’ pieces of art with the attacks of Al-Qaeda, Stockhausen found it fascinating to 
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get prepared to a single ‘performance’ for ten years, drive five thousand people to 
“resurrection” in one single moment and die during the performance itself (Hänggi, 
2011). For Stockhausen, this is what makes September 11 attacks “the greatest work of 
art”: “That spirits achieve in one act something we could never dream of in music, that 
people practice like mad for ten years, totally fanatically, for one concert. And then die. 
And that is the greatest work of art that exists for the whole cosmos. Just imagine what 
happened there. These are people who are so concentrated on this single performance—
and then five thousand people are driven into resurrection. In one moment. I couldn’t do 
that. Compared to that, we are nothing, as composers that is” (Hänggi, 2011). 
A year after the attacks, Damien Hirst, a well-known contemporary artist, also stated in 
a BBC interview that he believed that September 11 attacks are artwork in their own 
right (Allison, 2002). He further argued that the terrorists should be congratulated for 
achieving something “nobody would ever have thought possible” on artistic level. In 
response to the public outrage following his remarks, Hirst issued a statement and 
apologised for any upset he has caused “particularly to the families of the victims of the 
events on that terrible day” (BBC, 2002).  
The remarks of these two significant artists are neither scandalous comments nor slips 
of tongue; but they are in fact insightful responses of two ‘professional spectators’ of 
the September 11 attacks. As the ‘witnesses’ and spectators of an event televised real-
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time to millions around the globe, Stockhausen and Hirst seem to be fascinated by the 
spectacular character of the attacks to a degree that they even forgot politically correctly 
cursing the evil of attacks. Pointing out the fact that how it is prohibited to further 
reflect on the attacks if the reflection in question does not fit into the good vs. evil, us 
vs. them, hero vs. terrorist dualities of the global discursive consensus, both artists refer 
to the performativity of the attacks before anything else.  
Both of these distinguished artists as well as critics of their age were well aware of the 
fact that the terrorist attacks were not only aiming to kill thousands of people but also 
seeking to capture the global live cam of international TV stations for hours, which 
would be impossible in any other case. They had to find the most ‘creative’ way to 
transmit their messages to global audience and for Stockhausen and Hirst, they achieved 
their goal in a highly artistic way. Nevertheless, in the Manichean dualistic perspective 
of the post-September 11 media, these comments themselves would be interpreted as 
‘evil’ in the sense that they ‘blessed’ the attacks with one of the honorary remarks of the 
day: work of art. Nevertheless, what the comments of the two artists revealed was 
nothing but the spectacular aspect of the attacks. From hijacking planes to taking 
hostages of the Olympic team members, terrorist act has become a performance in the 
age of spectacle and it seemed to have reached its ultimate form in the case of 
September 11. The terrorist act that is admittedly not just a political violence but also a 
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form of symbolic action, a performance or a counter-performance enabled Stockhausen 
and Hirst to see and acknowledge the artistry and creativity behind the attacks. s 
September 11 attacks were terrorist ‘acts’ par excellence in the sense that they did not 
only aim to kill but also to gesture with an illocutionary force by the way of these 
killings (Alexander, 2004). In this gesture, Al-Qaeda turned the terrorist act into a 
counter-performance on the world stage by commanding the means of symbolic 
production in a very skilful way. Since theatricalisation plays not a contingent but a 
strategic role for the necessary relationship between terrorism and spectacle, September 
11 is not only one of the major world historical events in political terms, but also as a 
spectacular image-event, a counter-performance against the spectacle of consumer 
culture, if not a work of art of terrorist-martyr-actors of the attacks.  
“Inappropriate” admiration of Stockhausen and Hirst, however, is accompanied by a 
kind of envy that is not only about the skilful mastery and success of the attacks. Both 
artists also seemed to admire and envy the imagination behind the attacks. How could 
one imagine, think about and plan such an unbelievable act? For Jean Baudrillard, what 
makes September 11 attacks not an accident, not an arbitrary act but a perfect event or 
“mother” of all events is also our hidden, latent imagery and desire to destruct and see 
the collapse of the “omnipotent.” Their admiration and envy, in this sense, must have 
been ours in our desire to see the collapse: “It is because it is there, everywhere, like an 
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obscure object of desire. Without this deep-seated complicity, the event would not have 
had the resonance it has, and in their symbolic strategy the terrorists doubtless know 
that they can count on this unavowable complicity” (Baudrillard, 2002, p. 6). 
Baudrillard claims that we are, “without any exception,” accomplices of the terrorists 
behind the attacks in our hidden desire and dream of such an event since any of us can 
avoid dreaming the symbolic collapse of such a hegemonic power. Nonetheless, as the 
public outrage following Stockhausen and Hirst’s remarks on the attacks reveals, the 
recognition of this desire is utterly unacceptable in Western moral conscience 
(Baudrillard, 2002, p. 5). Yet, it is there, everywhere and here, the terrorists behind the 
attacks invest strategically in their efforts to create an ultimate counter-spectacle 
utilising the spectacle machine against itself. For Baudrillard, the hatred towards the 
hegemonic power is not limited to the terrorists or the disinherited, exploited or the 
subaltern but it reaches to those who are on the side of the dominant world power; this 
hatred and malicious desire is also felt by the ones who benefit from being on the “right 
side.” This would not be a surprise for Baudrillard, who already asserts that the allergy 
to a definitive order or power is universal. To him, this universal allergy can be 
observed in many disaster movies in which we aim to exorcise with images produced 
with special effects (Baudrillard, 2002, p. 7). 
Nevertheless, one could argue that what is scandalous about the statements of 
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Stockhausen and Hirst is the very fact that what happened in September 11 is not fiction 
but real in effect. The crash of the hijacked planes and the collapse of the two towers of 
World Trade Centre were not parts of a computer game and the death of almost three 
thousand people was real and immoral as Baudrillard as well as Stockhausen and Hirst 
would acknowledge. However, what these immoral and the “wicked” attacks also aimed 
was harming the symbolic structure of the global order by attacking the symbolic 
architectural buildings which do not only belong to the United States but also to the 
global order to a certain extent. In this sense, Hirst, not as a theoretician but as a visual 
artist, claimed that “it was devised in this way for this kind of impact. It was devised 
visually" (Allison, 2002). Since it is not allowed to reflect on the taboo of evil attacks, 
Hirst’s simple reference to the visual design of the attacks was deemed an unnecessary 
indiscretion as well as a scandalous remark. Nonetheless, Hirst went further to suggest 
that the collapse of two towers with the crash of hijacked planes has also changed our 
visual language: "I think our visual language has been changed by what happened on 
September 11: an aeroplane becomes a weapon –and if they fly close to buildings 
people start panicking. Our visual language is constantly changing in this way and I 
think as an artist you're constantly on the lookout for things like that" (Allison, 2002). 
By and through these words, Hirst did not refer to the change in security policies or 
politics following a major terrorist act but to a significant shift in our visual language. 
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His words underline not only the reach of a terrorist act in the age of spectacle but also 
the ways in which our understanding of the world in general is constituted through 
visual representations. And for the planners of the September 11 attacks, this latter point 
seems to be a very well-known fact. Indeed, the new type of visual language and the 
spectacle born after the attacks were not inaugurated by the attacks but the video images 
of the hijacked planes crashing into the two towers of World Trade Centre (Giroux, 
2006, p. 20). The image-event of 9/11, hence, signals a transformation in the political 
and ideological power of the image and spectacle. This is the beginning of a new age of 
spectacle: “the spectacle of terrorism.” It is not a simple and neutral transformation in 
our visual language but also signifies emergence of a new and powerful force central to 
the emergent forms of cultural politics following September 11. (Giroux, 2006, p. 19) 
To Debord, the image replaces the commodity as the basic unit of consumer capitalism 
whereas the media stands as the quintessential space for it. Since the spectacle is the 
magic word that can possibly bind political violence and image together with the media 
investment in the terrorist act, the counter-spectacle was created against the spectacle 
machine by utilising it against itself. Indeed, what constitutes the memory of 9/11 for 
the global audience as well as our individual selves is the images of the attacks. The 
terrorists did not only transform the planes into powerful missiles against the two 
towers; they also turned the images of the attacks into weapons by exploiting the ‘real 
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time’ broadcast and their worldwide transmission through the network of global media 
outlets. The images of the attacks did not only celebrate the victory with the collapse of 
two towers, but they also took the spectators hostage in front of their screens forcing 
them witness the so-called victory. Regardless of the fact that the resultant revenge of 
the hostage also took the form of a war of images as well as a global war on terrorism, 
the attackers managed to abuse and exploit the media system. 
In the case of spectators around the globe, the events of 9/11 have been consumed 
through the images of attacks and the attacks became image-events where the reality 
and fiction are indissociable in their totality. The author of The Gulf War Did Not Take 
Place (1991), Jean Baudrillard, in this sense claimed that “we had seen (perhaps with a 
certain relief) a resurgence of the real, and of the violence of the real, in an allegedly 
virtual universe” (Baudrillard, 2002, p. 28) .Within the fiction, within the theatre of the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, the image was reinforced with the real and it took its 
maddening horror and energy from the real itself. The real has itself become a fiction 
and the contest as well as the cooperation between them resulted in the most 
unimaginable of events. Indeed, Baudrillard claimed that the attacks combined the two 
elements of mass fascination within the image-event: “The white magic of the cinema 
and the black magic of terrorism; the white light of the image and the black light of 
terrorism” (Baudrillard, 2002, pp. 29-30). The attacks resembled violence-saturated 
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Hollywood movies; but their reach went beyond these movies by being available to and 
intended for an infinite display from web entertainment to the news outlets of the 
spectacle machine.  
Here, it is important to note that bin Laden had the idea of attacking the US with this 
kind of mise en scéne during the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, in which towers of 
Beirut were targeted by missiles and collapsed (Arak, 2004). In addition to providing 
training and weapons for the mujahedeen of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan, the enemy 
inspired bin Laden who was in front of the screen, watching the televised images of 
collapsing towers and buildings of Lebanon. In this sense, one can claim that the 
terrorists have taken over all the weapons created by their enemy against themselves. 
They abused not only the US and European technology and aeronautics but also the 
spectacle machine and media networks. Similarly, they exploited and assimilated the 
heritage of the images of Western domination. The elements of September 11 attacks 
such as inspiration, imagination, revelation of our most secret desires, planning, design, 
act, theatricality, spectacularity and exploitation of the giant image machinery of media 
brought into being the attacks called “9/11” and turned it into a kind of a work of image, 
if not art.  
In his “Requiem for the Twin Towers” (Baudrillard, 2002, p. 35), Baudrillard examines 
the symbolism of the two towers, their graphism, perfect twin-ness and duplication with 
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a lack of origin, and he reminds the reader the symbolic importance of the twin towers 
not only for New York and the United States but also for the global economic system. 
To further explicate the specific symbolism of the attacks, he asserts that the fact that 
the terrorists did not target White House but twin towers displays not only the relevant 
insignificance of politics in our age, but also shows how the terrorists aimed at the 
global techno-economic system instead of political centre of the US. For him, the 
symbolic attacks against the towers created its own symbols and interrupted the course 
of our visual language in three ways: Firstly, the use of hijacked planes as weapons, as 
Damien Hirst indicates; second, the falling man as it becomes the title of one of the 
significant novels of post-September 11; and the third, the collapse of the two towers 
reminding us the vulnerability of the global system as well as the US. (Baudrillard, 
2002) For Baudrillard, this symbolism is almost worse than its reality since “only 
symbolic violence is generative of singularity,” whereas violence could be banal and 
unaggressive in itself. (Baudrillard, 2002, p. 29) 
Just like the specific place of the work of art in the exchange system, the symbolic 
violence not only distorts the banal exchange between violence and counter-violence 
but it is also worse than the real. What makes all this exchange much more complicated 
is the role played by death. The suicides of the attackers disrupted the exchange system 
with what cannot be calculated and valued easily, that is, their own death. Baudrillard 
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goes further to assume that the collapse of the twin towers, their death, was a response 
of towers to the suicide of attackers. (Baudrillard, 2002, p. 43) The collapse of the two 
towers is a symbolic response just as the attacks. Indeed, Baudrillard claims that the 
major symbolic event unpredictable by the attackers themselves is the collapse of 
towers. By committing suicide and collapsing on their own, the collapse of the twin 
towers symbolises the collapse of a whole system. Though it is the architectural object 
that is seemingly attacked, the very symbolism of the collapse of the two towers is 
much more significant in its effect. For Baudrillard, the physical collapse followed the 
symbolic collapse, not the other way around in September 11 attacks (Baudrillard, 2002, 
p. 44).  
The system that can assimilate any visible antagonism into its exchange order could not 
respond to the suicide attacks of September 11 for the terrorists came with a definitive 
act and an ultimate gesture that is not available for exchange. The collapse of the two 
towers was inevitable because the terrorists attacked to the heart of the exchange system 
with an irreducible singularity, that is, with their own deaths. It is because death can be 
exchanged only by an equal or greater death, the two towers responded to the suicide 
attacks with their own death.  (Baudrillard, 2002, p. 43) Nonetheless, the symbolism of 
this type is worse in its absoluteness and irrevocability for it is sacrificial in the 
appearance of a real-time event. Interestingly enough, Baudrillard’s interpretations of 
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September 11 attacks remind us Damien Hirst’s one of the most recognised and 
important works: Speaking about “For the Love of God,” a platinum skull set with 
diamonds, Hirst says about death: “You don’t like it, so you disguise it or you decorate 
it to make it look like something bearable – to such an extent that it becomes something 
else” (Hirst, 2012).  
2.2 9/11 as a Historical Event 
In an interview held a few weeks after the attacks, a reporter asked Jacques Derrida if it 
is true that the September 11 attacks give “us” “the impression of being a major event” 
(Derrida, 2003, p. 88). Defining “us” as the ones “who never lived through a world 
war,” the interviewer Giovanna Borradori seemed to weigh the attacks of September 11 
with two world wars. Unlike Baudrillard, however, for Derrida September 11 is not an 
‘event’ in the philosophical sense of the word. This is because, according to Derrida, an 
event is always defined with “the unappropriability, the unforeseeability, absolute 
surprise, incomprehension, the risk of misunderstanding, unanticipatable novelty, pure 
singularity, the absence of horizon” (Derrida, 2003, p. 91).  
In contrast to an event, Derrida thinks that the US military and intelligence apparatuses 
have simply both the means and reasons to foresee these attacks. For Derrida, the world 
after the end of the Cold War and the auto-immune logic governing the world do not 
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point out to an eventual rupture or a pure singularity but to a lack of ethico-political 
responsibility in the face of global regime of violence and death. Derrida’s caution and 
hesitation about defining the attacks as an event does not mean that the attack was an 
ordinary occurrence or a simple accident. Rather, that caution is crucial in questioning 
the attacks and reflecting on whether or not they constitute an event. Along these lines, 
Derrida first of all focuses on the language that enables one to think and reflect on the 
event: The call to consider the event as a historical occurrence, as a source of historicity 
comes from a certain language, that is, English, the language of the US as well as the 
globe. And second, Derrida insists on the naming the event with a date (Derrida, 2003, 
p. 86). A few weeks after the attacks, it was obvious that the global community would 
call the attacks with a certain date, with no other thing but a date: 9/11 or September 11. 
Naming the attacks with only a date seems to be a sign of the fact that the attacks left a 
certain mark on ordinary language that hints at the historical force of the attacks.  
Yet, Marc Redfield points out that “name-dating in general tends to be a modern 
phenomenon, associable with what Benedict Anderson calls the “homogenous empty 
time of the nation-state” (Redfield, 2008, p. 222). Accordingly, the sovereign nation-
state needs significant dates to build a coherent history, unite the nation and constitute a 
sublime meaning for its sine qua non presence. In the examples of foundation, 
unification, victory, remembrance and celebration days, the date mostly is accompanied 
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with a title designating the significance and the meaning of the date. The power of the 
rhetoric of date stems from the blankness of the date since an “empty date suggests 
itself as a zero-point,” a day when “everything changed” and a new history began 
(Redfield, 2007, p. 58). Before 2001, interestingly, September 11 was the “9-1-1 
Emergency Telephone Number Day.” After the attacks, however, on October 25, 2001, 
the US Congress declared September 11 as the “National Day of Prayer and 
Remembrance” and on September 4, 2002, President George W. Bush changed its name 
into “Patriot Day” (Redfield, 2009, p. 17). This sheer change itself gives us an idea 
about the divergent political investments into the name-date via words and inscription 
through the media-theatricalisation of events.  
Hence Derrida’s caution about the historical scale and scope of September 11 is also 
about the aporia of the differentiation of ‘the event’ and its mediation through a giant 
machine of media-theatricalisation. That is to say, “the event is made up of the “thing” 
itself (that which happens or comes) and the impression (itself at once “spontaneous” 
and “controlled”) which is given, left or made (Derrida, 2003, p. 89). This is a warning 
about the impressions we get from the spectacle, or in Derrida’s words, global 
information system: “We could say that the impression is “informed,” in both senses of 
the word: a predominant system gave it form, and this form then gets run through an 
organised information machine (language, communication, rhetoric, image, media, and 
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so on). This informational apparatus is from the very outset political, technical, 
economic” (Derrida, 2003, p. 89). This is why the shock waves created after the attacks 
can never be deemed purely neutral or even spontaneous, since they inevitably depend 
upon a complex machinery of spectacle. 
Indeed, the sovereign investment and its partially uncontrollable discursive 
dissemination is not limited with the efforts to give impressions or simply manipulate. 
The name-date blessed by the US Congress as the day with prayer and remembrance in 
a quasi-theological fashion should be repeated again and again like a mantra to assure 
the sovereignty of the traumatised self. “We repeat this, we must repeat it, and it is all 
the more necessary to repeat it insofar as we do not really know what is being named in 
this way” (Derrida, 2003, p. 87). The continuous repetition of the name-date works to 
make sure that sovereignty of the self is guaranteed by reminding that everything has 
passed. Paradoxically, however, the reason behind the repetition of attacks is the future 
repetition of attacks. Here, Derrida speaks about “a language that admits its 
powerlessness and so is reduced to pronouncing mechanically a date, repeating it 
endlessly, as a kind of ritual incantation, a conjuring poem, a journalistic litany or 
rhetorical refrain that admits to not knowing what it’s talking about” (Derrida, 2003, p. 
86). This drive to repeat and remember has something to do with forgetting itself: 
inscription of the event to a calendar paradoxically but necessarily involves the 
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effacement of the event. In this juncture, however, the decisive move for the oscillation 
between inscription and effacement belongs to the machinery of spectacle.  
The attacks signed by a single name-date are consequently reduced to a thing resisting 
comprehension, castrating the symbolic system. Reminding the symbolic targets of the 
attacks, Marc Redfield claims that the act of naming an event with a date seems to 
suggest that the attacks also did some damage to the process of symbolisation itself 
(Redfield, 2007, p. 56). Redfield, in this regard, quotes Dominick LaCapra’s reflections 
on Shoah, who speaks about a “silence that is not mere mutism but intricately related to 
representation” (Redfield, 2008, p. 221). As Judith Butler suggests, this impossible 
work of mourning haunted by a crisis of sorrow and grief is ready to turn into a rage 
(Butler, 2004, p. 17). In this context, a date itself can become the easy and ready-to-use 
justification for patriotic crimes. This is because what is inflicted with the real and 
symbolic attacks is not only the personal identity but also the national identity of the 
self. The sovereign investment thus finds its target in a paradoxical way and the 
victimised nation is inflicted by the media discourses, if not directly by the terrorist 
attacks. Moreover, in the case of the US public, this investment obviously is not only 
for the sake of the existence, unity and survival of the nation but also of “the humanity” 
in a global sense. It is in this regard almost impossible to detect the limits of not only 
the shock caused by 9/11 but of the national territory or national interests of the United 
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States. The vulnerability of the “omnipotent” super-power is thus felt all over the globe 
since the world order in general depends upon the guarantor role of the super-power of 
the US. Butler in this context speaks about the loss of the grandiose fantasies of the First 
Worldism in the face of attacks (Butler, 2004, p. 10).  
Derrida insists on English in his interview not only because the injunction of naming the 
event with a date comes from the US media or from a place where English dominates. 
Rather, he asserts, English is the language predominating the globe in a very substantial 
way (Derrida, 2003, p. 88): In academy as well as popular culture, in international 
institutions as well as international law, and in economy and politics, English is the 
main source of all referential materials which we rely on in our daily and intellectual 
exchange. Leaving aside the other implications of this linguistic domination, he claims 
that the global political discourse itself is clearly linked to the Anglo-American idiom 
(Derrida, 2003, p. 88). This is not only about the traditions and conventions of the 
diplomatic, economic and military institutions depending upon the historic power of 
British Empire and the US. English is the source of a system of interpretation with its 
lexicon, logic, rhetoric and terminology, allowing the global public to understand and 
evaluate the attacks. Like it is the case in any other event that gives us the impression of 
a major event, world’s public space is predominated by this system in an 
overwhelmingly hegemonic fashion.  
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One could claim that even the adversaries of the prevailing discourses, the critical 
voices need to be articulated in this system if they need to be heard by the global public. 
Because it is this system in which the media discourses and the rhetoric of politicians 
circulate, the very authority of this system legitimizes the words, logic and rhetoric, 
hence the norms about violence, crime, war and terrorism. As the “critical essence” of 
the US hegemony, English defines the supposed differences “between war and 
terrorism, national and international terrorism, state and non-state terrorism,” and hence 
definitive in its judgement of any apparently meaningful phrase. (Derrida, 2003, p. 88)  
In this respect, it is interesting to note that this whole system of interpretation gives us 
the impression that September 11 is a major event in the course of history whereas it 
leads us to forget, efface or unknow another September 11 of 1973 when Salvador 
Allende was overthrown in a US backed coup that caused “one of the worst reigns of 
terror in the twentieth century” (Redfield, 2008, p. 224). There can be many other 
examples of mass murders and crimes that were not even recorded, not counted as 
unforgettable major events. Yet, as the product of this global information system, 
September 11 or its numerical version, 9/11 becomes sublimated, tabooed and elevated 
above other ordinary crimes against “humanity.”  
For Derrida, such a system cannot be self-existent but it depends upon an international 
system that he would call mondialisation in French instead of the term’s English version 
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‘globalisation’. This system is what determines the limits, the scale and scope of the 
influence of any major historical event as well as September 11. In this regard, focusing 
on what makes an event a major one in the course of history is not only a question of 
historiography or history of philosophy but also of media and information systems. In 
the case of September 11, Derrida draws attention to the US’s special and peculiar place 
and role in this system: Even the adversaries of the US are influenced by September 11 
just because the US has a guaranteeing role, the role of a guarantor in the world order 
(Derrida, 2003, p. 93). Though vulnerable from various aspects, the relative stability of 
the world order largely depends on the credibility of the power of the US not only in 
economic, political or technical levels but also in terms of discursive logic and 
axiomatic of juridical and diplomatic rhetoric in a global extent. The role of the US in 
the world order is “in principle and in the last resort, is supposed to assure credit in 
general, credit in the sense of financial transactions but also the credit granted to 
languages, laws, political or diplomatic transactions” (Derrida, 2003, p. 94). The US 
acquires this role not only due to its wealth or its technological or military power but 
also through its role as an arbitrator in international and even sometimes domestic 
conflicts as an outcome of its dominant presence in international institutions such as 
UN. In this regard, Derrida defines the US as “the sovereign among sovereign states” 
(Derrida, 2003, p. 94). 
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This is why the attacks of September 11 “touches the geopolitical unconscious of every 
living being” in a global sense (Derrida, 2003, p. 99). To destabilise the guarantor of 
this prevailing world order means to risk destabilising the entire system including the 
well-known enemies of the US. The transgression of the US soil with a terrorist attack, 
then, would be interpreted as a transgression and violation of the world order, that is, an 
attack against the world-ing of the world: “I am keeping the French word 
mondialisation in preference to ‘globalization’ or Globalisierung so as to maintain a 
reference to the world -monde, Welt, mundus- which is neither the globe nor the 
cosmos” (Derrida, 2002, p. 23). Mondialisation is about the very possibility of a world 
acting as a world, a world that renders any worldwide effort from a universal language 
to world market and from international law to any worldwide movement. The 
worldwide influence of September 11, then, is derived from the mondialisation and the 
specific role of the victimised US in this particular world-ing of the world.  
The wound opened by the terrorist attacks of September 11, however, does not only 
belong to a past but remains open before the future and it is this future that determines 
the unappropriability of the event (Derrida, 2003, p. 97). The wound is the sign of what 
might or perhaps will take place, which will be worse than what has taken place. It is 
the risk and threat expected from a future haunting the present. The temporality of the 
trauma does not proceed from the present or a past left behind but from an 
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unappropriable future in the sense that ‘the thing’ opened the wound and left it forever 
open in the unconscious of the identity (Derrida, 2003, p. 97). The traumatic experience 
thus wounds the future as well as the present no matter how much we repeat the name-
date as a mantra to keep the individual as well as the national and even, global identity 
and identifications safe. 
2.3 Global Spectacle after September 11 
The notion of spectacle as it was introduced in the Society of Spectacle (1967) of Guy 
Debord is mostly associated with fascist culture of 1930s and the consumerism of late 
capitalism. In his writings dating back to 1967, Debord analysed two forms of 
spectacles: Concentrated spectacle and diffused spectacle. In Comments on the Society 
of the Spectacle (1988), however, he emphasised a third, contemporary form that 
incorporates the elements of both concentrated and diffused spectacles. That integrated 
spectacle combines features of concentrated spectacle which is mostly associated with 
bureaucratic capitalism and fascist culture, and diffused spectacle that designates the 
later stages of consumer capitalism. Despite the distinction he introduces between the 
concentrated and diffused spectacles, in Comments, he warned his readers that at the 
times of crisis the techniques of the former can also be adopted by the late capitalist 
systems. In the same book, Debord reserved a whole section for terrorism as part of his 
Sovereign Power After September 11 
 
 
54  Emre Barca - June 2020 
 
 
reconsiderations of spectacle of the contemporary age. After readdressing the spectacle 
and introducing the new type of spectacle to his readers, Debord wrote a considerable 
deal on terrorism and its place in contemporary democracies. What he offers in his 
books still seems to be in effect particularly after the September 11 attacks. This is why, 
following Debord, some critical scholars tend to define the contemporary with “the 
spectacle of fear” (Kosovic, 2011) as well as “the spectacle of terror” and of terrorism 
(Giroux, 2006).  
For Henry Giroux, a new type of spectacle, the spectacle of terrorism “has emerged in 
the post-9/11 world, inaugurated by the video images of the hijacked planes crashing 
into the World Trade Centre” (Giroux, 2006, p. 20). Reminding Baudrillard’s comments 
on the radicalisation of the relationship between the image and reality, Giroux claims 
that September 11 attacks designate a structural transformation in the power of the 
image, constituting a new space for a novel kind of cultural politics. The spectacle of 
terrorism is an expression of this new cultural politics largely constructed around fear, 
violence and terror. In this regard, Giroux distinguishes older Debordian notions of 
spectacle from the spectacle of terrorism of our age, even though he is cautious in 
stating that “the terror of the spectacle and the spectacle of terrorism are neither 
completely divorced from each other nor suggestive of a complete historical break in 
that they overlap and coexist” (Giroux, 2006, p. 23). The older accounts of spectacle, 
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for Giroux, appeal to a sense of unity that serves integration of populace into state 
power with racial, nationalistic or market-based references. In doing so, the 
concentrated and diffused spectacles as well as the integrated spectacle downplay the 
role of politics and power in creating a society-to-come in harmony with the society’s 
consent. In these older accounts, even if they are not eliminated, appeals to politics and 
power relations are concealed under the mask of solidarity and conformity. However, 
the spectacle of terrorism requires a politics in which terror is the central word for the 
definition and justification of sovereignty as well as for the creation of a new subject 
constructed around fear and terror with overabounding daily images of both security and 
insecurity (Giroux, 2006, p. 22). 
In this way, the spectacle of terrorism legitimates a notion of sovereignty that has the 
power and capacity to semi-officially declare “who is safe and who is not, who is 
worthy of citizenship and who is a threat, who can occupy the space of safety and who 
cannot, and ultimately who may live and who must die” (Giroux, 2006, p. 22). The 
success of the spectacle of terrorism not only lies in the fact that terrorist counter-
spectacles go hand in hand with the mainstream spectacle of terrorism but also that it 
works with its powerful “image added with the thrill of the real.” Combining terror and 
security in itself, all these elements of this new type of spectacle, for Giroux, give rise to 
new antidemocratic social relations since the spectacle is “not a collection of images” 
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but “a social relation between people that is mediated by images” (Debord, 2005, p. 7). 
In the global society of the spectacle of terrorism, where a politics of consent covering 
almost all aspects of life is being constructed by new as well as traditional 
communication technologies, the spectacles of fascism and of consumer culture merge 
into one dominant spectacle of terrorism particularly after September 11. Giroux 
wonders how Debord would react to this new spectacle that combines the elements of 
consumerism and securitisation, since the spectacle of terrorism affirms a sort of politics 
in a perverted way with its continuous references to terror, violence, war and death 
(Giroux, 2006, p. 27). The social consensus once created around the nation, race and the 
market is now built upon fear not only for oneself but also for the society and the future 
to a large extent.  
According to Nicholas de Genova, however, a spectacle of security accompanies the 
spectacle of terrorism even though Giroux does not differentiate the two (De Genova, 
2011, p. 142). Therefore, Debord’s critique should be furthered considering the fusion 
of commodity fetishism with the fetishism of the state. De Genova claims that the 
fetishism of the image of the commodity is accompanied by a fetishism of state since 
the force of the spectacle should always refer to the coercive force of the state. In this 
manner, the spectacle of terrorism is inseparable from the spectacle of security in which 
the message is the same: “Be scared.” No matter how much we are scared, however, we 
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should not abandon our duties as citizen-spectators of the events: “Watch, be scared, 
share, consume, obey and enjoy.” To ensure that each title in this list is checked, what is 
needed is heightened insecurity to be convinced that the state is the most precious and 
necessary organisation before the threats we face. In this manner, more sovereign power 
is pre-emptively assured by securitisation and militarisation of everyday life at the 
expense of the freedoms and rights that have a history to be forgotten.  
What is common in those narratives of spectacle is the inevitable reference to the 
reappearance of evil in our age. Unlike the evil of the Cold War period, the source of 
post-September 11 evil is the fundamentalist terrorist whom we should be afraid of and 
protected against. Unsurprisingly, however, the fear of evil produced by the spectacle 
posits the state as the only friend and saviour against the evil. In this way, the 
securitisation of everyday life at the cost of freedoms and rights is automatically 
justified as inevitable, if not already good in its essence. For Debord, in order to be 
judged not by the outcomes of its dominance but by its enemies, the perfect 
democracies construct an inconceivable foe (Debord, 2011, p. 24). By this public enemy 
in the eyes of the populace, the state justifies itself in a magical effect affirming its very 
existence as absolute and necessary against the evil. This is a spectacle particularly 
produced by the state and therefore highly informative in its construction of the enemy 
and the self. What is interesting is that the states reach a supplementary spectacle about 
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themselves as well as the original spectacle of the evil itself. As Baudrillard claims, 
however, the Manichean understanding of the war between good and evil only amounts 
to the cease of being ‘good’ in order to thwart the evil (Baudrillard, 2002, pp. 13-4). 
This is in fact what happens after the September 11 attacks: “seizing for itself a global 
monopoly of power, it gives rise, by that very fact, to a blowback of proportionate 
violence” (Baudrillard, 2002, p. 14). A spectacle of terrorism accompanies the domestic 
and global violence, through which the spectators know only something about terrorism 
ensuring that they must know and see enough to convince them that anything else is 
acceptable but terrorism. For Debord, this is the basic logic of spectacle of terrorism: 
The task of it is not only to fight against the counter-spectacle of terrorism but also to 
consolidate the current position of sovereign power (Debord, 2011). 
The images accumulated in the form of spectacle of terrorism invest in creating 
emotions, particularly fear against the evil with historical references to barbarism and 
inhumanity. In a more negative way, however, it also tries to assure the control over the 
image via secrecy and censorship that is effectual not only for famous artists but also for 
the members of the academy or press. All in all, for Debord, ignorance and instruction 
in the spectacles of terrorism are not antagonistic factors but complementary to each 
other both in their isolation and display. In this regard, the spectacle has its own 
paradoxical dialectic between remembrance and forgetting in order to isolate what “it 
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shows from its context, its past, its intentions and its consequences” (Debord, 2011, p. 
28). Starting with the rational information and commentary on the recent past, the 
spectacle’s aim is to organise and manage the ignorance of what happens. Yet, for 
Debord, “spectacular domination’s first priority is to eradicate historical knowledge in 
general” (Debord, 2011, p. 13). It is not surprising, then, the anti-spectacle philosopher 
Noam Chomsky begins his narrative about September 11 with a long history of crimes 
and atrocities perpetrated by the US globally. This is because the blank references to a 
name-date can only serve the politics of forgetting which aims at suppressing the 
political imagination by abrogating the history as part of a possible social critique. 
Indeed, all the efforts to suppress history try to ensure the forgetfulness of “the spirit of 
history” within the society as a whole. To hide the potential relations between the 
political crimes and social critique, all types of criticism are rapidly reduced to a 
complicity with terrorism. Because only in this way can the spectacle hide its own 
complicity. 
The spectacle presents itself as “the reality” that should be the agenda of the whole 
society for an indefinite period of time that is impossible to measure. As the image 
should flow in a speed imitating the reality of the world within a virtual fluidity, the 
spectacle always posits and imposes itself as a positivity in substitute of life itself. For 
Debord, this can never be questioned since “what appears is good,” and “what is good 
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appears” in the eternal machine of the spectacle (Debord, 2005, pp. 9-10). Without 
allowing any response in its fluidity, the spectacle dominates the realm of appearances 
in a sort of flat and positivistic precision which does not assume the historical choices 
but undeniable facts. When only what is immediate has a social significance, the society 
is always under a noisy in-significance of events, always one replacing the other, but 
always without leaving a mark, being recorded in neither memory nor history (Debord, 
2011, p. 15). It is the parade of spectacles that makes the societies of the spectacle 
inconsiderate in the face of unverifiable conspiracy theories, uncheckable statistics and 
irrational discourses about terrorism as well as anything else. Security or other kinds of 
experts are always ready to serve in order to offer a reassurance in the face of any 
seeming crisis which does not deserve the name of crisis considering the very crisis of 
forgetting the recent past. 
Inasmuch as the history is the knowledge for understanding, at least in part, what is 
happening, what is possible and what is to come, it is also the measure of novelty in that 
particular age. Suppressing history gives the spectacle the chance to designate what is 
novel according to its own aims and conceal the progress of its novel ways to dominate. 
“It is in the interests of those who sell novelty at any price to eradicate the means of 
measuring it.” (Debord, 2011, p. 15). The spectacle of terrorism in this sense justifies 
the conditions of the existing securitisation regime and the goals of the state and the 
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corporate power in both form and content. Since the spectacle monopolises the time 
outside the production, this justification becomes omnipresent, strictly separating the 
possible from the permitted. Hence, it does not only inherently attack and assimilate the 
history but also the future by delimiting the political imagination with “undeniable” 
facts and “necessities” of survival.  
For Debord, the spectacle is a global phenomenon since the states are the parts of the 
same game. Even though they are presented as fundamental antagonisms, the seeming 
struggles for control among the states as well as different powers of an existing system 
actually reflect the unity of the system both internationally and within each nation. The 
archaic oppositions such as regionalism, racism and nationalism can be revived by the 
spectacle (of terrorism) but not at the expense of the existing socio-economic system. 
This is why, for Debord, the spectacle is “the map of this new world, a map that is 
identical to the territory it represents” (Debord, 2005, p. 27). In this regard, the lack of 
consensus about the definition of terrorism on a global scale is not about the nature of 
the phenomenon as the security experts would suggest, but because of the states’ abuse 
of their power of monopolising the right to define who is terrorist according to whose 
agenda. The comedy of defining terrorism in the conflicts such as Russia-Chechenia or 
Israel-Palestine, as well as in Syria extends to a level whereby non-violent opposition 
groups are labelled as terrorists in cases such as Turkey (Eleftheriou-Smith, 2016). 
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Nevertheless, “history itself haunts modern society like a spectre,” whereas “pseudo-
histories have to be concocted at every level of life-consumption in order to preserve the 
threatened equilibrium of the present frozen time” (Debord, 2005, p. 110). The history 
of the inequalities and atrocities in both national, regional and global level is this history 
haunting the modern societies of our age. In this regard, the spectacle is not a 
metaphysical or transcendental obstacle but subjection of social life to the hegemony of 
images of terror and security which leads to a form of cultural politics of the day. The 
distinctive form of politics of today is the formation and organisation of the state and 
spectacle in compliance with securitisation of everyday life. The tension between the 
fear and enjoyment finds a unique blend in today’s spectacle which tries to combine 
consumerist enjoyment with the sado-masochistic enjoyment of images of terror, 
violence and death. 
2.4 Counter-Spectacle after September 11 
What was manifested in the sacrificial image-event of September 11 was not just death 
but a spectacle created with the death of the self and the others in one single ‘real-time’ 
event. The televised and globally transmitted image exploited the media machine of the 
system that is, for Baudrillard, nothing but a pool of free floating, autonomous 
signifiers, simulational models and artificial codes (Wilcox, 2006, p. 90). Transcending 
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this system in an artistic way, the terrorists of 9/11 responded to this regime of infinite 
images, exchange of sign and spectacle in a tremendously spectacular way. This is, for 
Baudrillard, “the spectacle of terrorism against the terrorism of the spectacle” in our 
virtual age.  
In the novel Mao II by Don DeLillo (DeLillo, 1992), the protagonist, novelist Bill Gray, 
complains about the fact that in this age it is not the novels or artworks that “alter the 
inner life of culture” but terrorist acts “making raids in human consciousness” (Wilcox, 
2006, p. 89). Bill Gray laments not only about the terrorist acts but about the age in 
total, in which “modernist” novels cannot be popular whereas the terrorist act is more 
effective than the art in its intervention to the system of exchange. DeLillo, thus, 
parodies the romantic modernist nostalgia of the novelist who is helpless in the face of 
the spectacle of terrorism of our contemporary age. Even though written ten years 
before September 11, 2001, the Mao II portraits the world after September 11 in which 
the spectacle of terrorism haunts the course of our daily life in various images 
disseminated by the spectacular machine of affect. For Baudrillard, this age must have 
begun with September 11 for it is the most spectacular terrorist act in the history as well 
as the initiator of a new era in which the spectacles of terrorism and fear abound 
(Baudrillard, 2002, p. 12). In the post-September 11, the spectacle of terrorism 
continued to intervene the exchange of signs in the system with a seemingly pre-modern 
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brutality but through ultra-modern instruments and media as exemplified in the use of 
some short videos disseminated through social networks. 
More than a decade after the September 11, on 19 August 2014, a video lasting 4 
minutes and 40 seconds appeared on one of the social media platforms related with the 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS). Entitled as “A Message to America” the 
short video was displaying the beheading of an American photojournalist by a black-
clad militant and warning the US president about the air strikes made. The video 
concludes with the reappearance of the black-clad militant, this time with another 
kneeling hostage in his hands. Despite the efforts to censor the images, the videos have 
spread quickly on social media platforms and created a significant effect not only for the 
individual spectators but also for the political decisions followed the video-events (Friis, 
2015, p. 726). Hanna Kozlowska from New York Times described the video as “a 
modern guillotine execution spectacle, with YouTube as the town square” (Kozlowska, 
2014). Display of cropped screenshots from the videos in both traditional and the new 
media established a new image that became a symbol for the new brand terrorism of the 
ISIS: The images of the kneeling orange-clad hostage with a black-clad ISIS militant 
have become the predominant visual icon in the service of war against the ISIS.  
The great deal of attention devoted to these videos displays the ways in which visual 
imagery and media play a significant role in contemporary warfare and how the 
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spectacle machine itself is exploited by the terrorists in brand new ways. This is a 
legacy of Al-Qaeda for the new brand of transnational terrorism, namely the ISIS. 
Nonetheless, the IS interpreted the legacy of Al-Qaeda in its own way: Unlike Al-Qaeda 
which does not have claims for sovereignty over a territory, declaring the caliphate and 
imitating a state, the IS played the role of the sovereign. Its methodology of spectacle, 
too, was diversified and institutionalised in the form of social media marketing. In this 
respect, the ISIS was one of the most well-known brands of our age with a minimum of 
investment but a maximum effort in brutality and death. Taking its main force from 
death, the ISIS was an enviable success for any to-be-brand body striving for 
establishing a ‘real’ presence in social media networks, creating a brand, and producing 
an affect among its followers. An expert working for the social analytics company 
Brandwatch argues “ISIS' strength lies in the recognisability of its brand, the reach of its 
network, and its capacity to boost its Twitter presence through a combination of 
carefully crafted "official" messages, as well as the buzz and volume of fans sharing 
content across the globe” (Speri, 2014). Their basic method in marketing their brand 
was combining death, revenge and the collective fears many centuries old with the 
modern production and distribution techniques to create a powerful method of 
communication. Using a modern medium in an advanced level and blending a pre-
modern form of punishment such as beheading, the ISIS did not only give a message to 
its audience but also tried to recruit young Muslims from all over the world to join its 
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cause in the name of an authentic and original Islam (Speri, 2014). In this sense, the 
ISIS video marketing was quite different than the spectacle of September 11 attacks. 
Yet, both goes in the same direction in their seemingly pre-modern, inhumane brutality 
with ultra-modern instrumentalization of death.  
What is worth noting in this theatre of violence as spectacle is that it actually mimics 
the visual politics of ‘officially declared’ war of sovereign states in both primitive and 
contemporary ways. Even though it finds its unique methods and ways to perform 
effectively, the counter-spectacle of terrorism works against the spectacle by imitating it 
in several ways. What is common in both spectacle and counter-spectacle is their 
particular reference to the ‘real’ in its extremity and to moral absolutes in the form of 
dichotomies, such as hero vs. terrorist, believer vs. infidel. In both cases, a friend/enemy 
distinction apparent in the audio-visual representations aims at wiping out “any sense of 
uncertainty, need for thoughtful debate, and reason itself” (Giroux, 2014). Either in the 
name of an original and authentic Islam or democracy and human rights, these 
distinctions do not leave an open door for further reflection but only aim at 
consolidating and empowering the status quo. This is both valid for the video 
productions of the ISIS as well as the established global media networks. 
Indeed, after September 11 attacks, image-based mass media as well as the new media 
have acquired a novel and powerful force reconfiguring the nature of politics and 
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cultural production. Un-neutral images of terror and violence, and the audio-visual 
representations of spectacular violence have not only challenged the domestic politics 
but also the global power relations, since “audio-visual mode has become our primary 
way of coming in contact with the world and at the same time being detached (safe) 
from it” (Giroux, 2006, p. 17). These audio-visual representations radically transformed 
the relationship between the locality and specificity of a particular event and its public 
display and reception by opening the event to a global audience via visual mediation. In 
this sense, the counter-spectacle of September 11 is inevitably a multiple-spectacle since 
it is recorded, re-conditioned and re-distributed by the spectacle itself. As designed and 
carried out as a counter-spectacle if not a work of art the response of the spectacle 
machine to the counter-spectacle is recording, representing and redistributing, hence re-
constituting it in its own terms. It is, thus, a war of spectacles professionally carried on 
in contemporary warfare, even if there is no winner of this harsh contest of 
miscommunication through violence and death. 
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3 Globalisation and 
Sovereignty after 
September 11 
In 2002, a year after September 11 attacks, Kofi Annan, the former General Secretary of 
the United Nations, listed the abuses committed by the nation-states since the beginning 
of the war on terror: “To demonize political opponents, to throttle freedom of speech 
and the press, and to delegitimize legitimate political grievances.” Then he added “we 
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are seeing too many cases where States living in tension with their neighbours make 
opportunistic use of the fight against terrorism to threaten or justify new military action 
on long-running disputes. Similarly, States fighting various forms of unrest or 
insurgency are finding it tempting to abandon the slow, difficult, but sometimes 
necessary processes of political negotiation, for the deceptively easy option of military 
action” (Acharya, 2014, p. 128). The list by Annan covers not only the abuses of states 
that are part of the coalition of the willing but also the other states that are “unrelated” 
with September 11 attacks. Therefore, this list is in need of a great deal of extension 
given that approximately 650,000 were killed in Iraq, 110,000 in Afghanistan and the 
thousands have been detained, tortured and injured across the globe. Within this 
context, this chapter focuses on the questions of state and sovereignty after September 
11. It seeks answers to the questions how and in what ways do diverse states react and 
respond to the attacks in relation to pre- and post-September 11 global conjuncture?; 
How did they utilise the grievous attacks in order to gain more power in their own 
territory as well as in the international political realm? 
3.1 Empire after September 11 
In their well-known book Empire (Hardt & Negri, 2000), Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri made a claim also shared by some other scholars focusing on globalisation in 
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harmony with the days academic fashion. Accordingly, as nation-state sovereignties 
were in decline, a new formation on global scale was on rise: They called this new 
formation “Empire” with reference to the imperial history of the West. Drawing on this 
claim, they argued that a new era has begun while the old one is in decay; the global 
order was structured by a new logic and rule that is not dominated by the powers of 
nation-states but by supranational organisms. Old imperialist forms of domination such 
as divisions between centres and peripheries, and reliance on fixed boundaries were left 
behind with the post-Cold War period. In accordance with this line of thought, in the 
Empire, nation-states were not anymore at the centre of the global political order and 
even the United States was not an exception, they claimed: “No state can today, form 
the centre of an imperialist project.” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. xiv). Nevertheless, in 
Multitude (Hardt & Negri, 2004), which was published a few years after September 11, 
they had to reconsider their claim as the Empire thesis was challenged by a new and 
challenging development in the global realm. That was nothing but the consequence of 
the first years of post-September 11 and the War on Terror: The unilateralism and 
exceptionalism of the United States after September 11 and the rising arguments about 
“the reassertion of nation-states” forced them to construct a new defence of the Empire 
with the re-awakening of old imperialism or neo-imperialism theses.  
Indeed, following the attacks of September 11, diverse scholars interpreted the 
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declaration of War on Terror, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the strict 
security measures taken at the cost of repressing the populations as the return of the 
imperialism (Reid, 2005). It is widely claimed, in the Left as well as in the Right, that 
Western nation-states are reasserting themselves not only militarily but also politically 
since September 11. As particularly the United States has been associated with and 
accused of applying a traditional form of imperialism with the war on terror, the 
insufficient postmodern criticisms focusing on decentralisation, fluidity and complexity 
have been overruled. In sum, the September 11 attacks were claimed to cause a 
regression in international politics, whereby new fashion interpretations were 
disregarded as the old imperialism thesis revived.   
In Multitude, they tried to respond to the challenges and criticisms addressed above by 
reserving a whole chapter to the question of war. Hardt and Negri’s comments in that 
book -particularly significant for the defence of their original thesis of Empire- are also 
illustrative of the complex relationships of sovereignty and power characterising the 
post-September 11. Repeating their original claim stated in Empire, they resisted the 
idea that sovereignty and nation-states are back in power in international politics, and 
they noted that the conditions and the nature of war have also been changing in the 
Empire. Along these lines, they defined innumerable armed conflicts in the international 
political realm not as wars but rather as civil wars (Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. 3). Drawing 
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from the idea that the war, in traditional terms, is waged against a sovereign state by 
another sovereign state, they formulated contemporary conflicts the states are involved 
as civil wars. Different than traditional wars, the war on terror, after all, has been waged 
against the non-sovereign combatants beyond a single territory. In this light, Hardt and 
Negri offered that the wars in question are not isolated wars but designate a new 
condition of global war that erodes the distinction between war and peace.  
In this global warfare, nowhere is in peace for the war is not waged in a single territory 
and the new conditions of sovereignty pull the war into the public realm unlike the old 
wars. The old wars, traditional international relations literature suggests, were expelled 
from the internal national social field. Accepted as an exception, wars were limited to 
sovereign nation-states whereas the internal conflicts were resolved politically (Hardt & 
Negri, 2004, p. 6). According to this definition of the wars, the enemy was outside the 
sovereign state and the inside-outside distinction was what determined the means that 
can legally be used in internal and/or external conflicts. Wars, in this regard, were 
isolated in space and time in line with the traditional conceptions of modern 
sovereignty. As this conception is challenged by the new global forces, the character of 
post-modern wars has also changed. Rather than being exceptions outside the borders of 
nation-state territories, in post-September 11 world, wars became a rule pervading both 
international relations and the homeland. In this sense, war became a permanent social 
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relation, the primary organising principle of the society and the regime of biopower 
(Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. 8).  
For Hardt and Negri, this new form of war is a war that not only brings death but also 
produces lives. As a form of rule, this war aims at controlling the population by 
producing and reproducing the social life (Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. 13). Mobilising 
various social forces, this war suspends and limits ordinary political exchange for it was 
claimed to be indeterminate both temporally and spatially. The first consequence of this 
war is, thus, to create and maintain a social order with recourse to different types of 
violence. The second consequence of the new form of war is the emergent and 
increasing resemblance between foreign relations and internal politics of the nation-
states (Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. 14). Along these lines, a vague conception of security 
brought military and police activity closer to each other and the distinction between the 
inside and outside has been blurring. A third consequence is the changing conditions of 
enmity and friendship: The definition of enemy is now abstract and unlimited whereas 
friendship is expansive and potentially universal (Hardt & Negri, 2004, p. 43). All these 
consequences convinced Hardt and Negri that the warfare state of post-September 11 
aims at complete control of the society which itself turned into a society of war. Under 
these conditions, even the professedly most democratic societies have become 
authoritarian, violent and lawless.  
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In 2004, Hardt and Negri tried to respond to criticisms and the return of the imperialism 
thesis with these vivid illustrations of post-September 11 world. However, in 
Commonwealth (Hardt & Negri, 2009) after the obvious failure of invasions of 
Afghanistan and Iraq, they were much more self-assured about their original thesis. So 
much so that they named the fourth chapter of their book as “Empire Returns” (Hardt & 
Negri, 2009, pp. 203-60). In this chapter, they defended their original thesis much more 
confidently and this time they were the ones calling history to the witness against the 
revival of imperialism and nation-state theses. For them, recent developments of the 
time were proving them right whereas they seemed to be more defensive about their 
thesis during the first years of the war on terror when the Multitude was published. 
Hardt and Negri described this particular period of time as an attempt of coup d’état in 
the formation of Empire and announced the failure of primal attempter, the United 
States (Hardt & Negri, 2009, p. 205). Reiterating their original thesis, they claimed that 
at the end of the millennium, a new global formation has emerged, yet some global 
forces, particularly the United States government, have resisted and attempted to repress 
this formation. Instead of confronting the empire head-on, they tried to revive the ghosts 
of the last millennium such as imperial conquest, national glory, unilateralism and 
exceptionalism (Hardt & Negri, 2009, p. 203). Even though this attempt led to a great 
deal of violence and pain throughout the globe, it failed dramatically not only militarily 
but also politically and economically.  
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Hardt and Negri defined this failure as one of the most significant events of the first 
decade of the new millennium. This failure did not only show that it is impossible to 
repress the new global formation called Empire, but it also revealed that no single 
nation-state including the United States can unilaterally reverse this process (Hardt & 
Negri, 2009, p. 209). This statement also means that there is no return to old systems 
and/or imperialisms which rely on the ‘absolute’ sovereignty of nation-states. After the 
failure of the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq and the following financial crisis, Hardt 
and Negri was now sure that the US-led coup d’état aiming at transforming the Empire 
into an imperialism was buried in the history. More significantly, however, they also 
claimed that something catastrophic triggered this attempt to legitimize the toppling of 
power. This something catastrophic was obviously September 11 attacks on the World 
Trade Centre and Pentagon. In the narrative of Hardt and Negri, September 11 attacks 
provided justification for the application of state of emergency within the global system. 
Only after these attacks, the United States was able to reclaim the imperial role it wants 
to play. Nevertheless, this dangerous attempt of the United States government, which 
was impossible to succeed, inevitably failed. 
Following up Empire, Multitude and Commonwealth, Hardt and Negri published 
another book called Assembly (Hardt & Negri, 2017). Unsurprisingly, the authors of 
Assembly once again evaluated the latest developments in the Empire and directly 
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responded to the criticisms that assert the return of old sovereignty and imperialism 
theses. Referring to the out of control appearance of the new regime of Empire, this 
time they claimed that many from both Right and Left prematurely stated that nation-
state sovereignty is back after the attacks of September 11. In rush to respond the 
terrorist attacks and threats, globalisation, porous borders and waning sovereignty of the 
nation-states were openly blamed. The temptation to see the attacks of September 11 as 
a consequence of the global condition undermining traditional state sovereignty by 
allowing the porous borders and promoting multi-culturalist and liberal values seems to 
create a wish for regression. In this regard, the multiple-targeted war on terror was also 
supported, if not performed, as a defence of the nation-state sovereignty as well as the 
international system relying on it. 
Nevertheless, as the authors of the Assembly offer, the global hegemony of the United 
States is in a terminal crisis which cannot be overcome, and the original hypothesis that 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union even the United States cannot be a unilateral 
power on a global scale was confirmed by the historical facts. Instead, an Empire 
composed of “nation-states, supranational institutions, the dominant corporations, 
nonstate powers, and others” (Hardt & Negri, 2017, p. 264) is in power, though 
incomplete. In its incompleteness, resembling the capitalism, Empire contains within 
itself various forms of traditional social and economic orders. The idea that the older 
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forms of domination can survive with the newer ways of Empire explains the 
conjectural roaring back of nation-state sovereignty as well as the endurance of the 
Empire. Indeed, Hardt and Negri clearly state that the nation-states and globalisation are 
not mutually exclusive and thus, it is possible to think of a “mixed” structure combining 
the Empire and the sovereign nation-states (Hardt & Negri, 2017, p. 264). For them, 
however, if the return of the nation-state were real its consequences would be more 
catastrophic than the current state of affairs. That displays the hope they see in Empire, 
a hope that constitutes a significant aspect of their original thesis. 
3.2  Walling Sovereignty 
A 2004 article written by Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes may exemplify the above-
mentioned criticisms towards Hardt and Negri’s conceptions of Empire and sovereignty 
(Laffey & Weldes, 2004). In this article, the authors insist heavily that borders, 
boundaries, barriers and fortifications are the signs of empowerment of sovereignty of 
nation-states. Drawing on examples from Europe and South Africa, they claim that 
despite Hardt and Negri’s thesis, “borders continue to matter” in different parts of the 
world. Nevertheless, in 2010, Wendy Brown would claim the opposite asserting that the 
walls and barriers in question are the utmost signs of the waning sovereignty of nation-
states (Brown, 2010). Examining walls and barriers around the world, in Walled States, 
Sovereign Power After September 11 
 
 
78  Emre Barca - June 2020 
 
 
Waning Sovereignty (2010), Brown states that more walls are on the way: Barrier 
around the Spanish enclave of Melilla in Morocco, US-Mexico border, the Israeli wall 
in Jerusalem, India-Bangladesh border fence, Indian-Pakistan border fence, Saudi 
barrier at the border with Yemen, barriers in Baghdad and so on (Brown, 2010, pp. 19-
20). For Brown, all these walls built recently are the signatures of an explicit 
dissonance. The walls’ physicality, obduracy and pre-modern appearance is highly 
remarkable and paradoxical in an age defined by networks, virtuality and liquidity. This 
contradiction, Brown argues, is immanent in globalisation which hosts competing 
features such as physical and virtual power, secrecy and transparency, and 
territorialisation and deterritorialisation. Hence, Brown, from the very beginning, 
challenges a vision that is positing a final erosion of nation-states by globalisation but 
rather she refers to a period of time in which the conflicts between national interests and 
global market as well as the nation and the state prevail (Brown, 2010).  
Focusing on the walls and barriers all around the world, Brown claims that these 
particular practices of nation-states to empower national borders display the fact that 
nation-states are seeking concrete ways to defend and claim their abstract and waning 
sovereignty. Finding these efforts characteristic to a certain period of time, that is, post-
September 11, she states that in the face of transnational flows of capital, people, ideas 
and so on, nation-states performatively build walls and barriers. In this regard, she 
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argues, all these walls are not built against traditional sovereign states but against 
transnational actors. Unlike the old walls built against an invading army of a sovereign 
state, these walls react transnationally, rather than internationally (Brown, 2010, p. 21). 
Indeed, in the official discourses trying to gain popular support for these walls, 
terrorists, criminals and refugees are the primary targets. Thus, Brown argues that these 
walls belong to a post-Westphalian world in which sovereign nation-states are 
threatened by not other states but transnational actors. Within this perspective, she 
asserts that the monopoly of nation-states is largely compromised by transnational flows 
tearing the borders of them. Yet, neither she does claim that sovereignty is eliminated 
from the political map, nor she comfortably declares the beginning of a post-sovereign 
age. Brown’s message is rather nuanced in its extent: “As nation-state sovereignty 
wanes, states and sovereignty do not simply decline in power of significance, but 
instead come apart from one another” (Brown, 2010, p. 23). In Brown’s account, states 
persist as important actors, but they are non-sovereign in their acts. On the other hand, 
she finds the traces of sovereignty in two other domains of power: Political economy 
and religiously legitimated violence. Defining sovereignty with certain characteristics 
such as supremacy and autonomy, Brown claims that political economy and God-
sanctioned violence do not bow to any other power, resembling a sovereign. They are 
both indifferent to national and international legal frameworks and transcend the 
juridical norms (Brown, 2010, p. 23). Therefore, Brown’s approach detects sovereignty 
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in a place other than nation-states but still insists that the conception of sovereignty is 
persistently at work in world politics.  
Zygmunt Bauman, too, makes a similar statement in an article where he defines the 
current situation of the world as a “time of interregnum” (Bauman, 2012). Referring to 
the period of time when the throne was left empty after the death of a sovereign 
emperor, awaiting its new successor, Bauman claims that the new successor long 
awaited is not coming and will not come. The reason behind that interregnum which 
seems not to pass easily is the separation of sovereignty and the state. Bauman claims 
that supposedly unbreakable marriage of power and politics is coming to an end with 
important consequences. One such significant consequence, according to him, is 
emergence of a new form of sovereignty that is unanchored and free-floating in global 
space. While the distribution of sovereignty was rendered according to a “triune” 
principle of territory in the old order, nation and state are now dying and territorial 
nation-state is not the sole operating agent in the contemporary world politics. 
While Bauman speaks of rising numbers of competitors for sovereignty, Brown detects 
two of them as indicated above. Accordingly, the walls and barriers of this post-
Westphalian and post-September 11 world are built against these two newly emerged 
sovereigns: global capital and religious violence. Against these new transnational 
sovereigns, sovereign states are actually in defence: The frenzy of wall building of these 
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times aims at the recreation of the image of sovereign state in the face of its undoing. 
Giving a false impression of protection, containment and integration, Brown argues the 
walls and barriers “generate what Heidegger termed a “reassuring world picture” 
(Brown, 2010, p. 26). Since this is a world where horizons blur and a sense of insecurity 
prevails, the walls, barbed wires, fences and barriers supposedly respond to the 
emerging sovereign powers of religious violence and global capital, and they are the 
consequences of the desire for security in an insecure age.  
Particularly focusing on the US-Mexico border, Brown emphasises the inefficiency of 
these barriers that are made of a suspended rule of law and fiscal unaccountability 
(Brown, 2010, p. 37). She argues that these barriers even multiplied and intensified the 
criminal activity. Moreover, they are the signs of rising nationalism and xenophobia 
alongside the erosion of sovereignty. For Brown, there is a strict relationship between 
the popularity of these walls and the rise of right-wing in Western societies. In this 
regard, it is important to note the performative and symbolic effects of these walls and 
barriers upon the citizen subjects. The political imaginary reproduced by the walls and 
barriers intensifies the well-known distinction between us and them: By separating the 
others and us with fences and barriers, the walls materialise the difference in spatial 
terms.  
Here, Brown sees a parallelism between state policies and subject desires which are 
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challenged by the very same forces of globalisation. Alongside the sovereignty of the 
state, sovereignty of the subject is eroded by these forces for the subjects are tended to 
identify themselves with the state. As Brown underlines, in liberal tradition, political 
sovereignty is assumed to protect the sovereignty of the citizen subject. The liberal 
ontology defining the subject vulnerable and powerless before the state leads to this 
parallelism in which decay in state’s sovereign power puts the subject is in threat 
(Brown, 2010, p. 79). It is, then, impossible to secure the sovereignty of subject while 
the “original” sovereignty, the nation-state, is endangered. In this way, Brown describes 
how sovereignty of both states and subjects are in threat and how they react against the 
forces of globalisation in the face of such threats. These reactions, however, cannot 
possibly reverse the processes in which the nation-state sovereignty is in decay. Nor can 
the newly built walls and barriers provide a secure shelter for the nation-states. They do 
nothing but symbolise the deepening ungovernability and the crisis of the state.  
Even if she does not refer directly to post-September 11, Brown’s intervention can be 
interpreted with regard to securitisation prevailing during this period of time. From 
building walls to increasing surveillance, from declaration of state of exception to 
suspending civic rights and the security measures which are supposed to protect the 
subjects do not function as intended by the nation-states. Rather, they unmask an 
original deficiency in the conception of sovereignty and its use by sovereign states. In 
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other words, the walling practices which aim the protection of the nation-state from the 
evils of global capital and religious violence are emblematic of the crisis of sovereignty 
that is haunting the politics in the post-September 11. 
3.3 Interlude: Crisis of Sovereignty 
Hardt and Negri’s Empire thesis as well as Brown’s waning sovereignty approach allow 
us to remember a common narrative that is at work in the political discourse regarding 
the questions of nation-state and sovereignty in the era of globalisation. The Peace of 
Westphalia of 1648 is in this sense a basic point of reference as the official birth of 
sovereignty of states both domestically and internationally. While this treaty deemed 
nation states capable of pacifying their population and taking binding decisions within 
their respective territories, it also guaranteed them independence from outside 
interference in their internal decisions. With this narrative, which is still in effect in 
international politics, these two internal and external authorization and protection 
mechanisms have been accepted as the basics of state sovereignty. The narrative, 
however, has been evolved with an emergent presupposition about the relative decline 
of states’ power after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. 
Whereas the bipolar dimension of this post-World War II period gives some sort of an 
assurance about describing international order in the way it has been defined by 
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Westphalia, the post-Cold War accounts of the international order develop with a 
recourse to globalisation, interdependence and depreciation of nation-state borders.  
In this regard, the discourses on “the crisis of sovereignty” have already been 
proliferating by the earlier post-Soviet accounts of the world politics pre-dating 
September 11. Labelled with globalisation, the new era was defined by ends as well as 
novelties, with ‘post-’s and ‘neo-’s. In this new, emergent discourses, the new era was 
defined post-modern, post-colonial, post-national and post-sovereign referring not only 
to the demise, death and end but also to the afterlife –of a spectre of the left behind 
(Buck-Morss, 2008, p. 23). Indeed, the spectre would haunt the world and the rumours 
of its reappearance would pave the way for the discourses of ‘return’, such as ‘return of 
the nation-state’ and ‘return of imperialism’ after September 11. On the other hand, the 
terms such as neo-liberal, neo-imperial and neo-fundamentalist would refer to the 
reborn, renewal and a restart. It is as if a spectre is resuscitated and this time appeared in 
a new disguise, if not a new body. Whereas the prefix “post-” dwells on the left and 
tries to pursue a critical negation, the “neo-” represses the past and its disappointments 
and attempts to bring the old up to date (Buck-Morss, 2008, p. 23).  
In line with this discourse, the crisis of sovereignty was easily transformed into ‘the end 
of sovereignty.’ There were several symptoms detected for this final diagnosis: The 
strengthening of international organisations, the proliferation of non-governmental 
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organisations, appearance of a 'global' civil society, the emergence of new systems of 
global governance and so on  (Reid, 2005, p. 237). All these developments exposing the 
nation-state to both external intervention and internal fragmentation were interpreted as 
the loss of the Westphalian order of state sovereignty. In other words, these have been 
interpreted as the weakening of nation-states in the face of international law; 
depreciation of the image of nation-states in the face of international organizations; and 
consequently as the loss of Westphalian privileges of sovereign national states. 
International Relations theorists in this context found it necessary to revise the notions 
of nation-state and sovereignty. As the nation states have been losing power in the face 
of international organisations and infra-state bodies, what these theorists have observed 
were nothing but the diffusion and fragmentation of the authority of nation-states. So 
much so that, their argument followed, “all” states transformed into a newly formed 
“quasi-state” (Falk, 1999, p. 43). In a globalising world of this sort, interdependence 
became one of the most explanatory concepts, with a certain emphasis on the expanding 
constraints on nation-state sovereignty. The contradiction between trans-national global 
forces and Westphalia-based nation-states was found fundamentally structural, no 
matter some states would appeal to both. This is the paradoxical sign of oscillation 
between one and the other, mourning for one’s death while celebrating the coming of 
the other. 
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Susan Buck-Morss describes this phenomenon as a post-partum depression that results 
from the birth of something disappointing following a long period of pregnancy (Buck-
Morss, 2008, p. 23). What was born is nothing new given that the condition of 
globalisation has actually been present for almost five hundred years and/or the origins 
of neo-imperialism are at least two hundred years old. At this specific juncture, 
however, celebrating the elimination of the persistent obstacle of the USSR and its 
allies, some commentators found that the world was getting much closer to become 
‘One’ by the disruption of multiplicity. This was what made it possible to announce the 
end of the history or call for a new clash between ‘the civilisation’ and its enemies.  
Etienne Balibar here warns us against the presumption that the development of 
supranational, transnational, or post-national political spaces would inevitably lead to a 
crisis of sovereignty that is strictly identified with its national form. In this regard, he 
offers that “we need to avoid simplistic dichotomies between national and post-national 
eras, between sovereignty and the withering away of the state” (Balibar, 2009, p. 135). 
For him, sovereignty’s genealogy is not illuminated but rather masked by the dichotomy 
of national sovereignty and the subsequent post-national constellation. Along these 
lines, those others who are also suspicious about the discourses of the crisis of state 
sovereignty draw attention to sovereignty’s resilience in the face of challenging 
contemporary developments of interdependence and fragmentation (Krasner, 1999). 
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Indeed, despite the general consent about its crisis and the associated hopeful or fearful 
future expectations, state sovereignty in its national form seems to have the capacity to 
transform itself.  
This does not mean, however, that the crisis of sovereignty is pure fiction and did not 
take place. Rather, both fantasies of death and return of the sovereignty can be seen as 
the effects of the crisis itself. In Balibar’s words, even if it turns out that the old 
omnipotent (sovereignty) is impotent in the face of global challenges, what is at stake is 
not the end, death or demise but the nullity of traditional representations of sovereignty. 
In this regard, Negri points out that “the concept of sovereignty is in crisis because it is 
no longer dominant with respect to other sources of social legitimacy, to other 
constituent processes and forces” (Negri, 2010, p. 208-9). This remark is important 
firstly because it reveals that sovereignty shares its power with some other forces and 
secondly, that it no longer holds the greater share in this partitioning. Balibar, too, refers 
to this shared authority and emphasises the “growing autonomisation of the theological 
and the economic with respect to political regulation” (Balibar, 2009, p. 149).  
These comments indeed provide a different portrayal of sovereignty in comparison to its 
“absolute, ” “unitary” and “undividable” definitions throughout the history of political 
philosophy (Derrida, 2003). Along these lines, with reference to George Dumézil’s 
analyses of mythology, Deleuze and Guattari claim that political sovereignty has two 
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heads: the magician-king and the jurist-priest. In this picture, despot and legislator come 
together and constitute the political sovereignty in the form of the state. Although there 
is an opposition between the two, because one is obscure and violent whereas the other 
is clear and calm, this opposition is only relative. They are the pairs of the One (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 2010, p. 3). There are “two poles of sovereignty: the imperium of true 
thinking operating by magical capture, seizure or binding, constituting the efficacy of a 
foundation; a republic of free spirits proceeding by pact or contract, constituting a 
legislative and juridical organization, carrying the sanction of a ground (logos)” 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 2010, p. 35).  
The king prepares for the jurist and the jurist uses and retains the first. Here, while 
thought gains gravity, a centre that can be called state, state-form gains a whole 
consensus on its universality. In the state form one of them cannot be thought without 
the other, since sovereignty requires indivisibility and unity. Here, Deleuze and Guattari 
do not only emphasise the definitive aspect of sovereignty as indivisibility and unity but 
also give an important clue for the “mystical foundation of authority” which guarantees 
and secures the unstable union of politics and law in the garments of magician-king and 
jurist-priest. A traditional account of sovereignty cannot stand against these claims for it 
would lose its distinguishing trait if the sovereignty is shared (Witte, 2006, p. 518). 
What the traditional accounts foresee is the affirmation of the One in the body of 
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Leviathan, in a world where only a unitary power can overwhelm social anarchy. A 
divided, shared, split or partial sovereignty is seen impossible by definition, for these 
couplings would not only be wrong but also oxymoronic. However, what is at stake in 
the crisis of sovereignty, Deleuze and Guattari warn us, is that very principle of 
indivisible unity: Coupled with it, absoluteness was, too, originally and for a long-time 
trademark of sovereignty.  
Following Deleuze and Guattari, Hardt and Negri’s conception of “multitude” may also 
be read as a response to these traditional definitions of sovereignty. Reduction of 
sovereignty to One ahistorical form of sovereign territorial nation-state goes hand in 
hand with reinforcement of the images of One people, One state and the amalgamation 
of the notions of people and state into One concept of ‘nation’. In this sense, the monist 
understanding of sovereignty calls for a unitary people whereas unity of the state is 
guaranteed. Against this, Hardt and Negri’s conception of multitude recognises the 
reality of social division, sheds light into the dynamics of disagreement and conflict, 
and breaks with the long tradition of casting sovereignty unity that can be traced back to 
Thomas Hobbes. “The multitude is a multiplicity, a plane of singularities… The people, 
in contrast, tend toward identity and homogeneity… Whereas the multitude is an 
inconclusive constitutive relation, the people is a constituted synthesis that is prepared 
for sovereignty” (Hardt & Negri, 2000, p. 103).  
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Yet, sovereignty is always already in crisis in its hurry to hide its incompleteness and 
divisibility. Its unity is always under the threat of ‘other’ inner forces as well as external 
interventions. This is why Negri claims “sovereignty can only, from its origins, be 
defined as the (determinate) overcoming of crisis” (Negri, 2010, p. 214). Furthermore, 
he describes the so-called contemporary crisis not only with sovereignty but also with 
“the entire episteme, and all the events deriving from this” (Negri, 2008, p. 336). 
Indeed, for Negri, the concept of sovereignty may be considered to be in crisis from at 
least three perspectives. To begin with, what Michel Foucault calls the biopolitical 
transformation of the sovereignty is the first of the reliable perspectives from which one 
can detect the crisis. The crisis, whereby the paradigms shifted from the context of laws 
and rules to norms and systems, and the law transformed from a disciplinary machine to 
an apparatus of governance (Negri, 2010, p. 206). The second perspective is crystallised 
in the works of Niklas Luhmann and his followers: Their insistence on the 
fragmentation of law and analyses of the “functional processes of the legal structures 
outside state normativity”. And the third, the weakening of nation-states in the face of 
international law and diminishing power of nation-states in the face of international 
organisations and transnational forces. Those are the keys to understand the crisis of the 
normative representations of sovereignty for Negri. 
It was under these conditions prevailing in the international politics, the September 11 
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attacks took place. Questioning the gigantic outrage boomed in the global public after 
September 11 attacks despite the silence accompanying the murder of larger numbers of 
people in other parts of the world, John Milbank claims that the threat posed against the 
sovereign power and the very idea of sovereignty are the reasons behind the global 
outrage following September 11 (Milbank, 2002, p. 305). September 11 attacks, in this 
regard, have been perceived worse than a declaration of war since the attacks endanger 
the very system which can easily embrace war whereas it is vulnerable to this type of 
attacks. In this regard, the attacks were experienced as an offence against the 
international order of sovereignty that is led and regulated by the United States.  
The attacks in this regard doubled the perception of crisis in the sense that they 
intensified what one may call the original crisis of sovereignty preceding the attacks or 
any other attack. Nevertheless, for crisis also means opportunity in the lexicon of 
governance, attacks provided an opportunity for the United States as well as the other 
states to consolidate their power and reassert themselves. By means of media-
theatricalisation of the event and through repetition, heroism and securitisation as well 
as a “just war” discourse, the violent responses against the attacks were presented within 
the framework of the old-dated blackmail: either sovereignty or anarchy. The US 
President George W. Bush’s infamous phrase “you are either with us or with the 
terrorists” was an explicit threat and command foreclosing any third option that may 
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offer a refusal of a vengeful recourse to state violence including war, exceptional 
security measures or suspension of the rule of law. Represented as a threat not only 
against the state but also civilisation, September 11 attacks and the post-September 11 
terrorism enabled states to reclaim themselves as the fighters of civilisation against 
barbarism, i.e., fundamentalism.  
Within this context, while the United States found the excuse for and opportunity to act 
unilaterally in the international realm and declare war without recourse to international 
law, the other states abused the global context of war on terrorism in order to empower 
their authority. Although problematic in their assumption of a previous death, the 
narratives of return, reassertion or reawakening of sovereignty have some credibility in 
this context: As Bauman suggests, the nation-states indeed showed their muscles in 
domestic affairs as well as internationally (Bauman, 2016, p. 45). Nevertheless, like 
Wendy Brown, it is reasonable to interpret this show off and physical manifestations of 
power as a sign of waning. In this regard, it is possible to provisionally distinguish the 
traditional concept of sovereignty from contemporary sovereign power in order to 
unpack the post-September 11 reassertion of the nation-states. In the sense that Foucault 
makes a temporalisation and comparison between (the ancient) sovereignty and (the 
modern) biopower, it is possible to claim that sovereign power can be the name for the 
contemporary manifestations of traditional sovereignty as the consequence of the 
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inevitable continuity of this mode of power in a biopolitical age. Within this line of 
thought highlighting historical continuity of older modes of power, it is theoretically 
possible to detect the novel or age-old manifestations of sovereignty in the 
contemporary without falling into discursive trap of a supposed end and a following 
resuscitation.  
In sum, even if a decline in sovereign power of nation-states did take place following 
the end of the Cold War in the face of global challenges, this does not mean that a 
terminal crisis was at stake as it is proposed in some millennial discourses. Inherent 
rather than conjectural, the crisis of sovereignty was more about the traditional 
conception of it that presupposes a unity, absoluteness and indivisibility as 
characteristic traits. The crisis in this regard is not one that is to be solved with 
opportunistic reassertion of nation-states after September 11. Rather, it is the reason 
behind the post-September 11 manifestations of sovereign power such as the state of 
exception and securitisation. As Brown suggests, however, neither walls nor 
fortification of borders would rescue sovereignty from its inherent crisis, no matter how 
much the states invest in the sovereign power against the religious violence and global 
capital gaining more and more autonomy. And as Hardt and Negri claim, in the age of 
Empire, there is no possibility of turning back to the good old days of sovereignty, even 
if sovereign power is still in effect in a Foucauldian sense.   
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3.4 Securing Sovereignty 
Despite the discourses of death, end or demise of sovereignty, sovereign power is still 
able to manifest itself through the state of exception and securitisation in the post-
September 11 period. After the attacks, Western liberal democracies did not hesitate to 
use the idea of state of emergency to enforce measures that exceed their constitutional 
authority as well as democratic principles that are supposedly at the core of the 
legitimacy of their sovereign power. Thus, the sense of emergency resulting from the 
terror attacks has become the excuse for diverse manifestations of sovereign power. The 
states accumulated an unprecedented power that was not only intensified within the 
intelligence and security apparatuses but also felt in ever depths of the society.  
The question of state of exception in the way it was reinvigorated in the post-September 
11, is to a large extent discussed in the contexts of law, legality and legitimacy. In this 
context, the law is paradoxically used to suspend and weaken itself either by the way of 
enactment of new laws or negligence of fundamental rights in the context of state of 
exception. Losing its ordinary character, then, in state of exception law increasingly 
loses its potential to impose constraints on the sovereign power and therefore turns into 
an explicit instrument of it. When the law embodies its own suspension, there occurs the 
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paradox of the coexistence of the rule of law and lawlessness. Hence, through state of 
exception, sovereign power does not simply operate outside the law but creates an 
unclear zone in which the distinction between law and lawlessness blur (Agamben, 
2005).  
For Carl Schmitt, sovereign states including liberal democracies, which claim they 
constrain the sovereign power by law, actually operate with state of exception. 
Sovereign is the one who has the unilateral right to declare, define and describe the state 
of exception at the expense of abrogating the law it claims to depend. In this regard, 
Schmitt does not formulate the state of exception simply in terms of some extraordinary 
decisions taken in emergency situations. Rather, he claims, the legal order itself as a 
whole depends on the state of exception at the very base of its foundation (Schmitt, 
1996). The state of exception in this regard cannot be regarded as a temporary concept 
which occurs now and again but as the foundation of the nature of the sovereignty of 
state. For Schmitt, the state of exception is the very basis of sovereignty in the sense 
that sovereign becomes sovereign through its ability of decide on and declare the 
exception. Famously, he states “Sovereign is he who decides on the exception” 
(Schmitt, 2005, p. 5). Because the sovereign decides on whether there is a state of 
exception and what shall be done in order to eliminate it, he is the one who is able to 
stand outside the legal system (Schmitt, 2005). Schmitt claims that all other 
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characteristics of the sovereign such as declaring war and making peace, appointing 
civil servants, right of pardon and final appeal derive from its right to declare the state 
of exception and suspend the law. It is the decision over the state of exception what 
frees the sovereign from the so-called normative boundaries of the legal system and 
makes it absolute in true sense (Schmitt, 2005, p. 15). Moreover, the state of exception 
is a necessity for any sovereign to manifest its right to self-preservation: To ward off an 
existential threat to order, the legal order can be suspended in emergency situations and 
this is obviously preferable than the overwhelming threat of anarchy or the demolition 
of the state.  
In this regard, state of exception cannot be just temporal -specific for a certain period of 
time- or it cannot be limited to a particular sovereign, but it is essential to any regime 
claiming sovereignty in a certain territory. Since the foundation of the political requires 
a sovereign decision that is prior and superior to the norm, no sovereign regime can 
escape this but can only disclaim its foundation and deceive its subjects. Schmitt, in this 
context, criticises the liberal regimes for denying their very own foundation since the 
exceptional decision is the basis of any political order (Erlenbusch, 2012, p. 366). This 
denial enables liberal regimes hide the foundational sovereign moment and claim a 
normative structure which is against the political. Schmitt calls this moment de-
politicisation that results in “the most horrendous forms of re-politicisation through a 
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moralisation of previously political concepts” (Erlenbusch, 2012, p. 367). In this 
manner, liberal regimes are able to justify their violence no longer bound by political 
considerations with the creation of a monstrous enemy “that must not only be defeated 
but also utterly destroyed” (Schmitt, 1996, p. 36). 
In his book titled State of Exception, Giorgio Agamben examines what he calls the 
normalisation of state of exception in both external and internal affairs after September 
11. For him, the state of exception as a technique of government, which has powerful 
roots in the history of politics, reached a new level with security politics in the 
beginning of twenty-first century. From the legacy of French Revolution to the First 
World War, Agamben emphasises the efforts to define the state of exception within the 
limits of law, though he insists that the state of exception is neither external nor internal 
to juridical order (Agamben, 2005, p. 23). Instead, state of exception creates a zone of 
indistinction like a threshold where the boundaries between inside and outside blur. In 
this sense, it is not illegal, but rather signifies a space devoid of law. This area, where 
human activity is not subject to law, attracts Agamben’s primary attention. For him, this 
space seems to be essential for the juridical order to the extent that “it must seek in 
every way to assure itself a relation with it, as if in order to ground itself, the juridical 
order necessarily had to maintain itself in relation with an anomie” (Agamben, 2005, p. 
51). 
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Agamben traces the uses of state of exception as far back as the French Revolution 
when a state of siege was differentiated from state of peace. English martial law and 
suspension of habeas corpus in American Civil War are two other significant examples 
of the history of state of exception. Nevertheless, state of exception in liberal 
democracies reaches a maturity after the First World War, during the period between 
1914-1945 (Agamben, 2005, p. 12). The fundamental novelty of this period is the total 
transfer of power from parliament to the executive. For Agamben, this is one of the 
significant characteristics of state of exception: All the functions of politics are 
entrusted to the executive government in order to maintain the order again. Eventually, 
state of exception frees itself from its war context and re-presents itself in peacetime to 
deal with any other social disorder or economic crisis. It is not surprising, however, that 
sovereign power dominates the public realm with the discourses of war in states of 
exception: From war on drugs to war on terror, the discourse of war helps the executive 
power to totally mobilise the society and legitimise extraordinary but so-called 
inevitable measures. Agamben, here, notes the fictitious character of state of exception 
through which a vocabulary of war is enabled, opposition is silenced, and a sense of 
decisive danger is created. Within this context, state of exception becomes a “technique 
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For Agamben, state of exception has become the dominant paradigm of government in 
contemporary politics with a maximum worldwide deployment in the context of post-
September 11. The normalisation of state of exception in which the governmental 
violence is still in the claim of applying the law should be unmasked for there is no 
return to the state of law with the eclipse of politics: For Agamben, this is not a sign of 
new political situation but it signifies emergence of a pure apolitical regime replacing 
the state of law (Agamben, 2005, p. 88). Security state is the provisional name for this 
new regime prevailing in Western liberal democracies. In an article written for French 
daily Le Monde, after the extension of state of emergency in France, Agamben not only 
warns French government and public but also the global society living under the 
shadow of security state (Agamben, 2015). Giving familiar examples of Weimar 
Republic and Third Reich as well as the French Revolution, he acutely proclaims the 
damages of state of exception in any political regime resembling democracy.  
What is at stake here is the de-politicisation of Western democracies and the evolution 
of former states of law into security states. In this context, Agamben claims that the 
term security has become so prevalent in political discourses that the reasons for 
achieving security has replaced the existential reasons of state (Agamben, 2015). 
Referring the readers to Thomas Hobbes, he reminds that the function of state in 
Hobbesian theory deeply influenced Western political imagination: A contract, that 
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binds all, gives sovereign the authority to stop the fear and war of all against all. 
However, security state reverses this schema, in which the state is the source of fear for 
it finds its essential function and legitimacy in it. Security state is the state’s reassertion 
of itself in a new disguise fabricated with fear and security. The concept of security that 
becomes widespread across Western democracies after September 11 attacks does not 
actually aim to prevent the possible terrorist attacks but constitutes a new relation of 
generalised and unlimited control among men and women. To Agamben, this is a new 
regime that should be further examined by scholars, but he himself at least displays 
three contours of this emerging security state: “the maintenance of a generalised state of 
fear, the de-politicisation of citizens and the renunciation of all legal certainty” 
(Agamben, 2015).  
The consequence of this new form of government is the erosion of politics in general. 
Encompassing all areas of social life, security replaces any other political notion to the 
extent that there is no space left for an active political life. Referring to Greek origins of 
politics, Agamben states that security does not only blur the distinctions between public 
and private spaces but also pacifies and transforms the citizen-subject into a being that 
should be secured by police and even, military. This is, for Agamben, a situation 
exceeding the risks of state of exception for in security state a formal declaration of 
state of emergency is not even needed. In this regard, security state is nothing but the 
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normalisation of state of exception in which the excessive security measures are 
regarded as the instances of ordinary daily life. This devastating change on the level of 
government by no means depends on an overnight decision but rather is an 
‘achievement’ of a process. This process operating in the ever depths of the society is 
called securitisation.  
The term securitisation is coined by some critical scholars of security, who are widely 
recognised as “Copenhagen School” of Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan and a range of other 
researchers. Interestingly, however, two decades after the first appearance of the term in 
1995, Zygmunt Bauman announces that the word securitisation has become a neologism 
frequently used by politicians as well as journalists after September 11 (Bauman, 2016). 
Preceding this date, however, securitisation thesis seems to await to be discovered for a 
long time, even if it is known in the academic circles of security studies. Without going 
into detail of the original theory, Bauman concisely explains in what meaning this word 
is used frequently. He asserts that the word denotes “ever more frequent reclassification 
of something previously thought of as belonging to some other phenomenal category, as 
an instance of ‘insecurity’; recasting followed well-nigh automatically by transferring 
that something to the domain, charge and supervision of security organs.” (Bauman, 
2016, p. 41) 
To the scholars of Copenhagen School, in this sense, security does not only consist of 
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the necessary measures to tackle a risk or threat but also of a discursive practice through 
which an identity formation and a constitution of inter-subjectivity are established 
(Neal, 2010). In such a discursive process, political community is called to action in the 
face of a threat, and it is convinced to take urgent and exceptional measures to deal with 
the so-called threat. In this self-referential practice, not only a risk or threat is produced 
but also the measures to be taken by the security agents of the state are legitimised in 
advance. For the theorists of securitisation, this process is realised in compliance with 
an act resembling the “speech act” in language theory (Neal, 2010, p. 102). In speech 
acts, the signification process does not depend upon a sign referring to something real 
but it is the utterance itself that constitutes the act. Accordingly, in the first stage of this 
process the threat, the threatened and the fighters -against the so-called- threat as well as 
the source of threat are identified with a certain rhetoric, and the public is directed to 
consent for the necessary and exceptional further steps. In other words, the 
securitisation move is followed by the presentation of emergency actions against the 
threat, which inevitably break the ordinary rules in order to deal with this existential 
threat. Here, securitisation becomes the move that brings politics beyond the present 
rules of the game and determines a special kind of politics, if not an apolitical game. 
In this discursive process through which a threat is created and represented, ‘real’ 
existence of a threat is not a necessity. Unlike the mutism of the spectacle, the 
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discourses of securitisation call the subjects into an action through media and state 
experts, and it expects a certain response in this act. Thus, the discourses of 
securitisation create the reality of the threat and legitimise the so-called necessary 
measures to be taken by the state. This is not only an attempt to change the behavioural 
patterns of the populace but to constitute a new subjectivity against the threat. In this 
sense, the processes of securitisation are self-referential in their formation of identity in 
the face of the other, or in other words, the source of threat. As the identity is formed 
through the boundaries framing the self, the outside, the foreigner and the other, these 
boundaries should be demarcated with reference to an insecurity. This is why 
securitisation and insecuritisation are like two faces of a coin that require each other in 
their co-existence. Insecurity is the necessary product of securitisation processes, and 
both are in a dependant relationship whereby any securitisation measure creates 
insecurity in itself. Even if securitisation presents itself for the sake of the protection of 
citizens from terrorist attacks, it provokes a feeling of fear, vulnerability and insecurity. 
Securitisation, thus, requires and starts with the production of an insecurity regardless of 
the presence of an original risk or threat. In any case, securitisation underlines, 
intensifies and concentrates on insecurity to legitimise the sequent measures and 
policies of security (Beck, 2000). 
Summarised under the infamous title of “war on terrorism,” the main discursive 
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response to September 11 attacks has been the immediate securitisation of the event, 
elevating it above normal politics not only in the US but also within the global system. 
In this regard, the attacks of September 11 have become the source of both 
micromanagement of everyday lives and a “world-organizing macro-securitisation” in a 
global extent. What enabled this world-organising response discursively has been 
securitisation, which turned into dominant performative discourse positing terrorism as 
an existential threat to the identity of “us”, our fundamental values, civilisation and way 
of life. Thus, ever-expanding concerns of security, which have been framed with 
reference to democracy, human rights, freedom and civilisation, have been abused to 
such an extent that these referent concepts are increasingly associated with state 
violence, war and imperialist objectives. The paradox of using violent and extra-legal 
security measures as assurances for the maintenance and promotion of democracy and 
human rights could only be overcome by a thorough application of securitisation. 
Michael Dillon argues that security is always violent towards the very thing it claims to 
secure. In the sense that “securing is an assault on the integrity of what is to be secured” 
(Dillon, 1996, p. 122), the citizen’s freedoms and rights as well as the privacy of their 
lives are violated while they are also being surrounded by a feeling of risk and 
insecurity. Turning the citizens into vulnerable and powerless subjects who are 
dependent on the state just like in a child-parent relationship, securitisation engenders a 
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relation between the state and society in which citizens become potential targets to be 
protected as well as potential enemies who may present a risk for the state. In this sense, 
the citizens should be subject to a constant surveillance, in a liminal position that 
requires both protection and suspicion of the state. Nevertheless, a more targeted 
approach is also at work against certain groups in society: As the discourses of security 
constructs the citizens as subjects of risk, particular groups such as Muslim 
communities are assumed to present a greater risk particularly in Western societies. 
Thus, they have become subject not only to open ethnocentrism and xenophobia but 
also to police harassment and surveillance (Cox, Levine, & Newman, 2009). Terrorism 
has become the negative ideograph of Western identity, through which the figure of the 
terrorist as well as the Arab/Muslim have become the ultimate human other. The 
inclusion and exclusion barrier between the self and the other is thus reconfigured with 
regard to Arab/Muslim who is the potential terrorist. 
A precarious sort of social unity is thus achieved against an unknown enemy called 
“terrorist” who can be both external and internal, and whom should be fought against 
both at home and abroad. Creating an even greater demand for government intervention 
and control in the face of an all-pervasive sense of risk, securitisation against both an 
external and internal enemy erodes the conception of citizenry. The imaginary liberal 
balance between freedom and security has already changed in favour of security with 
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more intense control, regulation and policing of the society. This was rendered possible 
by elevation of security to an almost metaphysical level, which seems to define the 
central function of state as protecting citizens from a terrorist attack. Though 
paradoxical, this conception of state has also served neoliberal expansion by paving the 
way for abandonment of some of the traditional functions of the states such as provision 
of services and welfare. As discussed above, within this new security paradigm the 
insecurity, the sense of threat and construction of enemy within and outside the society 
allowed the states gain power and extend their reach to a level that is unexpected in 
liberal agenda (Cox, Levine, & Newman, 2009, p. 17). Meanwhile, the states, which 
have already been leaving public services on education, health, wealth equality and so 
on a side, managed to shift attention away from these serious and pressing concerns to 
an all-encompassing and metaphysical concentration on security.  
By way of this metaphysical concentration, from central left to right and from social 
democrats to conservatives a consensus over the primacy of securitisation has taken 
hold. And the new “normal” has turned into nothing but a permanent state of exception. 
In this ideological chimera of normality, what was previously considered exceptional 
and unthinkable has now assumed an everyday acceptability (Cox, Levine, & Newman, 
2009, p. 4). This new and paradoxically amorphous political agenda shaped by 
securitisation has achieved normalcy by a discourse neoliberal at economic level while 
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deeply conservative in the political, social and ideological levels. In this way, a 
neoliberal discourse driven by market expansion and global capitalism has been 
accompanying the authoritarian and highly regulatory measures of security. In this 
paradoxical logic, the fear of terrorism and the anti-terrorist state is intertwined with 
each other. As Agamben argues, counterterrorism and terrorism mutually incite and 
provoke each other in a deadly circuit in which terrorist attacks provoke even more 
violent responses from the states which in turn provoke terrorist attacks (Agamben, 
2006). 
3.5 Rogue States 
September 11 attacks provided a perfect opportunity not only for the US but also for 
other sovereign states which have been losing power in the face of globalisation. Under 
the influences of forceful and violent market expansion and financial globalisation, even 
the weaker sovereign states of the world system found new opportunities in the current 
wave of global war on terror. The same states which are at the forefront of globalisation 
race, after September 11 attacks tried to reassure the control of the transnational flows 
of finance, people and ideas. Trying to delimit and control the emancipatory and 
egalitarian possibilities offered by a globalised world and with the aim of regaining the 
‘old omnipotence,’ the sovereign states turned their faces to the old archives of 
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sovereigntist logic. Holding globalisation responsible for making the nation-state more 
vulnerable to terrorist threats, the war on terror also functioned as a defence of the 
traditional conception of the nation-state.  
Homeland security doctrines, border controls as well as fortification of borders in the 
face of an indefinite enemy have been used as tools to reassert nation-state sovereignty. 
In addition to war, policing of international relations and strict regulation of border 
politics accompany securitisation in global affairs. The suspension of rule of law, police 
control and surveillance in domestic affairs  also serve a greater aim: Re-inscription and 
reassertion of sovereign power as well as perpetuation of the world order within the 
dominant frame of nation-state system. Even if this is not the originally declared aim of 
the war on terror, states all around the globe transformed it into an opportunity for the 
consolidation of the ‘older’ claims of the state. Though not all of them were active in 
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, most of them participated to the global campaign of 
securitisation and as Kofi Annan asserts, they did not hesitate to abuse the global wave 
of securitisation in their ‘own’ wars against their ‘own’ enemies. In return of a 
cooperation against the new ‘common’ enemy, that is, terrorism, these states did not 
refrain from demanding their ‘own’ adversaries to be labelled as terrorists (Acharya, 
2014, p. 128).  
The restriction of freedoms and rights, the undermining of due process of legitimate 
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trials, and intrusions into the ‘private’ lives of citizens were only possible when the 
governmental power has become unaccountable by the way of an all-encompassing 
securitisation. From immigration and border control to detention without charge, 
sovereign states as well as the “petty sovereigns” became more and more unaccountable 
in their activities by justifying such acts as attempts to protect the security of the 
homeland. All in all, the sovereign power has been reasserted after September 11 with 
an obsessive emphasis on security, and the measures merging the police and politics in 
declared or undeclared states of emergency have been implemented. For Jacques 
Derrida, those illiberal measures of so-called liberal regimes or the undemocratic acts of 
so-called democratic governments do not represent a simple paradox but the original 
roguishness of the sovereign state in general (Derrida, 2005, p. 101). Even if the states, 
and as a leading figure among them the US, try to monopolise the power to announce 
which state is “outlaw,” “outcast,” “renegade” or “rogue,” it is impossible for them to 
conceal their own roguishness in effect. 
In Rogues: Two Essays on Reason (2005), Derrida states that the denunciatory 
expression of “rogue state,” which was rarely used by the United States governments 
before Bill Clinton’s presidency, became a powerful discourse in the international realm 
particularly between 1997-2000 (Derrida, 2005, p. 95). Before that, in its less frequent 
use, the term was simply referring to the states which are undemocratic and 
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disrespectful to the rule of law in their internal affairs. In the presidency of Clinton, 
however, rogue states were defined not in relation to internal affairs but in terms of 
international behaviours of the states: With a reference to international terrorism, 
Clinton government’s rogue states were the ones which do not act according to the spirit 
or the letter of the international law (Derrida, 2005, p. 95). In 2000, however, Clinton 
government declared that the US will use the more neutral and moderate expression of 
“states of concern” instead of “rogue states.” This more diplomatic and less demonising 
choice, however, does not conceal the significant role of the US in defining the official 
global enemies not only for itself but for the rest of the world. This role and the use of 
the expression rogue state have something to do with the end of the Cold War. In this 
new world following the bipolar international politics of balance, the US took the role 
of a guarantor in a global extent and it undertook the power and privilege to cast out 
some states according to its own “vital interests.”  
The question here is neither the US’s own apparent disrespect for the international law 
nor the variations in the ways in which the US interests identify the outlaw, outcast, 
renegade or rogue states such as North Korea, Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan and so on. What 
is at stake here is the fact that after September 11, the denunciatory words chosen to 
delineate the enemy in a concrete manner, in state form, with a territory, name and 
sovereignty were buried in history. Even if George W. Bush too occasionally used the 
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expression rogue state, September 11, 2001 is the definitive date, for Derrida, since 
when the efforts to define the enemy in state form come to naught inarguably: “Along 
with the two towers of the World Trade Center, what visibly collapsed is the entire 
apparatus (logical, semantic, rhetorical, juridical, political) that made the ultimately so 
reassuring denunciation of rogue states so useful and significant” (Derrida, 2005, p. 
103). For Derrida, since September 11, the efforts to identify the “terrorist” or “rogue” 
states are just rationalisations in denial of the fact that the threat no longer comes from 
an enemy identifiable with the state form. The panic or terror experienced by the US as 
well as other sovereign states in the face of this unidentifiable threat paved the way for 
the war on terrorism, permanent state of exception and security state.  
As described above in detail, those responses themselves are the signs of the fact that 
the most rogue of the rogue states is the one (or the ones) that assumes the power to 
declare which state is rogue. This is not only Derrida’s but also Noam Chomsky’s main 
argument with regard to the usage of the expression rogue state. Referring to Chomsky, 
Derrida states “the first and most violent of rogue states are those that have ignored and 
continue to violate the very international law they claim to champion, the law in whose 
name they speak and in whose name they go to war against so-called rogue states each 
time their interests so dictate” (Derrida, 2005, p. 96). What makes them more rogue than 
‘the original’ rogue states is their distinctive ability to name the rogues. The power they 
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assume by doing so, is so pervert to that that they do not only ignore and violate the 
international law they claim to champion but also, they legitimise waging war or 
carrying out police or peacekeeping operations in the name of it. The US and its allies 
abusing their power in this way are not only criminal in their particular violent acts but 
also the most rogue of all in harming the very spirit of the international law they claim 
to depend. In this regard, “the states that are able or are in a state to make war on rogue 
states are themselves, in their most legitimate sovereignty, rogue states abusing their 
power” (Derrida, 2005, p. 102). 
Derrida’s emphasis on sovereignty in this phrase is particularly significant because in 
the current lexicon of international relations as well as international law, the so-called 
“legitimate sovereignty” equips the nation-states with certain rights and abilities 
including waging war against other states. At this point, Derrida declares that in their 
most legitimate sovereignty and as a matter of fact particularly in their most legitimate 
sovereignty these states become rogue states. In their unilateral, unshared sovereignty 
relying on the “reason of the strongest” and the age-old principle of “might is right,” 
any state is always already a rogue state (Derrida, 2005, p. 104). In this regard, a so-
called “legitimate sovereignty” is not the legal or whatsoever basis that can save the 
state from “roguishness” but it is the very source of it. “As soon as there is sovereignty, 
there is abuse of power and a rogue state. Abuse is the law of use; it is the law itself, the 
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"logic" of a sovereignty that can reign only by not sharing” (Derrida, 2005, p. 102). This 
leads Derrida to conclude that there are only rogue states. Any state relying on 
sovereignty is rogue, potentially or actually. Stating that every state is rogue also means 
that there is no rogue state. This is not only a logical necessity but also the sign of the 
fact that “the concept will have reached its limit and the end -more terrifying than ever- 
of its epoch” (Derrida, 2005, p. 106). In the context of post-September 11, both on 
national and international levels, and indeed by abolishing the difference between those 
levels, states tremendously abused their power relying on their sovereignty. Even if “the 
state power is originally excessive and abusive” as Derrida states this excess and abuse 
reached a new extent that now “there are (no) more rogue states.”  
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4 Democracy and Sovereignty 
after September 11 
Almost all the rogue states, that is, all the states including the more rogues, claim to be 
democratic at the same time. In fact, Derrida points out that there are only a few states 
on the political scene that do not present themselves as democratic. Apart from those 
few openly relying on a theocratic origin, all the other states more or less claim to 
follow the Greco-Christian tradition of democracy (Derrida, 2005, p. 28). What is 
important to note here is the coextension and coexistence of aforementioned 
roguishness and democracy within the same conception of political that dominates the 
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globe. The fundamental but paradoxical relationship between democracy and 
sovereignty, which became all the more apparent in the context of post-September 11, is 
the focus of this chapter. If the sovereign power returns with a securitising mission in 
the context of post-September 11, what are the outcomes of this for democracy? If 
democracy is at risk after September 11, as some democrats would claim, what is it that 
put democracy at risk in post-September 11 statecraft? (Haddad, 2004, p. 29) Is 
democracy really at risk? Or else, is democracy a risk?  
4.1 Autoimmunity after September 11 
In an interview held right after September 11, 2001, while answering a question about 
this very particular event, Jacques Derrida reintroduced one of his earlier neologisms 
(Derrida, 2003). Borrowed from biology and riddled with geopolitical connotations, the 
neology in question was ‘autoimmunity’. Speaking about invaders, defenders, borders, 
aliens and identities, the language of autoimmunity allowed Derrida to address the 
attacks of September 11 as well as the early post-September 11 policies of the US and 
the European countries (Mitchell, 2007, p. 282). The limits, borders and boundaries of 
the body and its relations of friend/foe, inside/outside, self/other that are operative in the 
metaphor of immune system work in a similar manner in our political systems. In 
“autoimmune diseases,” the body inexplicably generates auto-antibodies against its own 
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cells assuming that they are foreign objects (Derrida, 2003, p. 188). That is to say, the 
body attacks itself for protection and security as a result of an inability to distinguish the 
self and the other. Attacking itself, the body aims to provide protection in a misdirected 
kind of hyper-active immune response. This situation is defined as a serious 
physiological anomaly of the body’s (politic) system. The confusion or inability of the 
immune system to discern the self and the other results in a disease that is harmful for 
the body since the immune system is what protects the body against the outside threats 
(Johnson, 2012, p. 107). In this sense, ‘good health’ presupposes immune system to 
work ‘perfectly’ in a manner that it must separate the self from the other, be alert to 
bodily dangers, but must not be excessive towards them as it is in the case of 
autoimmune diseases. Yet, to Derrida, this is an impossible task for the body as well as 
for the politics (Derrida, 2003). Derrida uses the term autoimmunity to refer to this 
phenomenon, when systems of protection and security generate its own risks and 
hazards attacking the body it aims to secure.  
For Derrida, any community like a nation-state has an inherent and incurable tendency 
to destroy itself and he calls this suicidal act as “auto-co-immunity” (Miller, 2008, p. 
238). Just like the body’s immune system attacks its own cells, a nation-state’s security 
organs may turn its protective mechanisms against itself in an attempt to protect its 
borders and achieve the homeland security. Whereas the immune system (as well as the 
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security systems) depend on the ability to discern the difference between the self and the 
hostile foreign, the systems in question mistakenly, if not systematically, confuse the 
two in a case of anxiety. W. J. T. Mitchell states that “when the nervous system is in a 
state of panic, anxiety, depression, or, even worse, psychosis, generating hallucinations 
and paranoid fantasies, the immune system has a tendency to respond inappropriately as 
well” (Mitchell, 2007, p. 285). Within this logic, Derrida claims that the attacks of 
September 11 triggered an autoimmune reaction that becomes particularly visible when 
the sovereignty of the state is ‘felt’ to be threatened. As discussed above, in its inability 
to discern the internal-external and friend-enemy, the immune system reacts but 
inevitably fails to secure: Since the attacks provoke the immune system to an auto-
hyper-immunity, the body politic attacks itself. What makes terrorism more threatening 
than any other threat for state sovereignty is its unidentifiable and unlocatable character. 
In this regard, not just a part, a region or a fraction of nation-state is ‘felt’ under attack 
by this spectral threat, but it is felt, presented and experienced as if the whole existence 
of the political authority, that is, the sovereignty of the state is endangered. Under this 
very condition, Michael Naas claims that “something is clearly happening today not just 
to sovereign nations but to the very notion of sovereignty itself” (Naas, 2008, p. 123). If 
the old sovereignties were threatened by the new ones as a result of globalisation after 
the end of the Cold War, the attacks of September 11 added a new dimension to this 
threat with autoimmunity reactions.  
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Derrida’s first intervention about autoimmunity focuses on the US democracy’s quasi-
suicidal tendencies in a historical context: “Immigrated, trained, prepared for their act in 
the United States by the United States, these hijackers incorporate, so to speak, two 
suicides in one: their own (and one will remain forever defenceless in the face of a 
suicidal, autoimmunitary aggression –and that is what terrorises most) but also the 
suicide of those who welcomed, armed, and trained them” (Derrida, 2003, p. 95). With 
reference to the end of the Cold War, Derrida claims that what happened in September 
11 is a historical trace or a remainder of the Cold War (Derrida, 2003, p. 98). To him, 
the Cold War has not ended since the old heroes of Afghan War have now become the 
new enemies of the US.  
Nevertheless, the attackers in question in September 11 are difficult to detect (define, 
discern, distinguish). What poses a threat against the sovereign state is not another 
recognised body politic, it is some enemy who is not institutionalised, but organised like 
a web. In this regard, the nation-state does not find an official enemy, another nation-
state or a terrorist organisation who has stable and concrete political ambitions before 
itself. Instead, it is exposed to an unknown, unseen and unpredictable enemy which 
transcends the political, immune and security imagination of the Cold War. This is the 
‘second moment’ of autoimmunity for Derrida, in which the overall political logic of 
Cold War is not adequate to address the politics of post-Cold War terror attacks 
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(Derrida, 2003, p. 96).  
In the ‘third moment,’ Derrida speaks about the autoimmune logic hidden in repression 
both in political and psychoanalytical sense: “For we now know that repression in both 
its psychoanalytical and political sense –whether it be through the police, the military, 
or the economy– ends up producing, reproducing, and regenerating the very thing it 
seeks to disarm” (Derrida, 2003, p. 124). In a quasi-suicidal fashion, then, the more a 
democratic state defends/attacks the more it works for the terrorist cause, and the more 
it violates the freedoms and rights with security measures the more it harms the 
meaning of and the belief in democracy. The democratic state in this way can be both 
self-protecting and self-destroying with its security policies such as closing and 
controlling its borders, excluding and repressing the others and resorting to violence. 
This is, for Derrida, a pharmakon, at once remedy and poison. And autoimmunity is the 
new name for this strange behaviour of states (Derrida, 2003, p. 124). 
This self-destructive, quasi-suicidal tendency of democracies mostly take place in times 
of crisis, particularly during the crises of security. Sovereign power in democracies 
“sometimes reflexively reaches back to the violence that secretly founds and subtends it, 
in order to secure its own survival” (Johnson, 2012, p. 117). These are obviously 
defined as states of exception or of emergency no matter how frequently they become 
norms and leave ineradicable anti-democratic marks in the history of democracy. That 
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is, state of exception works as an activation code for ‘democratic autoimmunity’ 
through which democracy is under attack by itself. Giving the example of Algeria where 
he was born and grown, Derrida claims that democracy carries the risk of welcoming an 
undemocratic regime, and this is the aporia of democracy, which necessitates the 
alertness of democratic forces. As in the case of Algerian coup d’état of 1992, the 
measures implemented for the security of democracy can bring an end to some of the 
constituents of democracy such as legitimate elections, human rights, civic and personal 
freedoms, and thus may easily turn into a self-destroying act for democracy (Derrida, 
2005, p. 33). Although this double bind of security and insecurity is inevitable in 
democracy, for Derrida, it is malignant to lose the democratic sensibilities against state 
terrorism, torture and violation of human rights in the face of security crises. During 
such crises, even the most vocal democrats sometimes find themselves considering the 
utilitarian advantages of anti-democratic practices in order to achieve a supposed 
homeland security. For the survival of the whole of democracy, they would claim, some 
parts of the democracy may be sacrificed unfortunately.  
Nevertheless, for Derrida, the conceptualisation of autoimmunity does not only 
engender political criticism but rather opens up a process of deconstruction. As 
deconstruction is not a criticism or a method but a process always already at work, 
Derrida sees autoimmunity as a structural phenomenon in modern democracies as well 
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as in any self or community. In this regard, autoimmunity is not a completely negative 
concept, but it denotes an inevitable and necessary process for the development of 
democracy (Derrida, 2003). Hence, Derrida’s conception of autoimmunity including its 
critical application in the context of post-September 11 does not imply a total failure of 
democracy. Rather, what he does is highlighting the aporetic nature of the concept of 
democracy and the “constitutive autoimmunity” that allows democracy to be rethought 
and reinscribed endlessly even if it presents risks for itself.  
Not submitting its sovereignty to any other authority apart from the demos, the meaning 
and the power of democracy depend on the decision that is not made by one but the 
many. It is sovereignty in this sense that puts at risk its integrity in order to ensure its 
potential for life and growth, and to realise the openness. Even if this openness also 
counts for a vulnerability in its acceptance of others as is dramatically seen in the case 
of September 11, this vulnerability is necessary for democracy’s commitment to 
freedom and openness: In Derrida’s words, the instability of democracy is its 
“pervertible” “perfectibility” (Derrida, 2003, p. 121). Through its autoimmune 
character, democracy undermines any possibility of being proper to itself and this is the 
very possibility of democracy. That is, autoimmune process is not only a process by 
which democracy attacks a part of itself but also the sign of the fact that democracy 
might not coincide with itself radically.  
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4.2 Aporia: Democracy and Sovereignty 
Even if democracy is axiomatically considered as the best antidote against terrorism, 
and the Western media and academia common sensically recognised it as the most well-
suited form of political governance to combat, prevent and pre-empt aggression both 
nationally and globally, it is destined to autoimmunity: Derrida defines this not as a 
simple anomaly but rather as a phenomenon constitutive of democracy (Johnson, 2012, 
p. 119). The structural vulnerability of democracy starts from the very beginning when 
the community is constituted by identifying who belongs and who does not to 
community. That is, betraying their own and first axiom of ‘commonness’ or being-in-
common in their very constitutions, the communities’ ultimate aim of common good is 
just from the start delimited and unevenly shared (Johnson, 2012, p. 108). This 
inevitable closeness of community to its others for the sake of self-identification also 
appears as an obstacle for the survival and development of community. Nevertheless, an 
openness is also necessary for the communities since a relation with the other is part of 
the constitution of community’s identity. Even if the closeness enables community to 
create its own identity, it can never be self-identical since it necessarily bears the trace 
of the other in itself. Despite the inner forces dictating an absolute closeness in several 
fictitious ways such as nation’s unity and indivisibility narratives, it is always an option 
to be more open in democracies and this is the very chance of democracy. 
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Consequently, democratic communities are the ones which claim to be more open, 
pluralistic and respectful to the others of the community. 
Nevertheless, in the post-September 11 context, modern liberal democracies seemed to 
betray their own foundations in order to secure themselves against the threats posed by 
terrorism. Within a language of Realpolitik imprisoned in securitisation, democratic 
norms and anti-democratic practices have somehow been mutually contaminated and 
implicated in each other. For Derrida, creating their own insecurity and destabilising 
themselves in unimaginable ways, anti-democratic practices prevalent in post-
September 11 democracies displayed the autoimmunitary logic of democracies in more 
fundamental ways than the democratic normativity. The aporetic structure of democracy 
in fact lies at the heart of its necessary relation with sovereignty. In order to be a –cracy, 
a realised political regime, democracy has to be sovereign: Considering the rule of law 
in democracies, sovereignty is the only force that would enforce the law in the name of 
demos, and democracy can only be a mere utopia without sovereignty. Nevertheless, 
even if democracy requires sovereignty in order to be ‘democratic,’ the problem is that 
sovereignty is by definition above and beyond the law of democracy. This is not only a 
sign of the basic contamination of democracy with sovereignty but also the paradox that 
operates within the logic and mechanism of autoimmunity: Since the sovereign would 
irreducibly seek for the continuation of its sovereignty above and beyond any other 
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principle, including the law, the principles of democracy inevitably contradict with the 
demands of sovereignty. In this picture, “democracy gives itself to be violated by 
sovereignty in order to be effective. But this also means that democracy is never fully 
present in and reducible to sovereignty” (Cheah, 2009, p. 88).  
Therefore, sovereignty and democracy are incompatible in the sense that both appear to 
be unconditionally excluding each other even though they desperately in need of one 
another. This aporia, for Derrida, is inevitable as well as irreducible since democracy is 
impossible without the authority and capacity of sovereignty whereas democracy’s 
tendency to share ability and subjectivity contradicts the indivisible unity and totality of 
sovereignty. The aporia is that democracy cannot totally renounce sovereignty if it 
wishes its mission to be actualised but it risks the same mission by submitting itself to 
sovereignty (Cheah, 2009).  
In order to approach more closely to this aporia, Derrida insists on autoimmunity and its 
other, if not original, manifestations in self-identity. For him, neither autoimmunity nor 
the paradoxes of sovereignty are limited to the democratic or political realm. Rather, the 
question of autoimmunity and sovereignty is part of a more general field, that is, 
metaphysics (Cheah, 2009). Autos is the Greek word for the self, and it is often 
translated to Latin as ‘ipse’. Derrida reminds that ipseity, self-ness, self-sameness or 
self-identity is necessary for all beings and what is to be protected and secured before 
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anything else is the very origin of the self as ipseity. Drawing on this line of thought, in 
Rogues, Derrida claims that sovereignty is reducible to ipseity that is “an a priori 
sovereignty necessarily precomprehended by any positive case of political sovereignty” 
(Cheah, 2009, p. 77). Before any sovereignty of state or nation-state, ipseity is the name 
of legitimate sovereignty of any power or –cracy.  No matter it is impossible, the self 
aims to be self-same and protects its ipseity from any alterity for an autos, an 
automatism is necessary: The self must be able to use the ability to return to or assert 
itself countlessly to be the self definitively. Drawing from Derrida, Michael Naas claims 
that “the self is autonomous only to the extent that it is automobilic and autotelic, that 
is, only to the extent that it can of itself, by itself, give itself its own law with its own 
self…” (Naas, 2008, p. 126)  
A self, identical with itself is also a necessity for the logic that aims to comprehend it, 
and for the self-comprehension, the self-image of the self should be stabilised and 
concretised in one image no matter how much the other blurs this image with its own 
sameness and difference. This game of identity, Derrida points, is also at work for the 
body politic that seeks its self-sameness in its own image under the conception of 
sovereignty. As seen in nation-states, sovereignty is at once absolute and united in the 
image of body politic. This is the ambiguity of sovereign identity in which the ipseity 
and self-sameness is both a necessity and an illusory fiction at the same time. 
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Democracy thus requires a power that inheres in people’s ipseity but the very magic of 
democracy is the plurality of people that does not allow self-sameness demanded by 
sovereignty. 
For sovereignty is always exercised over a closed community such as a nation-state, 
under the auspices of sovereignty, democracy would always remain conditional. 
Historically speaking, this is why democracy has been limited to the likewise citizens 
enclosed within a certain territory. Instead of being extended “to the whole world of 
singularities, to the whole world of humans assumed to be like me, my compeers – or 
else, even further, to all nonhuman living beings, or again, even beyond that, to all the 
non-living” (Derrida, 2005, p. 53), democracy in nation-state form is limited by 
fraternity. From Iliad to French Revolution, Derrida points out, the political theology 
assuming a familial bond among fellow citizens claims that this paternalistic and 
patriarchal bond designates the very limits of democracy in its current forms. The 
inevitable exclusion of non-citizens, practices of exile and delimitation of demos to only 
male (not female), free (non-slave) local residents (non-metic) begs the question: “How 
far is democracy to be extended, the people of democracy, and the “each ‘one’” of 
democracy?” (Derrida, 2005, p. 54)  
The aporia of democratic sovereignty thus lies in its commitment to two incompatible 
things at once: to welcome only men, on the condition of citizenship, excluding non-
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citizens and rogues; and at the same time remaining open to all the others and the 
excluded. For Derrida, democratic nation-states oscillate between these two and by 
doing so, they do not respond to the call for hospitality that is necessary for any 
democracy. The impossible task of hospitality, that is, unconditionally welcoming the 
other would mean putting the ipseity of democracy at risk. Without this risk, however, 
the life of the self (ipse) would turn into an automatic, life machine. And without this 
risk, democracies would be no different than autocratic and authoritarian regimes 
(Derrida, 2005, pp. 30-1). 
For that reason, democracies have to and do undertake these risks in several ways. Even 
though it seems impossible in the face of aforementioned aporias, democracy is the only 
political option that can undertake these risks. In this context, Derrida not only mentions 
how terrorists behind the September 11 attacks were in fact accepted, trained and hosted 
by the United States, but also lists the institutionalisation of human rights, international 
organisations such as United Nations, international law and the creation of International 
Criminal Court as the disputers of nation-state sovereignty (Derrida, 2005, p. 87). In all 
these relatively novel structures, for Derrida, the sovereignty of nation-states is 
challenged with an emphasis on human rather than the citizen. Even if those efforts do 
not finally undermine the nation-state sovereignty, and they do not aim to do so, they 
more or less and on different levels have the potential to surpass the nation-state’s 
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borders and boundaries. Extending the democratic beyond the nation-state and 
citizenship, human rights discourse, for Derrida, is a case for the invention of “new 
distributions and forms of sharing, new divisions of sovereignty” (Derrida, 2005, p. 87).  
This is, for Derrida, a sign of the deconstructibility, or even the ongoing deconstruction, 
of the conception of sovereignty. Even if these structures do not limit sovereignty of 
nation-states, and even if they set one sovereignty in place of the other, their presence 
reveals the autoimmune character of sovereignty. In this regard, and in line with 
Derrida’s usual invitation to deconstruction, the task of the post-September 11 as well 
as of the twenty-first century would be deconstruction, and in particular, deconstruction 
of sovereignty. Even though democracy is always in need of sovereignty to be effective, 
it also deconstructs sovereignty. Its universalism and orientation towards freedom and 
equality have the potential to undermine the monopoly of the sovereign power. Indeed, 
democracy is the structural deconstructibility of sovereignty: “Just as presence can 
renew itself only by being ruptured by the gift, democracy always exceeds and 
destabilises sovereignty” (Cheah, 2009, p. 88).  
For Derrida, democratic citizenship and state sovereignty can even be the guardians 
against the international violence and economic exploitation even if the sovereignty 
itself monopolises a certain violence in democracy. “Nation-state sovereignty can even 
itself, in certain conditions, become an indispensable bulwark against certain 
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international powers, certain ideological, religious, or capitalist, indeed linguistic, 
hegemonies that, under cover of liberalism or universalism, would still represent, in a 
world that would be little more than a marketplace, a rationalisation in the service of 
particular interests” (Derrida, 2005, p. 158). Nevertheless, Derrida’s account of 
hospitality and nationalism explicates that this guardianship cannot be achieved without 
any abuse by any sort of nationalism: “Nationalism, today, is always state-nationalism, 
a zealous, that is, a jealous and vindictive vindication of a nation constituted as a 
sovereign state” (Derrida & Roudinescu, 2004, p. 93-4).  
For it is an instrument of the state and a sheer mystification, nationalism is an irrational 
and relativistic regime of thought that has “no future” and “can promise nothing.” By 
excluding the noncitizens, with its emphasis on fraternity and familial bonds, 
nationalism supresses democracy’s potential openness to the other. Therefore, for 
Derrida, it cannot be a final response to globalisation of the market forces in the twenty-
first century. For this reason, Derrida’s hopes lie in democracy and worldwide-isation 
(not globalisation but mondialisation) of the world: A democracy, which transcends the 
limitations of sovereignty in its nation form, would entail questioning and share of 
sovereignty and bring up the possibility of unconditional hospitality. In this sense, 
worldwide-isation of the world does not mean globalisation of neoliberal market 
structures but instead, it refers to the worldwide transmission of institutions of human 
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rights. For globalisation, which reduces the world into a global marketplace, is in fact 
anti-world and world-less, Derrida invests his hopes in democracy, international law 
and the empowerment of international institutions (Derrida, 2003). 
In this context, Derrida claims that sovereignty must be dissociated from democracy 
unconditionality. Reflecting on the possibility of a conditioned and conditional 
sovereignty, Derrida’s deconstruction aims at questioning the absolutist and 
unconditional heritage of sovereignty. As such, it looks for an opening to the possibility 
of a democracy to come rather than barbarism of both state and non-state terrorism 
(Brown, 2009). To achieve this aim, Derrida does not try to reconcile traditional 
features of sovereignty with the rule of demos, but rather he tries to think about a 
shared, divisible and conditioned sovereignty that would be necessary for an effective 
democracy. De-constitution of sovereign nation-states by globalisation does not 
guarantee such a procedure. On the contrary, it could actually facilitate and exacerbate 
the symptoms of today’s political problems. In this conjuncture, for Derrida, 
reconsidering sovereignty with respect to its relationship to democracy is an ethico-
political responsibility. And his own response to this responsibility is a recourse to 
deconstruction of sovereignty. According to him, the inseparable but incompatible 
couple of sovereignty and democracy should live together not in a so-called balance in 
the present but with a certain reference to futurity. Derrida calls this futurity as 
  
 
Emre Barca - June 2020   131 
 
 
democracy to come for democracy is always to-come against the unconditional a-
temporality of sovereignty (Cheah, 2009). 
4.3 Democracy to Come 
To Derrida, democracy cannot be thought without reference to what is to come since it 
does not present itself in the present, but it is always ‘to come’ (Derrida, 2005). This 
futurity, which draws from the idea that democracy cannot be present at any time since 
it is not identical with itself temporally, is captured in his conception of “democracy to 
come.” Since we cannot speak about a finished, completed or achieved democracy 
neither in the past nor present, we still do not know what democracy is or what it means 
(Derrida, 2005, p. 9). Nevertheless, even though democracy’s meaning is obscured and 
reserved, for Derrida, it is not an empty signifier since it certainly has a history and a 
legacy that we should inherit. This legacy, however, is not the main reference point in 
political realm since democracy is presentable neither as a word nor as a thing. What 
allows us to think about democracy, use this concept and endlessly refer to it despite all 
its indiscernibility is, however, its futurity. Lacking a coherent meaning as well as an 
unequivocal history, democracy would always look towards a future, with an endless 
reference to a future in the form of a promise.  
Yet, this future does not guarantee the coming, becoming or, in the end, a final presence 
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of democracy. Derrida in this regard differentiates ‘to-come’ from the future anterior: 
Whereas the future anterior denotes foreseeability, in a way an automaticity, an 
expectability of the future, to-come signifies the unforeseeable, unknown and 
unexpected aspect of future (Derrida, 2003, p. 97). That is, democracy to come does not 
point to a certain future of democracy or a future date when the rule of demos will reign 
eventually. Rather, democracy to come “must have the structure of a promise –and thus 
the memory of that which carries the future, the to-come, here and now" (Derrida, 2005, 
p. 86). 
Derrida tries to approach democracy and democracy to come in a manner that is 
peculiar to negative theology; he focuses on what democracy is not instead of what it is. 
As this choice has a lot to do with his deconstruction of the philosophy of presence, 
democracy would always be “is not” instead of an “is.” For Derrida, this is neither an 
abstraction nor a negation but a necessity in any genuine discourse on democracy since 
the aporetic structure of democracy does not allow one to speak on it in the present. 
This aporetic structure is both the weakness and chance, both the critique and promise 
of democracy. Derrida lists some aporias that democracy suffers as follows: “force 
without force, incalculable singularity and calculable equality, commensurability and 
incommensurability, heteronomy and autonomy, indivisible sovereignty and divisible or 
shared sovereignty, an empty name, a despairing Messianicity or a Messianicity in 
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despair, and so on” (Derrida, 2005, p. 86). Even if democracy to come with all these 
aporias points to the unrealisability of democracy in the present, it is still the very 
source of the needed insistence on democratic demand. This insistence derives from the 
future as a possibility even though it is not guaranteed to take place.  
Right at this point, Derrida warns the readers that democracy to come is not a regulative 
Idea in Kantian sense (Derrida, 2005, p. 90). It does not propose an ideal, prefigure a 
program or presume a prescription for democracy but designates the perfectibility and 
universalisability of democracy. Since Derrida does not rely on ethical or political 
values in their fixity, stability and persistence, and rather insists on ethico-political 
responsibility in the face of the event that is undecidable, unforeseeable and 
unappropriable, he claims that it is not possible to expect an automaticity, a mechanical 
reproduction from democracy (Derrida, 2005, p. 85). Instead, he calls for the continuous 
vigilance of the democrat since democracy’s call is always urgent and that call cannot 
be delayed or postponed with reference to futurity. The futurity of democracy to come, 
in this sense, does not entail a justification of undemocratic politics with an excusatory 
reference to future perfection. Rather, it presupposes an unconditional injunction, a 
singular urgency and a here and now “that does not await an indefinitely remote future 
assigned by some regulative Idea” (Derrida, 2005, p. 90). In this respect, democracy to 
come does not form a democratic ideal to be reached at some point in the future but 
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constitutes the very horizon of democracy as well as politics.  
A democracy without democracy to come, without a certain force from the future, from 
the possibility of impossible is not only unthinkable but also not worth thinking, for 
even the possibility of a criticism of de facto democracies depends upon to-coming of 
democracy. Moreover, democracy to come determines the horizon of politics in general 
not only because the vast majority of nation-states claims to be democratic but also 
because of the coextension and coexistence of politics and democracy. For Derrida, 
what allows democratic realm to become constitutive of the political realm in general is 
“the in-determination and the "freedom," the "free play," of its concept” (Derrida, 2005, 
p. 28). Embracing its autoimmunity in the forms of self-critique and perfectibility, 
democracy is the only system that assumes “the right to criticize everything publicly, 
including the idea of democracy, its concept, its history, and its name” (Derrida, 2005, 
p. 86). This free play of democracy allows it to take different forms throughout the 
history and displays the potentiality and openness of democracy.  
Democracy in this regard cannot be only the name of a “political regime” for it 
somehow transcends this definition by welcoming the possibility of being contested, 
criticised and hence, improved (Derrida, 2003, p. 121). This unique character of 
democracy makes Derrida uncertain about whether it is possible to separate the political 
and the democracy (Derrida, 2005, p. 44). What is certain, however, for Derrida, is that 
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there is something “ultrapolitical” about democracy and this is nothing but its “seeking 
its place only at the unstable and unlocatable border between law and justice” (Derrida, 
2005, p. 39). That is to say, unlike other political regimes, democracy plays its game at 
the border between possibility and impossibility. 
Derrida reminds that justice always remains impossible whereas law’s playground is the 
possible even if the latter always aims, or at claims to aim, the justice (Mansfield, 2011, 
p. 233). In this regard, by opening its law and itself to discussion and by continuously 
searching for an impossible perfection from the future, democracy is possibly 
impossible. Nevertheless, defining two regimes of the possible, Derrida distinguishes 
the democratic from the political in the sense that unlike the democratic, the political is 
possibly possible (Derrida, 2005, p. 46). In this regard, Derrida claims, “it is not certain 
that “democracy” is a political concept through and through” (Derrida, 2005, p. 
39). There is something in democracy transcending the limits of the political and that is 
its particular relation with the impossible.  
The concept of democracy to come is in this sense inseparable from democracy, for it is 
the very concept that designates its relationship with the possibly impossible. In this 
regard, Derrida says, “Democracy will never exist in the present; it is not presentable, 
and it is not a regulative idea in the Kantian sense. But there is the impossible, whose 
promise democracy inscribes –a promise that risks and must always risk being perverted 
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into a threat” (Derrida, 2003, p. 120). Democracy to come is what undertakes this 
impossible promise without any guarantee of realising it or immunity. Without this risk 
opening to the future, to the event and the other, neither democracy nor responsibility 
would be possible for Derrida. Within this deconstructive regime of possible-
impossible, the possibility of a democracy that deserves this name, for Derrida, is its 
(possible) impossibility in the sense that this impossibility is not privative and does not 
designate an ultimate inaccessibility. Rather, it is real like the other, similar to the 
reality of the irreducible difference of the other. The impossible, in this sense, “is 
announced to me, sweeps down upon me, precedes me, and seizes me here now, in a 
nonvirtualizable way, in actuality and not potentiality” (Derrida, 2003, p. 134).  
In the context of post-September 11, the impossible, that is “announced to us, sweep 
down upon us, precedes and seizes us,” is the possibly impossible thought of hospitality 
which is essential for any democracy in Derrida’s thought. Hospitality in this context 
both displays one of the foundational characteristics of democracy for Derrida 
exemplifies the way in which the impossible plays a role in the face of contemporary 
problems of our societies. Unlike tolerance that is conditional on a particular religious 
and theological origin, Derrida calls for a pure and unconditional (impossible) 
hospitality particularly after September 11 attacks (Derrida, 2003, pp. 128-9). 
Unconditional or pure hospitality opens itself or is open in advance to wholly other that 
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is irreducibly nonidentifiable and unforeseeable in its otherness. Whereas conditional 
hospitality, tolerance, only accepts the other under the condition that the other should 
follow our rules, our way of life or even our language, pure hospitality is open to the 
other without any condition even if it means risking its own life, integrity or comfort.  
Such an unconditional hospitality is impossible in the sense that it cannot have a law or 
political status, but it is still necessary for any possible experience of hospitality. As 
observed in the relation between democracy and democracy to come, a conditional 
hospitality is not thinkable without the possibly impossibility of pure and unconditional 
hospitality. “Without this thought of pure hospitality (a thought that is also, in its own 
way, an experience), we would not even have the idea of the other, of the alterity of the 
other, that is, of someone who enters into our lives without having been invited. We 
would not even have the idea of love or of “living together (vivre ensemble)” with the 
other in a way that is not a part of some totality or “ensemble.”” (Derrida, 2003, p. 129) 
In Derrida’s lexicon, then, the thought, and hence the experience of the impossible, are 
the conditions of the possible. In their very opposition, conditional hospitality and 
unconditional hospitality require each other: They are both heterogeneous and 
indissociable. “I cannot open the door, I cannot expose myself to the coming of the 
other and offer him or her anything whatsoever without making this hospitality 
effective, without, in some concrete way, giving something determinate. This 
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determination will thus have to re-inscribe the unconditional into certain conditions. 
Otherwise, it gives nothing” (Derrida, 2003, pp. 129-30). These sentences do not only 
explicate Derrida’s aporetic views about hospitality and tolerance but also points at the 
inevitable relation between heterogeneous regimes of the possible and the impossible.  
Any political, juridical or ethical responsibility would take place on this transaction 
between these two regimes of possible and impossible. Since there is not any regulative 
idea or program preceding and determining this transaction, the transaction would be 
unique each time it takes place, just like an event. Thus, in this unique sense, democracy 
to come is the impossible of any possible, which allows it to criticise its law and itself 
endlessly in an autoimmune way with an unfulfillable promise of justice, hospitality, 
forgiveness and openness to the other. What is ultimately ‘undemocratic’ is, in this 
sense, to forget, give up or disregard the possible impossibility of democracy to come 
either due to a supposed guarantee, program or idea, or because of disappointment, 
failure or trauma.  
Triggering and inciting an already existent autoimmune reaction in democracy, 
September 11 attacks inaugurated a period marked with undemocratic politics. Because 
the very openness of democracy was blamed for the shortcomings of security in the face 
of the terrorist threats, undemocratic practices took hold. These practices that vary from 
migration and refuge policies to border control and walling practices, implemented in 
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the name of security, unity or greatness of the nation. Particularly at this point where the 
other is excluded, exiled or not welcomed, Derrida reminds the promise of democracy: 
“On the horizon without horizon of this semantic disturbance or turbulence, the question 
of the democracy to come might take the following form, among others: what is "living 
together?" And especially "what is a like, a compeer [semblable]," "someone similar or 
semblable as a human being, a neighbour, a fellow citizen, a fellow creature, a fellow 
man," and so on? Or even: must one live together only with one's like, with someone 
semblable?” (Derrida, 2005, p. 11) These interminable questions regarding living 
together and coexistence with the other, for Derrida, are not limited to ethical realm but 
they are genuine questions about democracy and politics in the sense that democracy to 
come intersects the ethical and the political. In this way, democracy to come enables 
him to think on a democracy beyond the bond of citizenship, of nation or any other 
social bond including a supposed contract (Derrida, 2003, p. 120).  
Last but not least, democracy to come, for Derrida, is a “militant political critique”, “a 
weapon aimed at the enemies of democracy”; the enemies nearby or far away, at home 
or some other place in the world. This critique beyond doubt includes the democracies, 
particularly at a time when they become more rogue than “rogue states.” And it applies 
to democracies particularly where they become “obscene alibis” for “the terrible plight 
of so many millions of human beings suffering from malnutrition, disease, and 
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humiliation, grossly deprived not only of bread and water but of equality or freedom, 
dispossessed of the rights of all, of everyone, of anyone” (Derrida, 2005, p. 86). Yet, the 
source of the democratic critique of democracies is not any established institution or 
practice, but it is the restless thinking of democracy to come in every aspect of life 
beyond geopolitical boundaries. This is why democracy always remains to be 
rediscovered, rethought and reinscribed again and again. It is an unfinished and 
unfinishable project. 
4.4 Deconstruction of Sovereignty 
The needed and ongoing deconstruction of sovereignty can be seen as Derrida’s very 
contribution to the thought and promise of democracy. As illustrated above, the couple 
of democracy and sovereignty is both inseparable and incompatible in an aporetic way. 
For “the metaphysical concept at the heart of democracy is sovereignty,” it stands as 
both democracy’s chance and fragility (Cheah, 2009, p. 77). Indeed, among other 
characteristics of democracy, the ones mentioned above such as freedom (Derrida, 
2005) and hospitality (Derrida, 2003) would require and presuppose a sovereignty, an 
ipseity, a self-identical and same with itself as well as the identity and the subjectivity, 
all of which are bound with the metaphysics of sovereignty. In this regard, it is possible 
to claim that the first step of the deconstruction of sovereignty is to reveal that it is not 
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merely a political concept but a metaphysical; one not only part and parcel of the 
sovereign but also, among others, of the self, reason, subject and God (Derrida, 2009). 
Therefore, in order to be able to deconstruct democratic sovereignty in its specific use 
or delimited meaning in the context of politics and democracy, it is firstly necessary to 
deal with the metaphysical and thus, generalised conception of sovereignty. 
Wendy Brown in this regard claims that, well before its declaration, sovereignty’s 
deconstruction had already began in the earlier works of Derrida, in which the very 
characteristics attributed to the sovereign such as unity, indivisibility, self-sufficiency 
and decisiveness have been deconstructed (Brown, 2009, p. 114). With vast references 
to Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Machiavelli and Carl Schmitt, 
Derrida, in his lectures published under the title of The Beast and the Sovereign (2009), 
demonstrates that all the qualities of the sovereign are also the qualities of the subject, 
reason and the self. And the deconstruction of the latter has always been in the agenda 
since the first, presumably ‘non-political’, text Of Grammatology (1967). As Vincent B. 
Leitch puts, this generalisation of sovereignty is not because the concept of sovereignty 
pops up in unexpected areas but rather because it is a principle that continuously finds 
itself “in struggle of contending sovereignties” (Leitch, 2007, p. 236). In this sense, the 
effects of sovereignty are also the effects of the self, reason, subjectivity and identity: 
“the drawing and policing definite boundaries, the production of determinate identity, 
Sovereign Power After September 11 
 
 
142  Emre Barca - June 2020 
 
 
the establishment of clear lines between insiders and outsiders, life and death, friend and 
enemy, familiar and foreigner.” (Brown, 2009, p. 114)  
In this regard, the metaphysics of sovereignty has an ineffaceable mark on the self, 
reason, subjectivity and identity, which makes them in effect and effective. Hence, they 
reciprocally illuminate each other’s operation in metaphysics and ethics as well as in 
politics and democracy. Even if it is intertwined with the deconstruction of the self, 
reason, subjectivity and identity in this way, deconstruction of sovereignty does not 
overlook its ‘own’ realm, that is, the theory and practice of politics and democracy. If 
one looks for a description of political sovereignty in the narrower sense of the term in 
Derrida’s oeuvre, one sees repeated references to “monopoly on violence”, “death 
penalty,” “the right of the state”, “the right of the sovereign to punish by death”, 
(Derrida, 2002, p. 268) “controlling borders”, “excluding noncitizens”, “protection from 
outside threats”, (Derrida, 2003, p. 124) “a certain power to give, to make, but also to 
suspend the law”, “being-outside-the-law” (Derrida, 2009, pp. 34-5) and so on. In all 
these references, it can be said that Derrida’s deconstruction of sovereignty certainly 
targets what we call state sovereignty, sovereignty of the state, sovereign state or 
sovereign nation-state.  
On the other hand, decoupling the understanding of sovereignty from that of nation 
state, Derrida also asserts that “it would be imprudent and hasty, in truth hardly 
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reasonable, to oppose unconditionally, that is, head-on, a sovereignty that is itself 
unconditional and indivisible. One cannot combat, head-on, all sovereignty, sovereignty 
in general without threatening at the same time, beyond the nation-state figure of 
sovereignty, the classical principles of freedom and self-determination” (Derrida, 2005, 
p. 158). What lies behind this reservation is Derrida’s argument that, as a “quasi-
transcendental” concept, the phantasm of sovereignty does haunt both the ipseity and 
freedom of the self, the subject and the citizen, and the state with its laws and 
regulations as well as its crimes and terror. That is to say, it is not possible to attack or 
vanquish sovereignty directly without risking the very reasons behind the initial 
intention of the attack, that is, for Derrida, democracy. Deconstruction, on the other 
hand, is never a destructive attack or an attack at all. Just like autoimmunity, 
deconstruction is not an overall negative concept, it is not a destruction in the 
Heideggerean sense of the term since it also implies affirmation (Derrida, 2005, p. 173). 
Derrida’s response to the double bind of sovereignty is thus “a rational deconstruction 
that will endlessly question their limits and presuppositions, the interests and 
calculations that order their deployment, and their concepts –beginning with the 
concepts of law and of duty, and especially the concept of the human, the history of the 
concept of the human, of what is proper to humankind, to the human as zoon logon 
ekhon or animal rationale” (Derrida, 2005, p. 151). Therefore, the deconstruction of 
sovereignty would question and destabilise some other concepts such as human, 
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humanity, reason, animality and so on, alongside the sovereignty.  
One of the effects of deconstruction is denaturalisation of the concepts, limits, laws, 
functions and calculations surrounding what is being deconstructed. This is why 
deconstruction of sovereignty displays the historicity and artificiality; it reveals 
construction of sovereignty and works against so-called self-evident and “natural” 
appropriations of sovereignty. In a conjuncture where sovereignty informs both the 
nation-state and international relations and gains a ‘universal’ currency that almost 
appears natural to political life, its deconstruction reveals how sovereignty is not natural 
in contrast to what its history suggests and shows how sovereignty is not stable despite 
its contemporary manifestations suggesting otherwise. If the contemporary 
manifestations associated with sovereignty are globalisation, destatification or 
deconstitution of nation-states and post-September 11 autoimmune reactions, the history 
of sovereignty, for Derrida, is always a history of theology, a political theology, an 
onto-theology or onto-tele-theology (Derrida, 2005, p. 87). Indeed, for Derrida, from 
Ancient Greeks to modern democracy, sovereignty has been inscribed by a tradition of 
political theology that connects ancient conceptualisations to contemporary ones. In 
Rogues (2005) and particularly in The Beast and the Sovereign (2009), Derrida focuses 
on a wide range of philosophers to display this filiation and affiliation.  
For Derrida, Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651), which is considered as a master piece 
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that marks the birth of a modern, secular or non-theological understandings of state and 
politics,  is particularly significant (Derrida, 2009, p. 53). What Derrida aims to show by 
citing Hobbes, however, is the artificiality and divineness sovereignty modelled in 
Leviathan: “Art goes yet further, imitating that Rationall and most excellent work of 
Nature, Man. For by art is created that great LEVIATHAN, called a COMMON-
WEALTH or STATE which is but an Artificiall Man; though of greater stature and 
strength than the Naturall, for whose protection and defence it was intended” (Derrida, 
2009, p. 27). Hobbes claims that Leviathan is in fact a human artefact in the logic of an 
imitation of the divine art: Whereas nature is the art of God in his creation and 
governance of the world, man is the most eminent creation of God. The art of man, in 
this regard, is unable to create a natural being even if it imitates the art of God. What he 
creates is an artificial animal that is called Leviathan. According to Derrida, by claiming 
that Leviathan is a creation of human art, Hobbes admits that sovereignty is artificial, 
unnatural, historical and thus, de-constructible. 
Furthermore, Derrida goes on to suggest that Hobbes follows the age-old theological 
tradition by claiming that Leviathan is created as a result of imitation of the art of God. 
In a very similar manner, Derrida takes issue with Jean Bodin, who also relies on a 
divine model in which the sovereign is shaped on the basis of God’s image. In Six 
Books of Republic (1576), Bodin states that “For if Justice is the end of law, law of the 
Sovereign Power After September 11 
 
 
146  Emre Barca - June 2020 
 
 
work of the prince, the prince the image of God; then by this reasoning, the law of the 
prince must be modelled on the law of God” (Derrida, 2009, p. 48). Just like Hobbes, 
Bodin asserts an image of a sovereign that is created by man imitating the art of God 
and defined by an unconditional unity and indivisibility.    
Even more interestingly, Derrida detects the same theological lineage in Alexis de 
Tocqueville’s Democracy in America (1835) where he states that “The people reign 
over the American political world as God rules over the universe. It is the cause and the 
end of all things; everything rises out of it and it is absorbed back into it” (Derrida, 
2005, p. 14). For Derrida, this sentence goes beyond the limits of rhetoric and reveals 
the theological origins of democracy. In this theological understanding, even if 
democracy is characterised by an institutional divisibility, there is a supreme sovereign, 
either in the name of God or ‘people’. Well before these modern thinkers, Homer, in 
Iliad, refers to Zeus who wins over his father Cronos and claims his sovereignty as the 
god of all kings. In Rogues, Derrida takes up this Homeric theogonic mythology and 
insists on its influence on Aristotle citing his words “no good thing is a multitude of 
lords; let there be one lord, one king” (Derrida, 2005, p. 16). This phrase, for Derrida, 
displays that the attributes of unity and indivisibility have been central to early politico-
theological conceptions of sovereignty, and he finds that modern nation-state’s 
references to one nation, one state or one leader can be traced back to these early 
  
 




Another line of thought that Derrida addresses in this Homeric tale is the articulation of 
Freudian parricide and the share of power by brothers. According to Derrida, this 
articulation designates the origins of fraternity and equality, and marks the filiation and 
affiliation between modern concepts of democratic sovereignty and ancient Greek 
mythology. More precisely, in the fraternalistic interpretation of democracy, an 
egalitarian contract is achieved by rival but equal brothers, and this “parricidal 
theogony” belongs to a long tradition of political theology that is “phallo-paterno-filio-
fraterno-ipsocentric” (Derrida, 2009). This tradition of political theology, Derrida 
argues, has been revived and taken over by modern thinkers of sovereignty (Derrida, 
2005, p. 17). In this regard, Derrida states that: “Today, the great question is indeed, 
everywhere, that of sovereignty. Omnipresent in our discourses and in our axioms, 
under its own name or another, literally or figuratively, this concept has a theological 
origin: the true sovereign is God. The concept of this authority or of this power was 
transferred to the monarch, said to have a ‘‘divine right.’’ Sovereignty was then 
delegated to the people, in the form of democracy, or to the nation, with the same 
theological attributes as those attributed to the king and to God.” (Derrida & 
Roudinescu, 2004, pp. 91-2) 
These attributes of politico-theological tradition that is still in effect are purity, 
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unconditionality, indivisibility and unshareability that are all posited in an absolutist and 
purist manner striving for resisting time, space, language and the other (Naas, 2008, p. 
127). What deconstruction aims to do is not only to denaturalise this fiction at the heart 
of politics and metaphysics, but also to reveal that sovereignty cannot and does not 
possibly resist time, space, language and the other. What is at issue in this regard is not 
an absolute sovereign, such as a king, God or people. Rather, the problematization is 
about the manifestations of sovereignty which assume that the sovereign can and should 
resist any share of power, any limitation on the duration of sovereignty, any discussion 
on its legitimacy or any openness towards the other of the community. This is why 
Derrida first and foremost refutes the claims to the purity of sovereignty: “But since this 
happens all the time, pure sovereignty does not exist; it is always in the process of 
positing itself by refuting itself, by denying or disavowing itself; it is always in the 
process of auto-immunizing itself, of betraying itself by betraying the democracy that 
nonetheless can never do without it” (Derrida, 2005, p. 101). 
Michael Naas points out the aporia that even if sovereignty “in its essence without 
essence” is indivisible and unconditional, it has neither full control nor authority over 
the realms of time, space, language and the other (Naas, 2008, p. 127). And this is 
precisely the point where the autoimmune character of sovereignty manifests itself. 
Whenever sovereignty tries to expand its dominion in space, whenever it works for 
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maintaining itself over time, whenever it produces arguments against its enemies and 
whenever it encounters with the other, it undoes or autoimmunises itself (Naas, 2008, 
pp. 127-8). For Geoffrey Bennington, this aporia is nothing but the “stupidity” of 
sovereignty, which is particularly apparent in the relationship between the legislative 
power (the sovereign) and executive power (the government) (Bennington, 2009, p. 99). 
Bennington claims that execution is always already a usurpation of legislation and 
sovereignty. This is because, in its need of execution, sovereignty is not sovereign just 
from the beginning: Willing and desiring an execution, it is in need of a 
supplementation and this need contradicts with the claims of sovereignty. Sovereign is 
not sovereign at all if it cannot remain purely sovereign in its unity, self-sufficiency and 
indivisibility. Nevertheless, if it cannot execute, it would also mean that it is not 
sovereign. This aporia requires sovereignty to descend from the summit of sovereign 
heights and present itself to the usurpatory hands of an executive branch. In this 
manner, in the form of a government, the executive power would undo sovereignty in 
the very act of supplementing and supporting it (Bennington, 2009, p. 98). 
All of these deconstructive moves uncover the aporetic claims of sovereignty which rely 
on some “essential” attributes such as unity, self-sufficiency, unconditionality and 
indivisibility. What deconstruction aims to display is that sovereignty is in fact subject 
to sharing, divisions and differentiation despite the abuses of power attempting to 
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conceal this fact. In this regard, Derrida invites to think about a form of sovereignty, 
particularly democratic sovereignty, in which power is shared, delegated and 
questioned. This contemplation, for him, is not a question “of sovereignty or 
nonsovereignty but that of the modalities of transfer and division of a sovereignty said 
to be indivisible –said and supposed to be indivisible but always divisible” (Derrida, 
2009, p. 291). This is to think sovereignty without purity and indivisibility. Today’s 
political task, for Derrida, is to distinguish sovereignty from unconditionality since an 
unconditional renunciation of sovereignty is an a priori requirement for an openness 
towards the unconditionality of the event and unconditional coming of the other 
(Derrida, 2005, p. xiv). Yet, Derrida warns the readers against any relativism or a blind 
battle against sovereignty: Even though the purist or absolutist attributes are challenged 
inherently as well as by an ongoing deconstruction, none of the historical processes and 
critical interventions would or should mean the ultimate depreciation of sovereignty. 
This is because, according to Derrida, it is impossible to think of a law, a state or even a 
self or subject without sovereignty. Therefore, it is and will be at the heart of politics 
and democracy but possibly and hopefully in a more democratic and open way towards 
the event and the other. In this regard, the experience of democracy is also an 
experience of a divided, shared and challenged sovereignty. Even if the aporia of 
democracy and sovereignty would remain unsolved, democracy to come would continue 
articulating the promise of democracy against the pure and indivisible modalities of 
  
 




Demonstrating the politico-theological origins of sovereignty, deconstruction, thus, 
dethrones the sovereign from the sublime heights to do justice to all other living beings 
or more, all beings, including the animal but also the human. This is because the 
sovereign is always posited not only in relation to human (ordinary, non-sovereign 
citizen/subject of the community) but also to the beast (the animal excluded from the 
community). And it is this relationality that determines what is “proper to man” in 
addition to the purity and indivisibility of the sovereignty. As illustrated above, for 
Derrida, excluding itself from space, time, language and the other, the human sovereign 
operates through an attribution of God, that is, beyond history and meaning: “Be it 
Moses, Christ, the monarch king as Christian king or an assembly of men elected and 
instituted as sovereign, their place always stands for the place of God [tient lieu de 
Dieu]. The (human) sovereign takes place as place-taking [lieu-tenant], he takes place, 
the place standing in for the absolute sovereign: God” (Derrida, 2009, pp. 53-4).  
This place-taking of the human sovereign also gives a proper place to non-sovereign 
human subject as well as to the beast. Even though human subject appears to stand in 
between God-like law-making sovereign and the unlawful beast in the first sight, 
Derrida shows that the trilateral relationality of this onto-theological analogy is much 
more complicated than it is usually thought to be. This is why Derrida would speak of 
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some other manifestations of this onto-theology such as the theo-zoology or the theo-
antropo-zoology in order to express this trilateral relationality. For Derrida, this 
relationality has much to say about the artificial nature of sovereignty as well as about 
the permeable limits and boundaries between sovereignty, humanity and bestiality 
(Derrida, 2009). 
In The Beast and the Sovereign Derrida starts his deconstruction of onto-theology by 
pointing out a significant common feature of the sovereign and the beast, that is, being-
outside-the-law. Referring to Schmitt, Derrida suggests that sovereign’s power to give, 
make and suspend the law makes it above and outside the law: The sovereign does not 
give account of itself but always remains silent; does not respond since it is situated at a 
distance to the law as the origin, guarantor and condition of it. Nevertheless, for 
Derrida, this feature of the sovereign is what makes it brutal and rogue to the extent that 
it, in fact, becomes bestial and beastly, which does not ‘naturally’ bound with the 
human law. For Derrida, these two different modes of being-outside-the-law have such 
a resemblance that “they call on each other and recall each other, from one to the other: 
there is between sovereign, criminal, and beast a sort of obscure and fascinating 
complicity, or even a worrying mutual attraction, a worrying familiarity, an unheimlich, 
uncanny, reciprocal haunting.” (Derrida, 2009, p. 17).  
In this regard, Derrida would not hesitate to state that the sovereign is the beast and the 
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beast is the sovereign. Moreover, focusing on the mythological and fabulous 
representations of the state, the prince and the sovereign in the works of Hobbes and 
Machiavelli, Derrida states that an artificial monstrosity of the animal is explicit in these 
descriptions of sovereignty. As articulated in Hobbes’s nomenclature, Leviathan, even if 
the sovereign is at a distance from the human realm, it is still a human artefact that is 
bestial, or more clearly, monstrous. In this sense, for Derrida, sovereignty is like an 
artificial animal, a non-natural, machine-like animal or a prosthetic monster that is 
superior to the man and the beast, even if it bears the marks of humanity and bestiality. 
Either in the figure of man or in the figure of animal, this prosthetic machine mimes, 
imitates and reproduces the living being that originally produces it (Derrida, 2009, pp. 
28-9).  
4.5 In Lieu of Conclusion 
With his lengthy interview on September 11 (Derrida, 2003) and his subsequent book 
on Rogues (Derrida, 2005), Derrida presents a deconstruction of sovereignty that is also 
focused on its relation with democracy. This is why, within our research, Derrida takes 
an important place as the theoretician of the sovereignty and a contemporary critical 
voice who utilises his philosophy to interpret one single event, that is, September 11 and 
the following shifts surrounding the socio-political scene of the world. In his meticulous 
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work, Derrida follows a multi-dimensional road, all intertwined with each other but the 
intersection point of all this conversation is nothing but sovereignty. The most 
significant aspect of his conception of sovereignty is, however, its not being merely a 
political concept but a metaphysical one; not only part and parcel of the sovereign but 
also, among others, of the self, reason, subject and God. In this picture, we encounter 
with a generalised conception of sovereignty and Derrida’s deconstruction tries to 
embrace an encompassing, metaphysical concept which is somewhat foundational for 
the self, reason and the subject. Nonetheless, within the limits of our research we tried 
to focus more on the political aspect of sovereignty in order to understand what 
happened to democracy after September 11 and why. If we can describe the 
theoreticians taken into account in this work as different voices, then Derrida is the 
voice of democracy. 
Like many other voices, Derrida, too, enlists and criticises what happens in liberal 
democracies after September 11 but more than that he insists on paradoxes, aporias and 
problems of democracy, which lead democracies to fail in their responses to September 
11. To Derrida, that insistence no doubt requires a deconstruction and his 
deconstruction focuses on the problematic couple of democracy and sovereignty. Even 
if we leave aside the period of post-September 11, the relation between the two is an 
aporetic, a paradoxical one for Derrida. The reason behind this is that like pharmakon 
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sovereignty is both a necessity and a poison for democracy. Like any other -cracy, 
democracy needs sovereignty to be realised but sovereignty’s characters like being-
outside-the-law, indivisibility, unity and so on are harmful for any democracy. 
Sovereignty’s monopoly on violence, obsession in order and inevitable exclusionary 
character undermines democracy. 
In this regard, democracy-to-come is a promising and hopeful concept and a theoretical 
thinking which enables democracy in spite of the risks and dangers sovereignty poses. It 
does not speak about an impossible task of eliminating sovereignty from the 
democracies but instead refers to a vigilance and unending perfectibility which are 
necessities for a working democracy. Derrida’s both criticism and future prospects after 
September 11 presents us a horizon to foster co-existence in democracy. As a 
philosopher as well as a public intellectual, with his deconstruction of sovereignty he 
offers an ethico-political perspective on both national and international levels. 
This is why he focuses on the idea of Europe as well as the European Union, and 
international institutions such as United Nations and international legal institutions like 
European Court of Human Rights. For Derrida, all these institutions must be 
empowered against the abuses of sovereign power of nation-states in domestic matters 
and against the roguishness of powerful states which sees in themselves to define which 
state is rogue. One can conclude that Derrida is more trustful to the existing institutions 
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than expected and even naïvely expectant from Europe and the international legal 
institutions. Nonetheless, to Derrida, this is what we have at hand for fostering any hope 
and he invites all deconstructionists from different disciplines to work for such a hope 
(Derrida, 2003). This is why deconstruction is not a negative act but also an affirmation 
in any case. 
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5 Life after September 11  
 
The newly emerging mottos following the September 11 were “Nothing will be the 
same again”, and “Everything changed”. Even if determining what has changed and 
what has remained the same requires further elaboration, the attacks and the following 
war on terror altered the lives of the people living in the US as well as the people of 
global community. The shifts in question include not only the lives of the victims of the 
attacks or the lives of the ones who are believed to be on the side of the victims, but also 
the lives of the thousands who might seem unrelated with ‘the event’. But on top of all 
these, the lives of war on terror’s almost invisible victims have been directly affected 
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from the event.  
This chapter inquires the ‘life’ at stake after September 11. It concerns the defined, 
regulated, affected life of the post-September 11 subject in the West and the invisible, 
unrecognised, bare life of the victims of the war. As much as ‘life’ is the very term that 
brings these separated groups of people together, it is also the word that divides them 
acutely. Apprehension, recognition and even the perception of life seem to depend upon 
a discriminatory distributive mechanism on a global scale. Moreover, as will be 
discussed more in detail, the biopolitical distinction between the life worth living and 
the life stripped of form and value keeps normatively dividing or implicitly defining 
humanity. 
In this background, reflecting critically on the concept of life drawing on the works of 
thinkers whose oeuvre intersect bios and politics -biopolitics- proves vital. Among these 
thinkers, Giorgio Agamben, who contributed to discussions on biopolitics in the context 
of post-September 11 significantly, is perhaps the most prominent and provoking one. 
Exceeding the disciplinary limits of philosophy, his work has been immensely applied 
as well as criticised by scholars of social sciences and humanities. Even though he is not 
the first thinker who conceptualised the biopolitics and biopower, his contributions and 
criticisms provide a critical approach to the discussions revolving around September 11. 
Agamben starts his probably most well-known book Homo Sacer (1998) with an 
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assertive argument and states that he is aiming at “correcting or at least, completing” the 
work of Michel Foucault, who first used the concepts of biopolitics and biopower in 
their current meanings in the first volume of History of Sexuality (1984). Both 
embracing and criticising Foucault’s legacy, Agamben’s starting point, as well as his 
main focus, is the politicisation of life; and his critical dialogue with Foucault both 
haunts and fosters Foucault’s thought. Agamben-Foucault distinction, in this sense, is a 
prolific one which allows one to reconsider the relationship between life and politics 
throughout the history.  
In Agamben’s reading of Foucault, biopolitics is the politicisation of natural life of the 
subject and the latter’s inclusion in the mechanisms and calculations of the state power. 
The subject in this frame is considered as a species, as a simple living body in the 
political stratagem (Agamben, 1998, p. 3). Foucault’s conception of biopolitics, on the 
other hand, develops within a temporal approach, if not a historical narrative. According 
to Agamben’s interpretation of Foucault, Foucault considers biopower as a modern 
invention that uses novel techniques which were lacking in the preceding forms of 
sovereign power. Moreover, according to Agamben, biopolitics in Foucauldian sense 
somehow abrogates sovereign power and opens up a new epoch which necessitates a 
novel approach to any sort of power relation. What Agamben wants to “correct or at 
least complete” in this conception of biopolitics is the supposed temporalisation of and 
Sovereign Power After September 11 
 
 
160  Emre Barca - June 2020 
 
 
opposition between these two modes of power, that is, biopower and sovereignty.  
In contrast to Foucault, Agamben claims that the birth of biopolitics can be traced back 
to the very foundations of politics in Ancient Greece. Citing Aristotle, Agamben 
demonstrates that there are two distinct words in Ancient culture denoting ‘life’: Zoe 
and bios. While zoe refers to living common to all living beings, bios stands for the 
living proper to an individual or a group (Agamben, 1998, p. 1). The distinction 
between these two terms, for Agamben, is not coincidental but, on the contrary, 
foundational for the Western politics. More precisely, according to Agamben, exclusion 
of ‘bare life’ (zoe) from the political realm and prioritisation of bios in the polis is the 
foundational relation of life and politics. Agamben’s objection to Foucault’s claim 
regarding the modernity of biopower is significant not only for revealing his approach 
to Foucault’s conceptual framework, but also for a further analysis of power throughout 
the history. While Foucault claims that the sovereign power to make die or let live 
historically precedes the biopolitics of modern age, Agamben’s attempt amounts to say 
that biopolitics has always been at work together with sovereignty. In Agamben’s 
thought, then, sovereignty and biopolitics cannot be two separate opposing models of 
power and therefore, the analyses of the two should not be separated in the occupation 
of political philosophy (Agamben, 1998, p. 6). Anne Caldwell names this combination, 
which allows Agamben to detect sovereign power at work both in the ancient and the 
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contemporary order, as “biosovereignty” (Caldwell, 2004).  
In this regard, for Agamben, the juridico-institutional aspect of power, which is 
neglected in Foucault’s analysis as a result of the distinction and opposition he asserts 
between biopower and sovereignty, should be taken into account for a more thorough 
analysis of power. Associating the legal and institutional power with sovereignty, 
(Agamben’s) Foucault neglects the analysis of what might be called macro 
manifestations power. In this sense, Agamben attempts to find the hidden intersection 
point between the biopolitical and juridico-institutional models of power (Agamben, 
1998, p. 6), and he demonstrates that this intersection point is the politicisation of ‘life’ 
in the Western politics. The figure of homo sacer in archaic Roman law is the 
illustration of this exceptional relation: Homo sacer is the one who can be killed without 
sanction but cannot be sacrificed. In this sense, it is excluded from the human and 
divine law in the form of a ‘bare life’. What is striking according to Agamben, however, 
is homo sacer’s inclusion in law by its very exclusion. The logic of exception, thus, 
works in a complex manner that Agamben calls “inclusive exclusion”. There lies the 
sovereign power who decides on the exception and the value and non-value of life. 
Within this logic, ‘bare life’ in its separatedness is included in politics and paradoxically 
constitutes the very foundation of it. In this way, bare life is deep inside the political 
system in the form of exception (Agamben, 1998, p. 11).   
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The contemporary in this sense is nothing but the intensification of this relation of 
exception where the sovereign power reigns. Regardless of living in happiness or 
misery, we all are homines sacri in the sense that our lives are captured by the sovereign 
power (Agamben, 1998, p. 84). For Agamben, our lives are defined by a dependence on 
sovereign exception, which shapes the nature of political belonging in the West. As 
citizen by birth, human life is captured by the law; law, not in the sense of the virtue of 
a contract or rights as various versions of liberalism would claim but I the sense of an 
exposure to the sovereign decision. The ‘normal’, everyday form of life, in which the 
relations of exception and sovereign decision are concealed, is not actually external to 
law, but rather “abandoned” by it. “Ban” in this framework is not simply a sanction but 
the characteristic of sovereign power in its relation of non-relationality. Agamben 
explicates the sovereign ban with reference to Aristotelean conception of potentiality 
and thus enlightens the paradoxical structure of sovereignty: Through its ability to not to 
be, potentiality maintains itself in relation to actuality (Agamben, 1998, p. 46). In this 
sense, “an act is sovereign when it realizes itself by simply taking away its own 
potentiality not to be, letting itself be, giving itself to itself” (Agamben, 1998, p. 46). As 
pure actuality and pure potentiality are indistinguishable, sovereignty dwells at this 
threshold of indistinction also bearing the mark of the relation of exceptionality. This 
shows not only how sovereign power operates in its seemingly ‘absence’ but also how 
the sovereign shares the logic of exception with homo sacer. 
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Within this logic, homo sacer and the sovereign are the two faces of the regime of 
exceptionality. Following Carl Schmitt, Agamben contends that for sovereign, who he 
decides on exception, all others are homines sacri while for homo sacer all others are 
sovereign. Like homo sacer is not outside the law but in a zone of indistinction between 
law and lawlessness, sovereign also acts in this limbo which renders the logic of current 
politics possible. In this regard, state of exception gains the qualification of a 
profoundly structural relation of politics. What is decisive in the social and political 
realm then is not the definition of norm or rule but the threshold between the law and 
lawlessness, which is constitutive of power relations.  Therefore, sovereign 
exceptionalism is not a deviance from the ‘normal’ order of things but the very 
foundation of sovereignty. Like homo sacer who is placed in a liminal position between 
a qualified human life and death, sovereign dwells at the limit between order and chaos, 
state of nature and the society with a state (Agamben, 1998, p. 11). Indeed, for 
Agamben, state of nature is not a temporal concept preceding the state but is always 
already contained in the form of it. The liberal understanding of separation of law and 
life thus collapses in this zone of indistinction, where sovereignty dwells. As life is 
already included in the sphere of law by being abandoned by it, the distinction between 
private and public also becomes questionable (Agamben, 1998, p. 122).  
‘Life’ after September 11 is an intensification of the regime of state of exception in 
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most of the areas of life from the application of biometrics at borders to everyday 
surveillance of public or even, private lives of subjects. Life in the state of exception 
means to live in-between the law and lawlessness in a total dependence on sovereign 
decision. To Agamben, reduced to ‘bare life’ rather than a citizen, the quasi-subject of 
state of exception is neither friend nor enemy of the state but a biopolitical unit that can 
be killed without committing homicide but cannot be sacrificed. In this indeterminate 
sphere of exception where the law is both suspended and in effect, the world becomes a 
camp. In such a world, the sacralised citizen equipped with rights turns into homo sacer 
and becomes naked in the face of sovereign power. Although it is always already there 
in potentia in modern democracies, the declaration or an undeclared application of state 
of exception uncovers the sovereign power in this age. September 11, 2001 in this sense 
is a critical date signalling this already unfolding process. 
5.1 The camp as the nomos of the world 
Turning of exception into a rule in the post-September 11 politics is not simply a 
temporary anomaly or a contingent situation but a consequence of a more fundamental 
problem: The problem of sovereign exceptionality that lies in the very foundation of 
politics in the West. From the governments of the First World War period to the 
Weimar Republic, the modern uses of state of exception are not new phenomena 
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(Agamben, 2005, pp. 2-12). Yet, the intensification and the variation of the regimes of 
exception worldwide is remarkable in effect. Finding the origins of the uses of state of 
exception in the French Revolution, Agamben detects that the application of state of 
exception is not a remnant of absolutist states of the past but a legacy of democratic-
revolutionary states (Agamben, 2005, p. 5). The transformation of mass democracies to 
totalitarian states after the First World War is not a sudden transformation but has 
biopolitical roots in itself. Democracy’s difference, however, is that it does not abolish 
the sacred life but “shatters and disseminates it into every individual body” (Agamben, 
1998, p. 121). In the sense that the word sacred appears in a paradox where it means 
both holy and taboo in Agamben’s lexicon, the life in modern democracy is sacred: the 
object of the old regime becomes the subject of democracy and sacralised with rights 
proper to man. One of the duties of the political philosophy is, then, to reveal the 
biopolitical origins and sovereign currencies in modern democratic state.  
No-man’s-land of law and lawlessness, which only the sovereign could once penetrate, 
is the land of the physician and the scientist in modern democracies where democracy 
undertakes the care of the body of citizen-subject. In this manner, the life is sacralised 
whereas the sovereign reserves his right to decide on the value of the life of the subject. 
The understanding of sacredness of life as opposed to sovereign power in modernity is 
nothing but a concealment of sovereign effect: Agamben argues, life is subjected to “a 
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power over death” and it is also exposed to abandonment in that exceptional relation 
(Agamben, 1998, p. 83). ‘Sovereign subject’ in this sense is an oxymoron of the 
political vocabulary of the West. To illustrate this, Agamben focuses on the camp as a 
place of isolation where the distinctions between law and lawlessness, and even life and 
death blurs. In his thought, camp is not used as a mere analogy but it is the very space of 
living defined by indeterminacy and indistinction of political pairs such as zoe and bios, 
and bare life and political existence. For him, the camp is the “hidden matrix” and 
nomos of the political space in which we still live (Agamben, 1998, p. 166). In this 
sense, camp does not have to be a determinate space; any space can be a camp insofar as 
bare life is produced there. 
It is no surprise that camps are the products of state of exception, not ordinary law. 
Camp is a space opened by normalising the state of exception as rule, and by turning a 
temporary suspension of law into a permanent situation. It is a particular spatial 
arrangement in which bare life is produced in state of exception: In the sense that its 
inhabitants are deprived of any political status and reduced to bare life, it is the absolute 
biopolitical space in which bare life confronts with the sovereign (Agamben, 1998, p. 
171). Camp, in this regard, is the materialisation of state of exception where the 
existence or non-existence of law is meaningless in the face of life/death. Referring to 
Schmitt’s description of the nomos of the earth, Agamben states that camp is the place 
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where localisation without order (camp as a space) and order without localisation (state 
of exception) corresponds (Agamben, 1998, pp. 19-20).  
In this sense, historically as well as theoretically, camp particularly emerges when the 
bare life can no longer be inscribed in the present juridico-political order of the state. In 
an exceptional logic, outside the camp is thus determined by the inside of the camp as 
the limit space. The existence of the camp as the place of biopolitical exception can be 
read as a spectacular message to the subjects outside the camp. Placed outside the law 
while being in a way legalised, camp is the incarnation of the regime of exception 
prevailing both inside and outside the camp. Although the ‘life’ inside the camp is not 
factually the same with outside the camp, for Agamben, the “biosovereign” 
exceptionality is the fundament of the both. 
The ‘life’ inside the camp is the life of homo sacer in modern ages and Muselmann is 
the new name for homo sacer in the Nazi concentration camp. Focusing on the figure of 
Muselmann, Agamben gives us a picture of life inside the camp. What is most striking 
in his descriptions is perhaps the depiction of Muselmann as a walking corpse, a living 
dead. Under the influence of physical and psychological violence of the sovereign, 
Muselmann is literally reduced to bare life, to a ‘biological unit’ that should be got rid 
of in a very calculative and bureaucratic way. Although Muselmann carries on for 
survival, for the sake of maintaining his life, his is a ‘life’ descriptively close to ‘death’, 
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not only because of the dangers of living in the camp but also because he is already 
‘dead’ in moral and political sense (Agamben, 1998, p. 185). In this regard, Agamben 
claims that in addition to other categorical pairs, the distinction between life and death 
disappears in the camp.  
To further explicate the life in the camp, Diken and Laustsen utilise Hediegger’s 
formulation of animal as the poor in the world and human as the rich in world-forming: 
Isolated in the camp, Muselmann is dispossessed of his world but just surrounded in an 
environment poor in the world (Diken & Laustsen, 2005, p. 27). Muselmann is world-
less to the extent that his life is not that of human’s but a bare life deprived of any 
political status. Paradoxically, however, Agamben states that no one is more political 
than homo sacer or Muselmann in the sense that his life is caught and captured in the 
sovereign ban in the most absolute way (Agamben, 1998, p. 184). As noted above, since 
everybody in the camp is sovereign for Muselmann, he is the one who sees the face of 
the sovereign in a very peculiar way. In this regard, Muselmann’s ‘life’ in the camp is 
the ultimate political experience of sovereign power: death. 
Nevertheless, no one mourns for the Muselmann nor he dies his own death: He dies not 
under the name given to himself in birth but he vanishes in the camp as a number. 
Diken and Laustsen state that the Muselmann is also deprived of the possibility of 
suicide for the self-killing requires a self which is already destroyed in the camp (Diken 
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& Laustsen, 2005, p. 28). The scope of dehumanisation in the camp reaches to a 
maximum when the difference between life and death loses its weight. Confronted with 
the mass production of corpses, death has long since lost its meaning and thus, becomes 
a frivolous non-event. Life in the camp thus is a life that cannot be thought without not 
only moral and political but also literal death. 
In this regard, Agamben defines the camp not only as the ultimate space of exception 
but also as the nomos of the world in which we live (Agamben, 1998, p. 166). 
Independent of the crimes committed inside, we find ourselves in a regulation of camp 
when the state of exception is structured as a zone of distinction between bare life and 
juridical order. The question in this sense is to find out the very logic shared by the life 
in the camp and the ‘normal’, everyday life we maintain. “The camp is the new, hidden 
regulator of the inscription of life in the order – or, rather, the sign of the system’s 
inability to function without being transformed into a lethal machine.” (Agamben, 1998, 
p. 175) Thus, from the refugee camps to the infamous Camp Delta in Guantanamo Bay, 
post-September 11 is marked by a sovereign spatialisation through which the bare life is 
reproduced again and again.  
Indeed, Camp Delta has become the very instance of sovereign exceptionalism and the 
subject of Agambenian criticism of law and order. Located outside the soil of the United 
States, Camp Delta is a US detention centre, a zone of indistinction hosting inhabitants 
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in the status of “illegal combatants” -a status newly created by the US government to 
define the members of Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters. Deprived of the rights to which 
they are entitled both by domestic and international law, “illegal combatants” are 
neither criminals nor war criminals but are subjected to presidential decrees and 
sovereign decision of the military officials in the camp (Diken & Laustsen, 2005, p. 29) 
“Illegal combatants” in the Camp Delta are reduced to bare life, living in small one-man 
cages for years without even a trial. With their orange clothes and the masks put in their 
face, their life became the symbol of dehumanisation of enemy in the war on terror. And 
the word “Guantanamo” became the name for the contemporary, post-September 11 
camp where not only the rights of the citizen criminals are entitled to but also the 
transnational human rights are suspended. Moreover, Camp Delta is not the only 
detention centre of the US located outside its own territory: In 2005, Amnesty 
International reported that approximately 70,000 prisoners were held by the US in these 
spaces of exception (Neal, 2010, p. 123). Needless to say, most of these prisoner camps 
were proliferated after the war on terror and they are mostly located in the war zones 
such as Iraq and Afghanistan.   
Among these prisoner camps, the most infamous is the Abu Ghraib prison located in 
Iraq. As a result of the circulation of photographs picturing the prisoners stripped, 
abused, and sexually humiliated in Abu Ghraib, a well-known fact became a scandal 
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and mediatised for a certain period of time, to be forgotten and left in the archives of 
American exceptionalism. Openly discussing the legitimacy of torture in the face of a 
terrorist threat, liberal and non-liberal opinion makers deemed Abu Ghraib incident as 
an excess, a mistake that should not be interpreted as the indicator of the US as a 
torturous country. For them, what was at stake was the image of the world’s global 
power. Yet, what Abu Ghraib signified was in fact the regular dehumanisation of 
prisoners in a system of exception, that is, Abu Ghraib was indeed a camp. Moreover, 
one can say that not only Abu Ghraib but also Iraq is a camp and one can possibly 
extend this definition to other territories governed by the so-called rogue or failed states. 
Indeed, represented with a kind of state of nature in the mainstream way of thinking, 
these territories which are not captured by the global map-machine are like no-man’s-
lands. They constitute the negative image of the law and order believed to belong to the 
Western world and they are considered to be un-governed by chaos, awaiting the forces 
of civilisation for ‘salvation’. As the geo-political and bio-political converge into each 
other, Middle East itself becomes the very place of exception. The efforts to 
territorialise and de-territorialise the lands of chaos which produce terror and 
disseminate it to the lands of order are thus righteous as well as some excess in the lands 
of chaos understandable. 
Nevertheless, the logic of camp does not only reign in so-called rogue or failed states, or 
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territories outside the homeland of Western states. Two weeks after the terrorist attacks 
striking London Underground, a suspect named Jean Charles de Menezes was shot to 
dead by an anti-terror police unit located in the Underground (Siddique, 2016). In the 
following days, the police forces expressed their apologies to the murdered suspect’s 
family for the unfortunate mistake: Menezes was not a terrorist but a Brazilian 
electrician wrongly wearing heavy clothes in the warm weather of London. Turned into 
homo sacer in the face of police’s sovereign decision of life worthy/unworthy of living, 
Menezes have been killed without committing homicide. The London Underground in 
its everyday normality thus became a temporary space of exception after the terrorist 
attacks. This is the lethal machine Agamben mentions, which granted the police force 
the authority to decide on life/death only in a moment, and opened a space of exception 
that renders the application of sovereign power in that moment (Minca, 2006, p. 387). 
Existing in potentia at the very centre of our everyday lives, sovereign power 
continuously creates spaces of exception. From gated communities to holiday camps 
and from refugee camps to detention centres, the logic of camp is always at work in the 
spatialisation of the world. As power both suppresses and liberates, there are negative 
and positive types of camps where denizens are reduced to bare life voluntarily or 
involuntarily. Exemplifying different versions of camps of the contemporary, Diken and 
Laustsen thus show how the logic of camp works from Ibiza’s clubber camps to 
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Guantanamo and from London Underground to Iraq (Diken & Laustsen, 2005). It is this 
nomos that creates a zone of indistinction cutting through every subject, regardless of 
the dwelling place: Since biopolitics dwells in the very body of the subject itself, bare 
life is not limited to a particular space or a group of people but it has been disseminated 
into the world as a whole. In this sense, camp is everywhere, and everywhere is camp. 
This is not to equate every single place in terms of biopolitical status but to claim that 
the nomos of the world is camp. Nomos in this sense does not refer to law but to a 
principle of ordering behind the law, a precondition for law (Diken & Laustsen, 2005, p. 
40). For Schmitt, originally referring to land appropriation, nomos is the spatialisation 
linking localisation with order, and it refers to the common rules of the partition of the 
earth. Agamben, and Diken and Laustsen following Agamben, in this sense, link the 
nomos with the production of subjects and reach the camp (Diken & Laustsen, 2005, p. 
18). In the sense that outside the camp reflects the inside of it, the camp becomes the 
“nomos of modernity” that continuously creates zones of indistinction from airports to 
shopping malls. For that reason, from Nazi concentration camps to Guantanamo, camp 
is not a historical anomaly but “the hidden matrix and nomos of the political space in 
which we are still living.” (Agamben, 1998, p. 166) 
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5.2 Life of the Refugee 
As the city turns into a camp, an “urban jungle” where the logic of exception reigns, 
biopolitics starts targeting not only the body of the homo sacer but the population as a 
whole. The aim of biopolitics is to secure the health of the nation in many respects 
ranging from reproduction to aging, and from obesity to epidemics. It addresses not 
only the excluded and the marginalised but every single subject. Utilising a whole range 
of technologies and scientific knowledge, it aggregates the society according to age, 
health, mortality and so on, and captures every aspect of life (Diken & Laustsen, 2005, 
pp. 43-4). In this sense, biopolitics considers and targets man not as an individual being 
but as a species. As the camp becomes the nomos of the world, there is no escape from 
the biopolitical power even for a single body.  
What is scandalous for both philosophy and politics is, however, the status of the 
refugee (Dillon, 1998). Denaturalised, displaced and stripped of rights, refugee 
destabilises any ontological meaning of being human and becomes the very object of 
biopolitics. Refugees also reveal the limits of the human rights regime as Hannah 
Arendt, who demonstrated the failure of human rights in their encounter with the 
refugee, underlines (Agamben, 1998, p. 126). Indeed, Agamben points the ambiguity 
between the meanings of human and citizen in the French Declaration of the Rights of 
Man and Citizen (Agamben, 1998, pp. 126-7): Are ‘man’ and ‘citizen’ two autonomous 
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beings, or do they constitute a unity in which man is included in citizen? This is indeed 
the core of the scandal: Refugee is the one who is reduced to bare life and loses his 
humanity when stripped of his citizenship.  
For Agamben, this overlapping of the definitions of humanity and citizenship is nothing 
but the foundation of nation-state sovereignty. Pointing out the etymological origin of 
nation, “nascere”, “to be born”, Agamben claims the link between birth and nation is the 
basis of political community as nation. In this sense, citizens are inscribed in the 
biopolitical order by birth and through this inscription biological life acquires political 
qualities attainable by citizen subjects. The fiction of nation-state thus allows the citizen 
subject to become sovereign. In this regard, two fictions complement each other, that is, 
the citizen as well as the nation is sovereign in the form of nation-state. Nevertheless, 
the refugee destabilises this inseparable couple linked by birth. Though he is once a 
citizen with rights, he comes to the lands of the others as a life “stripped of form and 
value,” that is, as bare life.  
It is no surprising that the societies founded on the basis of birth-nation faces a thorough 
crisis in the face of refugee: Is refugee a human being with rights, or a potential criminal 
penetrating the body of the nation? Whatever the responses of different segments of 
society are, the very place of the refugee is the camp, that is, the non-place of bare life. 
Scandalously exposing the fiction of nation-birth, the status of the refugee remains hard 
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to decide for host countries and the refugees are most likely seen as the source of 
unwanted risks for the society. Those supposed risks may vary from spreading diseases 
to destroying nation’s ways of life, but what is common in these securitisation 
arguments is the biopolitical exceptionalism lying at the bottom. In this biopolitical 
narrative, the nation is pictured as a pure and united body whereas the refugee risks to 
contaminate it.    
Biopolitics in this sense is what associates the discourses of migration crisis revolving 
around the refugees and the narrative of final solution in the Nazi regime. Agamben 
quotes Otmar von Verschuer, a Nazi physician and geneticist to clarify his argument: 
“The National Socialist revolution wishes to appeal to forces that want to exclude 
factors of biological degeneration and to maintain the people's hereditary health. It thus 
aims to fortify the health of the people as a whole and to eliminate influences that harm 
the biological growth of the nation” (Agamben, 1998, p. 147). This explicitly 
biopolitical line of thought in a book called Racial Hygiene as Science and State 
Function (1936) belongs to the man who recommended the “sterilisation” of the nation 
from “mentally and morally subnormal”. Here, Agamben claims that the extermination 
of Jews can only be understood only through this line of thought in which “the police 
and politics, eugenic motives and ideological motives, the care of health and the fight 
against the enemy become absolutely indistinguishable” (Agamben, 1998, p. 147). In 
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Homo Sacer, he highlights that racism cannot be thought without reference to 
biopolitics which discriminates the authentic life and the life without a political value in 
nation-state form (Agamben, 1998, p. 132). Thus, he finds any effort to link politics and 
life just instrumentally as an insufficient approach to racism and offers a more profound 
criticism of nation-state form. In biopolitical sense, racist regimes perform the sovereign 
power over life/death exactly by differentiating the life worth and unworthy of living. 
Categorising the people accordingly, racism presents some forms of life as a threat to 
the pure and united body of the race. Racist state in this sense is in a constant state of 
war not against another state but against the other forms of life threating the 
population’s biological purity. In this regard, enemy is not a political being but a 
biopolitical threat to be eliminated by the state. 
As the forms of life biopolitically considered as a threat to the well-being of the nation, 
refugee presents a risk to the unity and purity of the population. Therefore, the very 
place of the refugee should be the camp which is usually located outside the urban area 
and closed with fences which aim preventing contact with the local community. Already 
deprived of political rights of citizenship, refugee is both included and excluded, and his 
life in the camp is strictly regulated. He is socially a ‘zombie’ deprived of both social 
and political rights but subject to severe restrictions. All this is because he is no longer 
under the guardianship of a nation-state and not native to the country he is now 
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inhabiting. Breaking the continuity between human and citizen, and nativity and 
nationality, the figure of refugee reflects the crisis of modern nation-state sovereignty.  
Referring to the proliferation of refugees and stateless persons after the end of the First 
World War, Agamben notes that the separation of rights of man and of citizenship 
becomes more and more apparent since then (Agamben, 1998, p. 132). Eventually 
evolving into the contemporary conception of human rights, rights of man supposedly 
present a shield of protection against the state sovereignty. However, in the face of 
refugee it becomes evident that human rights share the same biopolitical foundation 
with sovereignty, that is, the distinction of bare life and political existence. In this 
regard, sacralisation of human life in the form of human rights cannot be thought 
without its supposed counterpart, that is, state sovereignty. Therefore, the separation of 
humanitarian field from politics only seems to be a division of labour in dealing with 
bare life: Humanitarian aid helps and supports the refugee who is deprived of his rights 
by state sovereignty.  
Leaving the refugee’s bare life to the ‘mercy’ of humanitarian aid and police action with 
an inclusive exclusion, biopolitical sovereignty tackles the problem of migration both in 
terms of security and humanitarian crisis. Since the contradictory couple of security and 
humanitarianism reigns the discourses about the refugee, it is hard to decide if the 
refugee’s life is the most sacred and should be protected, or conversely, it presents a 
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fundamental risk for the society. In both cases, refugee is trapped in a biopolitical 
inclusion/exclusion and abandoned by the law to a space of exception where he is 
exposed to extra-legal measures and procedures. Through the double move of 
sacralisation and securitisation, the problem of migration, refuge or asylum becomes 
depoliticised although it is the very body of refugee where exactly the biopolitical 
sovereignty operates.  
Enclosing the topic to further discussion and even forbidding to imagine any other 
alternative, the politics of transpolitical biopolitics is thus the continuous production of 
bare life and dealing with it. Indeed, what is concealed in this transpolitics sacralising 
human life is the continuous production and securitisation of bare life. Risking to bring 
into question the link between birth and nation, the problem of the refugee is the exact 
domain of bio-politics whereas it is suppressed by both fears and ‘rights’ and becomes 
depoliticised. It is interesting to note that human rights do not only complement the 
biopolitical paradigm in this act of depoliticisation but it also paves the way for the 
inscription of life within state power (Agamben, 1998, p. 121). Therefore, the 
Agambenian problem in politics is not about equipping bare life with some rights but it 
is the very paradigm that suspends any person’s legal and political status, reducing him 
to bare life. The life of the refugee in this sense is an instantiation of homo sacer in our 
contemporary world and an ongoing scandal for the nation-state sovereignty. 
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5.3 Government of Life 
Agamben’s thought, which almost prophetically foresaw contemporary manifestations 
of sovereign power, securitisation and state of exception before September 11, has been 
found highly suitable by many researchers pursuing further analysis post-9/11. Even 
though it has been immensely applied to various types of research within the fields of 
humanities and social sciences, Agamben’s project of Homo Sacer is also criticised with 
hyperbolism, pessimism and over-generalisation of particular concepts (i.e., state of 
exception) and distinctions  (Prozorov, 2014). These criticisms come from scholars of 
various disciplines including legal and political sciences as well as ancient Greek and 
Roman history and political philosophy. Most notably in this context, Foucauldian 
critics of Agamben expectedly insist on “the Foucault in Agamben” and argue that 
Agamben’s claim to correct and complete Foucault’s understanding of biopolitics is at 
least unnecessary, if not totally wrong. For them, what Agamben seeks in the Western 
legal, political and philosophical history is already there in Foucault’s work.  
According to this line of thought, Foucault’s distinction between sovereignty and 
biopower is not essentially a temporal but conceptual one; therefore, Agamben’s 
correction of Foucault in terms of sovereignty’s presence in modern times is 
unnecessary. Noting the fact that Foucault does not claim that sovereignty has 
disappeared after the birth of biopolitics, those critics state that sovereign modes of 
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domination can co-exist with biopolitics for Foucault. It is noteworthy that the debate 
here is not just about the affirmation or negation of a certain periodisation in Foucault’s 
work but about a more general understanding of power and domination as well as the 
analysis of both history and the contemporary.  
Agamben, in this regard, is accused of elevating the concept of sovereignty to an almost 
timeless status and prioritising it over biopolitics and governmentality. By leaving the 
path of Foucault with this move, Agamben’s thought revolving around bare life and 
sovereignty betrays the ‘original’ Foucauldian line and misses the micro manifestations 
of power focusing on a mythicized power of state sovereignty. These accusations of 
disciples of Foucault might have found more audience if post-September 11 reassertion 
of state sovereignty, securitisation and exceptionalism did not take place. Yet, the 
conditions of this period gave Agamben’s voice a significant volume as well as some 
empirical evidence, which critics claimed to be missing in his work.  
Among these critics, Judith Butler’s viewpoint is particularly remarkable for not only 
she pursues a critique of Agamben in dialogue with his works but also for she offers a 
new approach to sovereign power utilising the works of Foucault in the post-September 
11 period. Even though Butler emphasises the fact that sovereignty and biopolitics can 
co-exist according to Foucault, she differs from other Foucauldians by declaring that 
Foucault’s work does not explain the anachronistic resurrection of sovereignty in the 
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wake of post-September 11 (Butler, 2004, p. 54). Particularly at this point, her theory 
begins to develop in a direction through which Butler attempts to explicate and analyse 
the co-existence of sovereign power and governmentality. It is no coincidence that 
Butler prefers the concept of governmentality instead of biopolitics in the Foucauldian 
vocabulary: This preference allows her to maintain a Foucauldian line while also 
insisting on the reassertion of sovereignty.  
As noted earlier, Agamben differentiates his thought from Foucault’s by pointing out a 
neglected dimension in his work: judicial-institutional aspect of power. With this move, 
Agamben’s project immensely focuses on law whereas Foucault, according to 
Agamben, dismisses the law as the manifestation of old sovereignty in favour of novel 
micro techniques of governmentality. Nevertheless, Butler finds another way to 
approach this question and suggests that the law becomes a tactic of governmentality in 
the post-September 11 anachronistic resurrection of sovereignty. Explaining the co-
existence of sovereignty and governmentality in this way, Butler offers a perspective 
embracing both judicial-institutional and governmental aspects of power. This requires 
Butler to speak about a type of sovereign power, which complements governmentality: 
spectral sovereignty (Butler, 2004, pp. 52-3). That sovereignty has a spectral dimension 
in the sense that it awakes from a sleep this time with a new façade: Whereas Foucault’s 
sovereignty is delimited with a unified locus for state power and a source of legitimacy 
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for state, the new sovereignty is characterised by the suspension of rule of law and a 
prerogative power commissioned to administrative bureaucracy and executive branches 
of government (Butler, 2004, pp. 54-5). The spectral sovereignty, in this regard, 
differentiates from the traditional version of sovereignty which demands an absolute 
obedience to law, and manifests in convergence with governmentality. In spite of a 
more abstract conception of sovereignty, Butler suggests that “petit sovereigns” are at 
work in the capillaries of state power and thus governmentality becomes a precondition 
for such an anachronistic resurgence of sovereignty (Butler, 2004, p. 65).  
Butler’s approach to sovereignty is manifested through her efforts to deal with the 
concept of indefinite detention in the case of Camp Delta, Guantanamo. The extra-legal 
situation faced by the detainees in Camp Delta is thus explanatory: As discussed earlier, 
the decisions of detention in Camp Delta are not subject to a trial but depend upon the 
evaluations of officials to the extent that they decide on who will be sent to trial and 
who will be detained indefinitely or not. Butler points out that this is a new exercise of 
state sovereignty in which administrative bureaucrats absorb the “adjucative prerogative 
from the judicial branch” (Butler, 2004, p. 71).  
These “petit sovereigns” are at the same time the exact agents of governmentality in the 
sense that they combine the performance of the sovereign with strategies and tactics of 
governmentality. In this regard, Butler claims that the new war prison is the place where 
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the new configuration of state power manifests itself in a double existence: 
Governmentality as the management of populations on the one hand, and the exercise of 
sovereignty with suspension and limitation of law on the other. Within this new 
interpretation explaining the co-existence of sovereignty and governmentality, Butler 
contends that Foucault was in fact right in his emphasis on governmentality as the 
primary exercise of power in modern times (Butler, 2004, p. 52). Therefore, it is 
necessary to posit governmentality as the precondition for the revival of this new 
sovereignty. Even if it does not originate from a single source of power or a unified 
sovereign by definition, sovereign power now re-emerges in the context of 
governmentality.  
Operated through strategies and tactics, and aimed at whole population to produce and 
reproduce subjects and their practices and beliefs, governmentality dispose and order 
populations in accordance with specific policy aims (Butler, 2004, p. 52). As Foucault 
suggested earlier than the present manifestations of indefinite detention, law may 
become a tactic and currently it is so in its suspension (Butler, 2004, p. 54). Allowing 
the operation of sovereign power in the context of governmentality, the suspension of 
rule of law does not only create an extra-legal domain in war prison but also allocates 
the prerogative power to executive and managerial officials.  
Thus, functioning like a sovereign with detailed regulations but without recourse to any 
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source of legitimacy, these officials rely on their own judgements with reference to the 
sublimated concept of security. Accountable to no law and without any legitimacy, they 
sovereignly decide on the fate of the detainees on the basis of questioning whether they 
pose a danger for the country. This discretionary power is only possible with the 
resurrection of sovereignty in a so-called emergency situation reducing the law into a 
sheer instrument in the context of governmentality. In this regard, neither identified 
with sovereignty nor limited with governmentality but conditioned by both, state 
allocates more and more sovereign power to the administrative and executive 
bureaucracy to gain control over society. To remind once again, this sovereignty is not 
the old sovereignty of a unified power under the conditions of legitimacy but a lawless 
and “rogue” power ghostly reigning within the site of governmentality. It is a tactic 
ultimately aiming its effectivity and an instrument of power to monitor, control and 
regulate the everyday lives of the population (Butler, 2004, p. 97). 
Butler exemplifies the use of this tactic with reference to post-September 11 racial 
profiling in detention of thousands of Arab residents and Arab-American citizens as 
well as the harassment of numerous people at the borders (Butler, 2004, p. 76). Similar 
to Agamben, Butler at this point states that these individuals are not counted as subjects 
and humans, and the exercise of sovereign power is not limited with the indefinite 
detention in Camp Delta. Rather, through governmentality it operates within the 
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capillaries of the society normalising and naturalising the exception of indefinite 
detention. In this regard, indefinite detention serves “a broader tactic to neutralise the 
law in the name of security” (Butler, 2004, p. 67).  
Yet, one of her most significant contributions to the discussion of contemporary 
manifestations of power is her explanation about the delegation of sovereign power to 
state officials, thus the conceptualisation of petit sovereigns in the case of security 
bureaucracy. By the suspension or trumping of the law, the new sovereignty causes the 
creation and the use of unaccountable subjects who are, knowingly or not, invested with 
a discretionary power (Butler, 2004, p. 71). More precisely, it is the rule of law that 
produces the sovereignty in its very suspension as an effect: The rule of law is not 
suspended by a single source of sovereignty but conversely, it is created through the 
suspension of law. Following the delegation of this exceptional power, petit sovereigns 
decide on the basis of their unaccountability and act as sovereign in their self-grounding 
and unconditioned decisions. Even though their acts are conditioned, their decisions are 
unconditional in the sense that “they are final, not subject to review, and not subject to 
appeal” (Butler, 2004, pp. 65-6).  
The conceptualisation of the petit sovereign has thus the quality of being a key for the 
explanation of the convergence between sovereignty and governmentality: Petit 
sovereigns are like the bodies into which spectral sovereignty is incarnated as the 
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apparatuses of governmentality. Butler remarks that that reanimation of sovereignty in 
the midst of governmentality did appear particularly at a point where the loss of 
sovereignty is at stake through governmentality. Stating that this loss is compensated 
with an aggressive nostalgia, she expresses her position laconically: “the historical time 
that we thought was past turns out to structure the contemporary field with a persistence 
that gives the lie to history as chronology” (Butler, 2004, p. 54). 
5.4 Precarious Life 
Butler’s contribution to the discussions of micro/macro manifestations of power in her 
post-September 11 accounts is not limited with the mentioned approach to sovereignty 
and governmentality but also fosters a new dimension based on the human condition of 
vulnerability. In Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (2004) and 
Frames of War: When is Life Grieavable? (2009), pursuing both a socio-ontological and 
ethico-political investigation, she comes to describe precariousness and precarity as the 
two significant concepts for the analysis of the contemporary. Considering the violent 
responses to the attacks of September 11 as a missing political opportunity to define the 
United States “as part of the global community”, Butler points out the necessity of 
apprehending the human interdependency and vulnerability in relation to violence 
(Butler, 2004, pp. xi-xii). Referring to the disappointment of the First World’s 
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privileged self-imagination and the collapse of the fantasy of being an inviolable and 
invulnerable unity in relation to September 11 attacks, the missed political opportunity 
is thus marked with the transformation of the grief in the face of loss into a vengeance 
against an indefinite enemy (Butler, 2004, p. xi). In this manner, a so-called initial 
violence produces a greater violence and there is no lesson for anyone to take in this 
cycle. Butler, however, is interested in how the experience of mourning might open up 
new possibilities for rethinking the politics with a new normative aspiration. It is by this 
way possible for her to achieve a political action less aggressive and more ethical 
(Butler, 2004, p. 26).  
For Butler, grief and mourning are forms of dispossession and show how we are 
dependent on each other: Referring to Sigmund Freud, Butler states that in losing 
someone we experience that something in the “I” is also missing with the other. By this 
dispossession, the “I” is also transformed revealing the subject’s dependence on the 
other for its sense of self (Butler, 2004, p. 22). This is, for Butler, not just a relationality 
that should only be taken into account historically and descriptively but a normative 
condition that should shape our social and political lives. In this regard, violence is 
nothing but the exploitation of this primary tie between the self and the other: For each 
of us is constituted politically by virtue of social vulnerability, our bodies as sites of 
physical vulnerability are exposed to others and at risk of violence by this exposure. 
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This condition, for Butler, emerges with the life itself and it is unrecoverable in the 
sense that it even precedes the formation of an “I”. Just from the start of Precarious 
Life, Butler finds this condition of vulnerability unarguable but invites her readers to 
reflect upon the socio-political conditions under which some certain lives are more 
vulnerable than others (Butler, 2004, p. 30). This is a particularly significant point not 
only because it involves an implicit criticism of Agamben’s Homo Sacer, which does 
not deal with the unequal distribution of dehumanisation, but it also opens up a new 
dimension for the social and political research of the precariousness and precarity.  
Pointing that some deaths are grievable whereas the others remain non-grievable (hence 
some lives are liveable and others non-liveable) Butler stresses the relationship between 
the normative frame circumscribing some lives more grievable than others and the 
unequal distribution of human vulnerability across the globe (Butler, 2004, p. xii). 
Simply put, Butler suggests that human lives are maintained and supported differently: 
Whereas some lives are highly protected reaching necessary support more easily and 
rapidly, others are not even considered worth living and thus, their loss is not worth 
public grieving. In this regard, public grieving highlights both the underlying condition 
of precariousness that is common to all and its unequal distribution among the subjects. 
We all lose but this does not mean that we all can publicly grieve: Butler mentions a 
Palestinian citizen of the United States, who submitted to the San Francisco Chronicle 
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obituaries for two Palestinian families who had been killed by Israeli troops and got 
rejected with the excuse that “the newspaper did not wish to offend anyone” (Butler, 
2004, p. 35). She particularly urges to think about the context in which an obituary can 
become an offense. Here, in this example, it is important here to note the normative 
frame which likely affects some imaginary people who are supposed to feel offended by 
the other’s public grief. This context, to be sure, is not limited to the Israel-Palestine 
conflict but can historically be expanded to Antigone, the people died of HIV+ or 
famine as well as to thousands of victims of war on terror.  
In terms of vulnerability and grieavability of others, war creates a more violent 
normative framework that is in the service of military aims. Frames of War (2009) deals 
with this particular condition in the context of September 11 and reveals how the war 
machine dehumanises the supposed enemy and disregards their loss and injury. In fact, 
it is possible to claim that war itself is the work of maximising the precariousness of the 
enemy with the supposed aim of minimising the precariousness of “our” people. The 
question against the discourses of war is that why the minimisation of our 
precariousness requires the maximisation of other’s (Butler, 2009, pp. 2-3). The 
discourses of war, however, build such strict necessities and oppositions at the expense 
of the more precarious lower classes of the very society which is supposedly defended 
against an enemy. Under these conditions, Butler indicates that the lives which are not 
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regarded as grievable are the ones that are much more exposed to violence, starvation 
and death in the wartimes as well as in the peace (Butler, 2009, p. 25).  
This leads her to conceptualise precarity and discern it from precariousness: While 
precariousness is an ontological condition unarguable for and common to all, precarity 
designates the differentially distributed precariousness induced by social and political 
conditions. In this regard, bearing the higher risks of illness, poverty and exposure to 
violence, some populations are deprived of the support of established social and 
economic networks that are ubiquitous for other segments of the society (Butler, 2009, 
pp. 25-6). This inequality of precariousness is structured and maintained in the society 
through a normative ontology, various epistemological frameworks and the suppression 
of an ethical and political responsibility towards the other.  
Butler explains all these conditions by looking into the cultural investments of military 
power in the post-September 11. She first of all offers that it is impossible to separate 
the material reality of war from some “representational regimes” through which war is 
justified. These regimes are only made possible by certain epistemological frames that 
strikingly disable “us” to apprehend certain deaths and lives. Focusing on not only the 
pain but also the ‘appearance’ of others, Butler points out that these frames are 
politically saturated operations of power effective to an extent that they delimit the 
“sphere of appearance” if not condition it unilaterally (Butler, 2009, pp. 1-2). The 
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disappearance of certain lives and deaths, and the unrepresentability of them in the 
public sphere is thus an effect of certain epistemological frames. These epistemological 
frames, however, work with a normative ontology insisting on the “being” of life and of 
body without recourse to social and political aspects. In this regard, it is possible to 
formulate that an apolitical normative ontology leads to certain epistemological frames 
and these frames produce the ethico-political problem of guarding the other against 
violence or injury (Butler, 2009, p. 3).  
Positing such a relation between ontology and epistemology of the precarious, Butler 
arrives at an ethical and political critique as well as an invitation to resistance to such 
frames. Yet, this is not an easy task since frames of war condition even the affects and 
the affective responsiveness, which, in Butler’s account, precedes interpretation and 
cognitive process (Butler, 2009, p. 71). Asking how it is possible to be disinterested to 
the pain, loss or injury of someone while genuinely grieving and mourning for others, 
Butler points out the regimes of power producing subjectivity on the level of affect. 
Resonating the anthropologist Talal Asad’s question on the diverging responses to 
violence of state and non-state actors in On Suicide Bombing (2007), Butler reiterates 
how suicide bombers create a revulsion and outrage in Western public whereas state-
directed and legitimised violence is responded with disinterest and unconcern. Butler, 
reminding the distinction between the categories of grievable/nongrievable, underlines 
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that war sustains itself by “deadening affect in response to certain images and sounds, 
and enlivening affective responses to others” (Butler, 2009, p. 52).  
Displacing the conception of an autonomous and sovereign subject and defining the 
subject with vulnerability and dependence on the others, Butler posits that affects are 
never merely our own but always communicated from elsewhere, socially and 
politically regulated (Butler, 2009, p. 41). In the wartimes, however, the regulatory 
power not only intervene the affective responses that would cause potential protests, but 
also targets the production of a subjectivity compatible with normative frames. Outrage, 
horror and grief thus gain a particular attention while the more fundamental regulation 
is about the responsiveness and non-responsiveness of the subject. This selective 
responsiveness towards the violence or loss of the other is the outcome of the operation 
of normative frames registering some lives as more life than others.  
Indeed, for Butler, the conception of humanity paradoxically divides human populations 
into humans and non-humans and becomes a coercive norm regulating our affective and 
moral response (Butler, 2009, p. 76). Always double in the sense of producing the non-
human within the definition of human, humanity constitutes a relationality with the 
other: The other’s life is either livable and grievable or conversely, unsuitable for any 
response and responsibility in the face of violence. This dehumanising effect of 
humanity is also related to the concepts of democratisation, civilisation or 
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modernisation, all of which set a target for the dehumanised others while the Western 
subject is already considered to be democratic, civilised and modern. In this regard, 
Butler asserts, whereas humanity is attained for some humans beforehand some others 
have to struggle for it lifelong (Butler, 2009, p. 76). In the context of such a taken for 
granted humanity against supposed non-humanity, affective responses are experienced 
with an immediacy in the sense that they are seen as part of the “humanity” of the self.  
This supposed immediacy or spontaneity, however, is not the sign of nativity or 
naturalness of the affect but the indication of the fact that affection is a field of 
regulation that is always already at work through the continuous construction of 
humanity. Even if this does not mean that affection is predetermined in an absolute 
sense, it is to be acknowledged that affect is always under the influence of some forces 
other than one’s self. Affects, like the life and the body of the subject, are the outcomes 
of those forces which enable one to feel a genuine horror in the face of some violence 
and a disinterested acceptance towards others. Asad’s question, in this sense, cannot be 
avoided with reference to the unreason or the inevitable lack of critical judgement in 
affection but should be extended to the criticism of frames of war through which affects 
and moral responses are regulated. 
For Butler, this is in fact a question of media in the most general sense (Butler, 2009, p. 
51): The infamous “embedded journalism” in the war of Iraq and the responses to the 
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photographs of torture and abuse in Abu Ghraib prison are two different but close 
examples in post-September 11 as efforts to delimit and reframe the image in 
accordance with the aims of war. In relationship to media representation of Abu Gharib, 
Butler mentions that some “conservative television pundits” openly claimed that it 
would be “un-American” to publicise the Abu Ghraib images and invited all the other 
media to censor the photographs for the sake of nation’s worldwide image (Butler, 
2009, p. 41). Embedded journalism, however, was a much more concerted effort to limit 
the power of image and ultimately regulate the visual field through the submission of 
media power into the hands of governmental and military bureaucracy (Butler, 2009, p. 
64).  
These efforts concentrated on the media and image ultimately serve for the greater aim 
of regulating affects. Photos of Abu Ghraib, for instance, were found not only un-
American but also risky for the outrage it may cause: The image as well as the self-
image of American-ness was at stake in dissemination of these photos and indeed, they 
influenced the public opinion against the war in Iraq after they are publicised. 
Embedded journalism, on the other hand, was particularly invented to prevent such 
accidents in the visual field and to acquire the moral support needed for military aims 
and operations. Indeed, the reporters in question “travelled only on certain transports, 
looked only at certain scenes, and relayed home images and narratives of only certain 
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kinds of action” (Butler, 2009, p. 64). By these means, the state makes a considerable 
investment on the field of perception in order to control affect. 
What is important to note here is the fact that not only the content but also the 
perspective, the angle, is under the control of state authorities who are interested in 
regulating the visual mode of participation in the war. Controlling the perspective and 
the frame is something more than simply delimiting the narration; it amounts to 
predetermine the interpretation by intervening into the field of perception. Deciding on 
what will and will not be seen, these frames thus lead one to perceive the world in a way 
that certain dimensions are left out within the frame. Even though any sort of frame 
would necessitate exclusion, in embedded journalism a sort of reality that is specifically 
tailored for military aims is created and circulated as if what is left outside the frame do 
not simply exist. The question about framing, in this sense, cannot possibly be about a 
full inclusion or exclusion but should focus on learning how to critically see in not 
seeing (Butler, 2009, p. 99). Even though not seeing is always the condition of seeing, 
Butler urges her readers to at least recognise the forcible frames that conduct the 
dehumanising norm putting constraints on not only what is seen but also what is felt. 
In this regard, Butler’s occupation with the photographic image is part of her theory of 
affect seeking the conditions for a sensate understanding of war as well as a sensate 
opposition to it. Insisting that “affect is not only structured by interpretation but 
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structures interpretation as well”, Butler’s call to struggle against the forces regulating 
the affect aspires to deregulate the frames of war and encounter the precariousness of 
the other’s life (Butler, 2009, p. 72). As she considers this encounter as the very basic 
condition for the minimisation of precariousness in an egalitarian way, she calls for an 
ethical response and responsibility towards the other. In this regard, it is necessary to 
focus and expand the critique of state violence both in its forms of war and other 
legalised versions in order to minimise the precariousness of the subject. Even if the 
source of precariousness is not only and always politics, the task of minimisation of the 
precariousness as well as the distribution of it in more egalitarian ways remain deeply 
political. 
What is common in both Agamben’s and Butler’s responses to post-September 11 
period is the reawakening of sovereignty or sovereign power in the face of September 
11 attacks. Even if they follow different paths based on their diverging readings of 
Foucault and other philosophers, both emphasise that the state of exception and the 
suspension of the rule of law reinvigorate sovereignty. The regulation of perception, 
affection and hence subjectivity as well as the dehumanisation processes against the 
other are thus common points in their criticisms. What makes them invaluable in their 
differing approaches is, however, their relentless and meticulous effort to address the 
preliminary question posed at the start: What has changed in the defined, regulated, 
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affected lives of the post-September 11 subject in the West and the invisible, 
unrecognised and bare lives of the victims of war?  
5.5 In Lieu of Conclusion 
Agamben and Butler’s diversified readings of Foucault become an important parting of 
the ways for the ethical and political tasks ascribed in their theory. Whereas Agamben 
focuses on the legal and institutional aspects of power in line with his criticism of 
Foucault, Butler chooses to follow Foucault in his insistence on governmentality but 
with a revision of his conceptualisation in the context of post-September 11. For 
Agamben, unlike Foucault, we cannot periodise sovereign and biopower since both of 
them have a longer history than Foucault thinks. Butler, however, agrees with Foucault 
in that our age is primarily an age of governmentality even if sovereign power is at 
work after the September 11 attacks.  
It seems that Agamben and Butler discussion basically knots around the periodisation 
problem in Foucault’s modes of power. This problem is nothing but about a poor and 
rich reading of Foucault’s works. It is not reasonable to expect from Foucault to make a 
fixed type of periodisation between sovereign, disciplinary and governmental powers 
because first of all these are less periods than modalities of power. Even if there is an 
inevitable historicity and continuity between those powers, there is no reason to state 
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that these are historical blocks without any transition. As seen in the Collège de France 
lectures and particularly in Security, Territory, Population (1977-8), Foucault clearly 
underlines that those modes of power can co-exist and work together. As with sovereign 
power in the age of governmentality, he states: “I am not saying that sovereignty ceased 
to play a role when the art of government becomes a political science. Rather, I would 
say that the problem of sovereignty was never more sharply posed than at this moment, 
precisely because it was no longer a question, as in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, of how to deduce an art of government from theories of sovereignty, but 
rather, given the existence and deployment of an art of government, what juridical form, 
what institutional form, and what legal basis could be given to the sovereignty typical of 
a state” (Foucault, 2007, p. 106).  
In this sense, for Foucault, sovereignty is never an outdated mode of power eliminated 
with the emergence of a new one. On the contrary, he states, it is much more acute than 
ever. Thus, older models of government do not leave the political scene forever but 
instead constitute new alliances with the novel technologies of power. Butler’s reading 
thus follows a Foucauldian line through which she explains the power relations of post-
September 11. Diken and Laustsen, too, in this context, write about a triangle composed 
of sovereignty, discipline and governmentality (Diken & Laustsen, 2005, pp. 59-60). 
Moreover, they invite us to reflect on another dispositif at work in our age: Terror, for 
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them, unlike discipline and control, functions with fear related to insecurity and 
uncertainty, and immobilises the subject and the flow (Diken & Laustsen, 2005, p. 58). 
What is significant, however, is their emphasis on the fact that discipline, control and 
terror co-exist, containing elements of one another within themselves.  
Life after September 11 is, then, regulated, disciplined and governed by all these powers 
at the same time. Camp Delta, as a case, can be an example of how these 
characteristically different modes of power are all at work in a certain specific 
geography: What is at stake here is the disciplinary confinement administered with a 
governmental reason by petit sovereigns. Even though it seems difficult to distinguish 
these different modes of power, it is theoretically possible to consider all of them 







Emre Barca - June 2020   201 
 
 
6 Sovereign Power and Post-
September 11 
Michel Foucault’s analysis of the modes of deployment and the ways of execution of 
power throughout the history have been unfold the earliest in Discipline and Punish 
(1975), and History of Sexuality: Volume I, The Will to Knowledge (1976) as well as in 
the Collège de France courses Security, Territory & Population (1977-78). In this latter, 
Foucault explains three models of power: sovereignty, discipline, and governmentality, 
which are defined by different historical epochs, nonetheless, do not exclude or 
annihilate each other: “First, the state of justice, born in a feudal type of territoriality 
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and broadly corresponding to a society of customary and written law, with a whole 
interplay of commitments and litigations; second, the administrative state that 
corresponds to a society of regulations and disciplines; and finally, a state of 
government that is no longer essentially defined by its territoriality, by the surface 
occupied, but by a mass: the mass of the population, with its volume, its density, and, 
for sure, the territory it covers, but which is, in a way, only one of its components. This 
state of government, which essentially bears on the population and calls upon and 
employs economic knowledge as an instrument, would correspond to a society 
controlled by apparatuses of security (Foucault, 2007, p. 110).” 
6.1 The Foucauldian Triangle 
The sovereign power basically reigns over its territory by taking lives or letting live 
(Foucault, 2007, p. 135). The people, as well as the territory they populate, belongs to 
the sovereign because by taking lives of the adversaries, it is the sovereign who keeps 
its people alive. The lives of the people are the gifts of the sovereign, which defines 
their belonging to a community by the same means. Inhabitants of the conquered lands 
either let live becoming the sovereign’s subjects or get killed. The word of the sovereign 
is law, and the life is allowed within the limits of the sovereign’s word/law. The 
sovereign is the law and law the sovereign; a violation of law is a direct challenge to the 
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sovereign’s authority. This is the level of direct presence of the sovereign, pure 
identification of the utterance and the law. “Power in this instance was essentially a 
right of seizure: of things, time, bodies, and ultimately the life itself: it culminated in the 
privilege to seize hold of life, in order to suppress it.” (Foucault, 2007, p. 136)  
The sovereign, being the one and only exception of his reign, is transcendent to the 
system situated above and beyond the limit of this territory. He is the condition of 
possibility as well as the execution by not being determined by it. The sovereign lets his 
people live, and in return they are obliged to keep the sovereign safe in all terms. The 
well-being of all is dependent on all the obedient people subjected to the sovereign’s 
will, on the sovereign’s well-being. Individuals are disposable in keeping the sovereign 
safe, for the sovereign is the only power that could keep the majority safe. And yet, at 
this stage, it is not to keep indirectly the people itself safe, it is solely for the welfare of 
the sovereign for he is the possessor of it all by not being determined by the people 
under his reign.  
The analogy here is with that of a family, and the sovereign/father as the giver and taker 
of the life as the possessor (Foucault, 1978, p. 135). In cases which the sovereign is 
contested, threatened or his authority is challenged, he holds the right to wage a war 
since his reasons are legitimate to determine his subjects life in jeopardy in his defence 
(Foucault, 1978, p. 135). The obedience is the form of subjects’ existence as they are 
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the extension of the sovereign who is the sole judge and his subjects are like the limbs 
attached to it. Therefore, the form of the sovereign state is prohibition, and the people 
are allowed to maintain their lives within the limits of these prohibitions. The 
sovereign’s right is a form of deduction, in the sense of holding a part of all possession.  
Along with the historical development, the manifestation of powers is transformed but 
the sovereign power does not disappear, rather continues to manifest implicitly. The 
first transformation Foucault mentions averts the focus from the territory to the 
individuals, from the possession to the regulation. The disciplinary power is the 
defining character of administrative state which is centrifugal force concentrating the 
normativity within the centre of the life itself; it organises and regulates the livings as 
the allowances which are commands and orders. It does not prohibit but determines 
what and how to do through shaping the norms, which is setting a deterministic model 
with a desired outcome, and the form of obedience then takes the form of conforming 
the norms.  
The juridical state having the sovereign power as the basis of its functioning, certain 
behaviours were prohibited because they challenge or harm the authority of the 
sovereign, whose protection is the ultimate goal. Nevertheless, in the disciplinary state, 
almost virtually, each and every single action populating the life has to conform the 
norms for the lives of the citizens are no longer at stake explicitly. As mentioned above, 
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at this level, the sovereign power and the law does not disappear or is dissolved into 
new ways. The disciplinary power makes use of the juridical dispositions along with the 
disciplinary ones but in accordance with the goals and strategies specific to the 
disciplinary state (Foucault, 2007, p. 106). 
Governmentality is the result of modern institutionalisation marked by policies and 
procedures, calculations and predictions, targeting the populations with tactical 
management of the masses. The political economy is its greatest source of knowledge 
and the security technologies are the means, it is essentially exercised over the masses 
of population (Foucault, 2007, p. 109). These security technologies have the disposition 
to grow and extend to cover larger areas letting people act in it. It takes the reality as its 
direct object, the things and events instead of directly addressing to the people 
themselves; however, does not exclude the territory that is essential for the sovereign’s 
regnum and consider all the elements of exchange and interaction from the political to 
the economical in this web.  
The governmentality model directly works on the reality, actualisation frequencies of 
happenings in order to predict and regulate in a responsive way. “In other words, the 
law prohibits, discipline prescribes, and the essential function of security, without 
prohibiting or prescribing, but possibly making use of some instruments of prescription 
and prohibition, is to respond to a reality in such a way that this response cancels out the 
Sovereign Power After September 11 
 
 
206  Emre Barca - June 2020 
 
 
reality to which it responds—nullifies it, or limits, checks, or regulates it. I think this 
regulation within the element of reality is fundamental in apparatuses of security 
(Foucault, 2007, pp. 46-7).” 
This framework offers to a certain degree a liberty as its condition of functioning as it 
exerts power in indirect or symbolic ways and necessitates what Foucault calls 
“subjectivation”. The freedom it requires for the subject of the experiences shaped by 
the intervention of governing dispositions to freely dislocate, act and behave in certain 
ways is possible because of the security. It is therefore not an absolute, but rather a 
conditioned and framed by its very condition of possibility. This is achieved by the 
government of the space of possible actions and attitudes, the frame of possibility in 
which subjects actively and wilfully participate in. This is the process formulated by 
Foucault towards the 1970’s as “conduire la conduite de…”, that is, to govern the 
comportments by means of governing the possible realities to have attitudes towards, 
which is made possible by the dialectic between the larger scale governance of the 
realities and the micro scale framings of possible actions and attitude by discursive 
methods.  
Simply put, subjectivation is the appropriation of certain values and norms by the 
individuals dictated by the dominant rationality. It is of high importance to state that this 
is actualised by the participation to the space of freedom offered and encouraged 
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through the formation of experiences and encouraging for their adoption (Foucault, 
2007, p. 353). Foucault’s notion of experience is a historical formation by dual system 
of knowledge and normative powers which is rendered a ready-to-govern experience. 
When they relate to this experience appropriating the system of values presented by the 
power of knowledge, individuals become the subject of this experience objectifying 
them in their subjectivities. From this point on, the regulation is divided into subject’s 
own self-regulation in accordance with the regulated and governed experience. In this 
manipulative fashion, it is differentiated from the coercive deployment of sovereign 
power exercised through the law or the prescription of commanding disciplinary power.  
In this regard, Foucault summarises the spatial dimensions of these three modes of 
powers as such: “Baldly, at first sight and somewhat schematically, we could say that 
sovereignty is exercised within the borders of a territory, discipline is exercised on the 
bodies of individuals, and security is exercised over a whole population” (Foucault, 
2007, p. 11). Leaving the further examination of relations between those powers to the 
next part of this chapter, we can suffice to cite Foucault once again: “So we should not 
see things as the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a society of discipline, and 
then of a society of discipline by a society, say, of government. In fact we have a 
triangle: sovereignty, discipline, and governmental management, which has population 
as its main target and apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism (Foucault, 
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2007, pp. 107-8).” 
6.2 Relations Between the Modes of Powers  
How do these three modes of power, that is, sovereign, disciplinary and governmental 
power relate to each other? This question is at the heart of the previously mentioned 
Agamben and Butler discussion, and we have already some clues about the nature of 
this relationship. In the Foucauldian framework, however, it is needed to be addressed 
in particular for the decisive nature of historicity/temporality of the modes of power in 
general. Yet, there is enough evidence in Security, Territory & Population (1977-78) 
clarifying that these three modes of power are not mutually exclusive, historically 
annihilating each other or requiring the previous ones to  in order to occur. Particularly, 
when it comes to sovereign power, Foucault seems to feel a need to explicate that 
sovereign power is not a dead, historical phenomenon but still at work. Even if he does 
not deal with sovereign power at length except in Society Must Be Defended (1975-
1976), he specifically insists on the presence of sovereignty in contemporary affairs.  
Before the Collège de France lectures, most of the interpreters tended to read that 
sovereignty only seems to function as an explanatory concept in contrast with 
disciplinary and governmental powers. Thus, “cutting off the King’s head” would 
basically mean forgetting macro-power relations in favour of micro ones and so law, 
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state, prohibition, domination and so on have no place in Foucault’s lexicon. 
Nevertheless, the view encountered in Collège de France lectures, particularly Security, 
Territory & Population presents the sovereign power not as relevant in contemporary 
but also “more acute than ever.” Foucault clearly states: “[…] there is not a sort of break 
between the level of micro-power and the level of macro-power, and that talking about 
one [does not] exclude talking about the other. In actual fact, an analysis in terms of 
micro-powers comes back without any difficulty to the analysis of problems like those 
of government and the state (Foucault, 2007, p. 358).” 
Negating the claim that the three forms of power, i.e. sovereignty, disciplinary and 
governmentality, are mutually exclusive modes entails negating the framework in which 
the sovereign power is a force totally distinct and causally (therefore, historically) prior 
to all other deployments of power. The relationship between the sovereign power in 
origins and the later expressions is not a causal relationship; although the sovereign 
power can be argued to be a sort of enabler of all the others. Not being causal, it is 
rather genealogical similar to the relationship of the seed to the tree. Nonetheless, there 
is no clear restriction to cancel out the possibility of governmentality becoming a tool 
for the sovereign power. Sovereign power then becomes a force having the other powers 
as its subjects, not the individual bodies or masses.  
It acts upon the forces to keep itself alive determining the governmental power as letting 
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live or taking lives. In this sort of approach, the sovereign power is not a mode of power 
like others, i.e. disciplinary or governmental, but hierarchically superior to them in the 
sense that it precedes them historically, therefore still present through others as it is 
preserved. It would not be, however, legitimate to argue that all other powers are 
subjugated to the sovereign power since this view would fall under the refuted category 
of mutual exclusiveness of these three modes of power. Optimistically, one could argue 
that the transformation involves adaptation to changes in a given period of time and the 
life is rarely about letting live and taking life in the modern era compared to the 
everyday challenge and survival on the daily bases in the earlier ages with countless 
constant threats to life.  
From the seventeenth century on, a certain web of connections, policies and customs 
along with the analysable methods gave rise to a certain rationality according to which 
public intelligibility could take form. Statistics and data sciences as one the most 
effective tools of governmentality, have become the tools to form the reality of the state, 
which defines the border of rationality. The history of governmental reason is what 
allows Foucault to build his narrative of the creation of the modern state. The modern 
state functions through the governmentality and its border building via the use of binary 
logic to define the inclusion and exclusion to a certain sphere, i.e., state, political, 
private, public, right and rational (Foucault, 2007, p. 109). “We live in the era of a 
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governmentality discovered in the eighteenth century. Governmentalization of the state 
is a particularly contorted phenomenon, since if the problems of governmentality and 
the techniques of government have really become the only political stake and the only 
real space of political struggle and contestation, the governmentalisation of the state has 
nonetheless been what has allowed the state to survive. And it is likely that if the state is 
what it is today, it is precisely thanks to this governmentality that is at the same time 
both external and internal to the state, since it is the tactics of government that allow the 
continual definition of what should or should not fall within the state’s domain, what is 
public and what private, what is and is not within the state’s competence, and so on. So, 
if you like, the survival and limits of the state should be understood on the basis of the 
general tactics of governmentality  (Foucault, 2007, p. 109).” 
6.3 Sovereign Power and Post-September 11 
Earlier than War on Terror in the frame of his counterterrorism Presidential Decision 
Directives in 1995 (no. 39) and May 1998 (no. 62) Bill Clinton stated that terrorism was 
a national security problem, not just a law enforcement issue. As a result, the authority 
of the National Security Council was reinforced within and outside the country in 
accordance with the interior and foreign counterterrorism program. Clinton’s directives 
reinstating terrorism as a national security problem rather than a legislative one declared 
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that necessary precautions and measures to battle terrorism cannot be taken within the 
domain of legislation, but it requires another rationale, a set of action, determination and 
execution. In the Will to Knowledge (1976), Foucault describes the transition from “war 
to defend the sovereign to war to defend the nation”: “Wars are no longer waged in the 
name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged on behalf of the existence 
of everyone; entire populations are mobilised for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in 
the name of life necessity: massacres have become vital (Foucault, 1978, p. 137).”  
The apparatus or dispositif of security in Foucault’s understanding is a creation of a sort 
of plane of possibilities that is bounded with a spectrum of allowances where any 
opposition is to be calculated in terms of costs and expenses. The apparatus of security 
has a certain flexibility permitting it to grow in ways and means, and in terms of 
connectivity it enlarges itself as the core plane of possibilities which organises 
everything in or in relation to it. In contrast with the discipline as the principle 
conditioning all occurrences; the security, on the other hand, functions in tuned with the 
by-products, collateral events, rarities and crises which cannot be evaluated in their 
absolute sense, but always by the role they play within the current system of security. 
The individuals do not confront the natural unfolding of the events as they are but 
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After the attacks, responses were largely irrelevant or impotent to fight the terrorism in 
real terms addressing the agents responsible for the attacks; rather justifying the Iraq 
invasion becoming part of the ‘fighting the evil’ discourse. Once the State’s very own 
existence, values of America and the American life with its values, such as freedom, as 
it is clearly stated by president Bush’s announcement after the attacks stating the 
danger, the foundation of the extreme state of war has emerged. The justification of the 
invasion of Afghanistan as well as Iraq, however dubious, represents the play of forces 
remaining within the state of governmentality. Highly controversial the USA PATRIOT 
Act which is an acronym of Providing Appropriate Tools to Restrict, Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism Act passed in October 25, 2001, is an example of extreme security 
precautions by legislative means.  
The authorisation of indefinite detentions of immigrants, law enforcements related to 
searches of private properties without pre-announcement or consent, and unrestricted 
authority to the Federal Bureau of Investigation to collect and store personal and 
professional data. The law equips the state forces with extreme authority to collect data 
and to use it in accordance with “to deter and punish terrorist acts” within and outside of 
the country, “and for other purposes”. This legislative reinforcement reflects the 
extreme security measures, the extensive use of data collection and surveillance 
methods in fighting against the threat to sovereignty.  
Sovereign Power After September 11 
 
 
214  Emre Barca - June 2020 
 
 
As a matter of fact, the vastness of the terrorist threats covering the responsible of the 
attacks as Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan reaching out to Iraq possibly under the category of 
hosting countries, although lacking evidence, announced to be treated equally is a clear 
manifestation of sovereign power. The war in Iraq is not only a matter of death outside 
of the American territories; it is also a command of death for young American patriots 
recruited actively from the economically disadvantaged regions. The United States 
Department of Defence casualty website announced in 2016 4.424 deaths and 31.952 
soldiers wounded in action. As a prolongation of president Bush’s rhetoric of “evil/the 
worst of human nature”, a war is declared with the Axis of Evil comprised countries 
acting for terrorist purposes, sponsoring terrorism and holding ‘weapons of mass 
destruction’, namely, Iran, Iraq and North Korea in January 2002 and later with those 
added by the former undersecretary of State John Bolton “beyond the Axis of Evil” 
comprising Cuba, Libya and Syria in May 2002. Later, the legitimacy of these countries 
holding or progressing in developing mass destruction weapons were highly contested 
and came in view to “rely heavily on analytic assumptions and judgment rather than 
hard evidence” according to the United States declassified intelligence report of 
September 2002 on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program; and has never been 
proven.  
Later then-president Barack Obama declared the end of the War on Terror on May 2013 
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announcing the shift of focus rather towards “a specific group of networks determined 
to destroy the United States” (Shinkman, 2013). With repetition to the former president 
Bush’s September 11 speech, the United States was self-proclaimed as the “defender of 
freedom and all that is good and just in our world” against the “evil of humanity”. It is 
the very rhetoric that put thousands of lives at stake and command to kill for unjustified 
reasons of the State. Therefore, not only that the lives of the young American patriots as 
well as civilians in the invaded regions were at stake, but also the morality of those 
commanded to kill as a result of norm determining power of the state.  
The re-emergence of white supremacism or alt-right movement as a form of neo-
fascism dating back to early 2010s gathered public attention in the August 2017 ‘Unite 
the Right’ Rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. Although being devoid of a clear manifesto 
or an open political agenda, the alt-right has been known as an anti-egalitarian view in 
favour of white race supremacy therefore dominance over the others. The most 
importantly, it is defined as a result of the historical transformation after 17th century 
from the sovereign state to the administrative state with its focus on society; Foucault 
remarks in Society Must be Defended genealogically the defence of sovereign precedes 
giving birth to the defence of a population marked by identity gives birth to the notion 
of state racism. (Foucault, 2003) “[A] battle that has to be waged not between races, but 
by a race that is portrayed as the one true race, the race that holds power and is entitled 
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to define the norm, and against those who deviate from that norm, against those who 
pose a threat to the biological heritage  (Foucault, 2003, p. 60).” Foucault continues his 
definition of the state racism as: “a racism that society will direct against itself, against 
its own elements and its own products […] the internal racism of permanent 
purification, and it will become one of the basic dimensions of social normalisation.”  
It is differentiated from the sovereign power by its positive nature, to foster life in 
opposition with the repressive and negative nature of sovereign power that is in effect 
taking life in a juridical form. Foucault defines the biopower as the second form of 
transformation of the sovereign power alternative to the disciplinary power: “The 
second, formed somewhat later, focused on the species body, the body imbued with the 
mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological processes: propagation, 
births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, with all the 
conditions that can cause these to vary. Their supervision was affected through an entire 
series of interventions and regulatory controls: a biopolitics of the population (Foucault, 
1978, p. 139).” 
The general discourse was not that the aim is to protect and defend the lives of 
American citizens; but a more abstract notion of American lifestyle, freedom and “all 
that is good and just in our world”. Nonetheless, there was a reference to “the great 
nation of America” which is a notion exceeding the individuals, and the operation held 
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rather at the expense of individuals. On the ground of victimisation of American 
citizens as a result of September 11 attacks, goodness, justice, righteousness of every 
act be it invasion, killing or dominance was justified towards the enemies or those 
harbouring them.  
The war is not meant to be won; it was meant to be continuous. It is waged by the ruling 
group against its own subjects and its object is not the victory over either Eurasia or 
East Asia, but to keep the very structure of the ‘world’ intact. The worldwide 
exceptional status of the United States, in defence of its values within the planet with 
the self-ascription of the defender of all justice and good, and as a result mobilising 
thousands of troops of many countries based on analytic results instead of solid proof, is 
a process which requires a juridical-sovereign power which in its defence holds the right 
to let live and take life. “In the post-9/11 world, threats are defined more by the fault 
lines within societies than by the territorial boundaries between them. From terrorism to 
global disease or environmental degradation, the challenges have become transnational 
rather than international. […] In this same sense, the American homeland is the planet 
(USA government 9/11 report, Chapter 12, Defining the Threat).” 
When the American homeland is planet, the war is not for the sovereign, even not for 
the nation but for the humanity. This encompassing definition of the homeland is not 
simply imperialistic but the symptom of the special place of the US in the international 
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constellation. In any case, it shows how anti-terroristic measures disseminate from a 
centre, that is, the attacked, the victim of all victims, the gendarmerie and financial, 
economic centre of the world order. But, in what sense post-September 11 era needs for 
the notion of sovereign power to get into the play to conceive and to explain the power 
structure and its deployment?  
The main answer is to be sure is the triangle as explained by Foucault: Since all three 
modes of power can co-exist, sovereign power can play a role in an era predominantly 
experienced through governmentality. The second point is that how much analytical the 
definitions and descriptions of those modes of power are they are intertwined in each 
other both conceptually and practically. Yet, these two points of course only sign a 
possibility not an actuality that takes place. Indeed, all of which taken into account as 
regression in liberal democracy, as archaic in terms of governance, repressive and 
chauvinistic can be most probably the sign of sovereign power in the contemporary. The 
reappearance of sovereign power beneath the governmentality manifest in three axes: 
the exclusivity or transcendence, unquestionable commands of the raison d’état, and 
finally, the expansion of territory with the wide notion of terrorist threats. In this regard, 
sovereign power is never dead or non-existent but for many reasons, in post-September 
11 it becomes a significant deployment of power in terms of use and abuse of law with 
anti-terror measures, states of exception, immigration and surveillance regulations and 
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so on. Hence the sovereign power with its traditional prohibition, censoring, restriction 
and domination mechanism becomes a mode of power goes hand in hand with 
governmentality.  
Nevertheless, this relation between sovereign and governmental powers should be 
clarified even if Foucault left this job to Foucauldians. One of them, Andrew McNeal 
thereby claims, “sovereignty should not simply be understood as an outmoded, centred 
institution of power but as a political concept that holds a rich history of contestation, 
colonization, innovation, and radical transformation (Neal, 2010).” To be sure, Neal’s 
comments are based not only on Agamben’s Homo Sacer but on Foucault’s Society 
Must Be Defended and he is right in his criticism of Agamben who claims to complete 
or correct Foucault. In light of the Collège de France lectures of Foucault, Agamben’s 
intervention seems not only unnecessary but also unproductive in its insistence in 
sovereignty as an ahistorical, almost metaphysical concept and over-generalisation of 
state of exception.  
That is, question is not a revival, rebirth or reawakening or sovereignty but sovereign 
power’s tactical and/or strategical use in a time of governmentality. It is also a fact that 
clear cut separating sovereign and disciplinary/governmental powers and imprisoning 
sovereign power to the monarchical history also result as depoliticising social relations 
through statistics, calculation and security. Nevertheless, all these and raison d’état are 
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nothing but in the service of political sovereignty. In this regard, repressive legal-
discursive sovereign power and productive, more positive, calculative power of 
governmentality work together. Both these powers cannot be reduced to each other but 
also cannot be thought without the other. Post-September 11 reveals this fact more 








7.1 Post-Post-September 11 
In light of Michel Foucault’s works, we have seen in the last chapter that sovereign 
power became much more relevant along with governmentality after September 11. 
Contrary to Agamben’s criticism regarding Foucault’s strict periodisation of modes of 
power, Foucault’s oeuvre allows us to analyse power relations in a kind of triangle 
where sovereign, disciplinary and governmental powers coexist and interact. Within this 
framework, our focus was post-September 11 just from the beginning but what 
happened after post-September 11? What about after Al-Qaeda was ‘inactivated’ to a 
certain extent or the leader of the network organisation Osama bin Laden was killed? 
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Did the terrorist threat disappear, or did the infamous security measures soften? Is 
sovereign power still at work in a fashion we observe after September 11? To answer all 
these questions, we have to look at after post-September 11, a period when, even if it is 
not totally forgotten, September 11 became less and less a point of reference explaining 
the world affairs. It is a period when September 11 was regularly memorialised, became 
a memory but somehow silently repeated again and again like a depressing nightmare.  
As discussed in the second chapter from the perspective of spectacle, the ISIS and its 
attacks in Europe has created an environment similar to post-September 11. From the 
declaration of state of exception to extreme security measures, a trauma was repeated 
once again at the cost of civic rights. Refugees and immigrants, even if they are EU 
citizens, were the first ones to blame and all this securitisation atmosphere was abused 
by extreme right who fosters xenophobia and Islamophobia. Also having members from 
Europe, US and Canada, ISIS was a social media phenomenon, regularly occupying the 
agenda with new tweets and spectacular videos as well as terrorist attacks. Combining 
the images created with the state-of-the-art technology with a Middle Age barbarism 
mise-en-scene, the ISIS became a nightmare for ordinary Europeans for a while. 
Considering its claim of sovereignty in some lands of Iraq and Syria and its emphasis of 
khalifate, it is questionable whether the ISIS is the direct heir of Al-Qaeda. Though 
these organisations have quite different goals and discourses in the end, the ISIS took its 
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fuel from the Al-Qaeda’s relative success as part of it. But particularly after Arab 
Spring, the ISIS gained its real power organised against the middle-class, well-educated, 
secular protesters. More significantly, the failure of Arab Spring and the end of 
liberation movements with coups and civil wars weakened the ‘high hopes’ of Arab 
Spring and empowered the radical jihadist movements among the Arab peoples. 
Both the ISIS’s public image with beheadings, machetes and traditional clothes, and the 
failure of liberation movements of Arab Spring empowered the Islamophobia based on 
a simplistic version of orientalism. Accordingly, while the ISIS was revealing the real 
face of all Muslims, the Arab Spring showed the Arab-Muslim populations’ thin 
potential towards democratisation. The consequence was almost obvious: It was 
impossible for Arab-Muslim peoples to become democratised because it was once again 
proven that Islam and democracy is already incompatible.  
7.2 Trump and the Others 
In the meantime, Bush government’s loss of credibility in terms of justifying the war in 
Iraq may have not deterred the voters from re-electing George W. Bush but at a time 
when a new president must be chosen due to the two term limit of an American 
president, the attempt to justify the now clearly unjust war in Iraq clearly contributed to 
the victory of the Democratic candidate Barack Obama who represents the most of the 
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micro-identities that September 11 attacks and the discourse justifying the War on 
Terror crucified. Obama as a secular originally Muslim, non-white American governed 
the United States for eight years defeating the Republican candidates in two presidential 
elections. During Obama’s presidency the number of soldiers in Iraq was ‘drawn down’ 
gradually. Moreover, the number of the prisoners in the detention camp in Guantanamo 
Bay decreased significantly although he could not have the detention centre closed 
down entirely due to a lack of majority and potentially due to conflict with the Pentagon 
on matters of national security.  
Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and the main figure 
associated with the September 11 attacks was killed during Obama’s administration as a 
result of a previously announced, targeted and restrictedly focused series of operations. 
The operational efficiency of the Obama administration has proven more successful 
than that of the Bush administration by this medium, when compared to the overall 
tactical wars on terror policy of the implemented immediately after September 11. 
Under Obama, the dominant discourse of “America, above and beyond of everyone” is 
replaced by the infamous slogan “Yes, we can!” and the abstract transcendental notions 
such as “the protection of our great nation” is replaced by the more concrete “to protect 
our people” summarised as in the example of his speech in relation to the former 
National Security Agency officer Edward Snowden’s revealing the surveillance of 
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civilians as part of a program called PRISM. In line with Foucauldian triangle, during 
the period of Obama’s administration we observe the strengthening of governmentality 
with a more libertarian environment, the highlight on security, the extreme use of 
technologies and statistics based on information services and data.  
Nonetheless, Donald Trump’s presidential campaign as the Republican party candidate 
was defined by an internationally conservative, anti-Muslim, White-supremacist 
program involving the ban of non-American Muslims entrance to the US, the 
construction of a wall between America and Mexico, and “Make America great again” 
rhetoric. Trump was openly in favour of restoring Guantanamo Bay and openly 
condoning torture as both a method of gaining information from a detainee and simply 
as a deserved punishment. Within the years, Trump displayed that he is immune and 
indifferent to these both nationally and internationally scandalous comments. And this 
was not only limited with comments; he did what he said and probably became a 
symbol for a period of time when populist-authoritarian leaders reign most of the world, 
from Russia to the UK, and from Philippines to Turkey.   
In this way, Trump is far from being unique, but it is once again surprising for the 
world’s central super-power has a president so indifferent to diplomatic and political 
courtesy of any sort in both national and international ways. The US had populist or 
authoritarian leaders in the past, but Trump has his own way combining 
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authoritarianism and populism, which makes impossible any kind of politeness in 
political matters. In any ways, Trump is still a question: Is he another strongman figure 
menacing democracy or is he a crowd-puller demagogue? Or is he just a good salesman 
who lacks any kind of principle? All these have some truth in itself, but the most 
important fact is that he is not alone in his discourse, rhetoric, style or policymaking 
about the most significant issues of the age. Nor he is the first in history. 
Indeed, political scientists Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart find the roots of Trump 
kind of populism in Chartists in early Victorian Britain, Narodnik revolutionaries in 
Tsarist Russia and Peronism in Argentina (Norris & Inglehart, 2019, pp. 3-4). With this 
historical account, Norris and Inglehart connect Trump to a long tradition of populism 
and list a few characteristics defining the populists including Trump, Putin or Erdoğan. 
Accordingly, one of the most important characteristics of populism is its powerful, 
angry and heated discourse against what they call “establishment”. Populists try to 
found their identity against the establishment which could include political parties, 
media, public-sector bureaucrats, intellectuals or international organisations. All these 
targets are defined with a kind of treason, uselessness, arrogance, distrust or corruption.  
The second main argument of populists is their absolute reference to the ‘people’ as the 
source of all the good for the society and the country. “Silent majority” silenced by the 
corrupt establishment knows the best and its decision is always the best regardless of 
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what intellectuals, judges, experts, media or scientists said. So much so that if people 
does not believe it then the climate crisis is not real whatever the scientists or 
environment activists say. This circular reference to the people does not only include a 
praise directly aiming the vote of the people but also a vagueness paves the way to 
abuse sovereign power of people in democracies. Since the sovereignty of people 
remains vague, and since the populists obviously are not talking about direct democracy 
they are referring to a terrifying unification of the will of the people in the body of one 
strong man/woman. 
Among many other commentators from the left as well as the liberals, Norris and 
Inglehart criticise Trump and other populist leaders with authoritarianism. For them, 
populism is a hollow shell like an empty signifier, which does not say about what will 
be done and this blank shall be filled with authoritarianism. Then, the common 
diagnosis is the combination of populist-authoritarianism, but it should be stressed that 
authoritarianism is a huge area of debate from Frankfurt School to Hannah Arendt. 
Thus, as liberal democrat political scientists Norris and Inglehart only referred to 
contemporary manifestations of authoritarianism with reference to Erich Fromm (Norris 
& Inglehart, 2019, pp. 69-70). Though uncritical and idealising a liberal democratic 
universe, their views show us how today’s political strong man/woman populist figure 
can be seen from a common sensical, classificatory and definitional perspective. 
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Accordingly, for them “authoritarianism is defined as cluster of values prioritising 
collective security for the group at the expense of liberal autonomy for the individual 
(Norris & Inglehart, 2019, p. 7).” In this regard, the first emphasis of authoritarian 
regimes is security and securitisation: They insistently speak about stolen jobs, terrorists 
and risks brought by foreigners. The demand of a strict obedience both in party politics 
and society is another aspect of authoritarian regimes. And lastly, a kind of 
conservatism dedicated to preserve traditional values of ‘us’ against ‘them’ is always at 
work. This picture is not only naïve but also too much familiar from history. But this 
does not mean that it does not contain some truth in itself through policies changing 
lives of millions of people. 
Combining populism and authoritarianism, Trump and the others, who are sometimes 
represented in the personality of him even if all of them have their own peculiarities, 
have similar discourses and policies. They use restrictions imposed on others to protect 
‘us’ from the risks the others can bring: from immigrants, refugees and asylum seekers 
to plain foreigners authoritarian policies impose official language requirements and bans 
on religious practices. It even can include “forcibly separating immigrant children from 
parents at the US border (Norris & Inglehart, 2019, p. 8).” Moreover, the restrictions 
also cover the ‘others’ among ‘us’: limiting same sex marriage and access to abortion, 
and unrecognising LGBTQ rights and gender equality, non-traditional lifestyles are 
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marginalised and punished. As with the foreign affairs, instead of cooperation, 
engagement and alliances, protectionism is at work with the mission of secure borders, 
strong military and trade protectionism. International organisations are just useless or 
against us as part of the establishment to be collapsed. 
All those descriptions are not unfamiliar to us from the post-September 11 period so 
that we can presuppose a kind of continuity between post-September 11 and after it. In 
any case, as a preliminary remark one may possibly claim that post-September 11 must 
have prepared the conditions for after post-September 11, particularly in terms of using 
the fear of terror and of the others in general. In other words, both populist-authoritarian 
regimes of post-September 11 and after post-September 11 takes their legitimacy from 
the discourses of security and securitisation.  
Surprisingly, however, post-post-September 11 may be more terrible in the sense that 
the threats surrounding the people is not only terrorists but also criminals, gangs, 
corrupt establishment and so on. In this kind of a world where the borders are 
vulnerable, inside the country is governed by the corrupts and outside is full of enemies, 
then high walls and strong leaders become inevitable to protect us from those dangers. 
And in such a world there is much to sacrifice from civic liberties to personal freedoms 
to achieve a collective security. In this way democracy is attacked without coup d’etat, 
without cancellation of elections, state of exceptions or military intervention (Norris & 
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Inglehart, 2019). Everything happens in the normal course of the things in abnormal 
times. 
Probably, there are many things to say about the contemporary socio-politics but if we 
would like to limit ourselves with our context the first thing to notice would be 
populism’s criticism regarding the weak sovereignty of people in liberal democracies: 
Basically, populists abuse the truth that there are numerous intermediary institutions and 
bureaucrats between the power and sovereignty of people, which makes the sovereignty 
of people almost like an abstract argument. The second remark is that populist discourse 
sublimates the people and the “will” of it (with the claim of knowing it) and considers 
the people as a unified totality. This particularly reminds one fascism(s), in which the 
‘real’ sovereign leader (Führer) governs the state apparatus in the name of a 
homogenous, inherently decent and unquestionably morally right “sovereign” people, 
volk or popolo.  
Nonetheless, we see that the present strong leader regimes are taken into account in two 
categories: Either naively, as a simple regression in the history or a simple deviation 
from liberal democratic ideal. Both arguments are weak because of their presupposed 
historical teleology. Foucault’s remarks on Nazism about a well-developed bureaucracy 
and the advanced governance techniques combined with sovereignty in Nazi 
government can be interesting point both for our original claim in this research and the 
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history of the present. This is not to say that contemporary “populist-authoritarian” 
regimes are actually soft fascisms but a Foucauldian approach would not fall into the 
traps of historical teleology both can be existent in the left and liberal wing intellectuals.  
In this regard, we can stick to our original claim regarding the co-existence of sovereign 
power with governmentality after post-September 11. This does not mean that nothing 
changed but if we look for an understanding of contemporary without falling into the 
traps of historical teleology, we may follow this way. Though they look different in 
many ways, Derrida’s deconstruction of democracy can allow us to understand 
democracy’s problems in a Foucauldian way. Like he argues that politics is never 
secular in Western history, we can claim that the immanence of the sovereign power in 
popular democracies has not been achieved yet as it is declared. Secondly, 
governmentality or security dispositif utilising all the sciences in the service of raison 
d’état makes sovereignty of people abstract and invisible with all the intermediary 
bureaucracy and check-balance apparatuses. Lastly, the transcendence of sovereign 
power and “corruptness” of governance techniques, as populists say, turns out to 
separate power and politics more radically. That process could be more like the death of 
politics, a regime where there is anywhere or anyone to appeal for political demands. 
Thus, Norris and Inglehart’s efforts to criticise populist-authoritarian regimes fall into 
trap to implicitly idealise a liberal democratic world and compare and contrast the 
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contemporary regimes with this ideal. This does not withhold them from making 
reasonable and worthy observations about those regimes but prevents them to make a 
more radical critique about the contemporary politics. Accepting that Foucault can be a 
source for such a critique, I would like to now focus on Turkey, how Foucault can help 
us to understand one of those contemporary regimes. A historian of the present, Ferda 
Keskin writing on Turkey will allow us to understand and criticise contemporary 
“populist-authoritarian” regime of Turkey from a Foucauldian point of view (Keskin, 
2014). 
7.3 Foucault on “Populist-Authoritarianism”: The Case of 
Turkey 
It is a common idea that the theories of Foucault, and even most of the other Western 
thinkers cannot be utilised in the non-Western world. Even if they are not deemed Euro-
centric, an approach following their theory must supposedly use a kind of template 
which cannot be applied to the other parts of the world. No matter there is a right 
warning in this approach, there is also a kind of protectionism or conservatism, which 
presupposes that non-Western cultures and societies are ‘unique’ and ‘anomalistic’ in 
their so-called special conditions. This is mostly untrue and an orientalist obstacle 
against differing approaches and criticisms about specific societies and cultures located 
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in the non-Western world. Therefore, it is quite possible to reflect on different parts of 
the world with the help of Western or non-Western thinkers without falling into trap of 
sheer imitation. 
Keskin’s first point departure is that: He openly states that Foucault’s theory of power is 
applicable to Turkey’s history and explanatory for the contemporary governance of 
Turkish Republic by the president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who is deemed one of the 
populist-authoritarian leaders of the age (Keskin, 2014, p. 1). In this path, from the 
reformation days of Ottoman Empire to Erdoğan’s Turkish Republic, he presents a 
genealogical narrative utilising Foucault’s theory of power. Starting with sovereignty, 
he describes how transcendent was the emperor in the face of his subjects in the 
Ottoman Empire. As a discursive-legal, prohibitive as well as punitive empire, Ottoman 
Empire presents a perfect example for the use of sovereign power. 
On the other hand, with the waves of Westernisation and modernisation in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of Ottoman Empire, the period of these centuries 
can be defined as an acquaintance with and first steps towards disciplinary power. 
Starting with military as in the West, big reforms in the realm of education and 
governance of population are the main examples for the establishment of the normative 
power: Urban and spatial regulations, Western style schools, big barracks accompany 
and embody this disciplinary normative power (Keskin, 2014, p. 11). Nonetheless, 
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Keskin emphasises that the real peak for the disciplinary power is the Republican period 
after 1923. In this period, Westernisation and modernisation reforms go hand in hand 
with a disciplinary power. So much so that, the khalifate was abolished in the name of a 
radical secularism and the Arabic alphabet was replaced with the Latin one for 
Westernisation. All the other reforms from the establishment of first psychiatric 
institutions to modern education are the works of disciplinary power that is constitutive 
in a Foucauldian sense. 
This period was also a one-party government, an environment where democracy is 
found somewhat dangerous for the system. The trials of founding new parties 
alternative to the state party (Republican People’s Party, CHP) were unsuccessful and 
ended with purges and harsh interventions. Nevertheless, in 1945 a second party was 
founded and the first multi-party elections took place in 1950 with the success of 
Democrat Party (DP). Keskin describes the period following the multi-party system as a 
struggle between disciplinary and governmental powers (Keskin, 2014, p. 12). This 
period between 1960-1980 was interrupted with coup d’etats and for Keskin, Turkish 
Armed Forces are the representative of the disciplinary power model. Even if the 
thought of governmentality was in circulation first in the nineteenth century in Ottoman 
Empire, its empowerment occurred after the multi-party system in Turkey.  
Keskin defines this period of coup d’etats as a trial of creating a new capitalism which 
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is not elitist/hierarchical and controlled by the state. Even though the intellectual roots 
of liberalism date back to nineteenth century Ottoman Empire, its embodiment in the 
political realm took shape after the multi-party period. It is also noteworthy that the 
appearance of the new mode of power does not take place in quiet and peace but 
encounters with a resistance, even sometimes violent. After the last successful coup 
d’etat in 1980, for Keskin, neoliberalism gains a certain power in Turkish politics and 
makes a peak under the governance of Erdoğan. Thus, Keskin introduces a new concept 
to understand “populist-authoritarian” regimes, that is, neoliberalism (Keskin, 2014, p. 
13). 
For Keskin as well as Foucault, neoliberalism is not only an economic doctrine but a 
normativity encompassing all domains of life. Keskin states that the key to Erdoğan’s 
governance is the execution of neoliberal rules in macro level while applying a 
neoliberal kind of conservatism to the capillaries of the society. Intervention to abortion 
and caesarean section and regulation of the selling of drinks are typical examples of 
interventions to society, which do not prohibit but strictly regulate (Keskin, 2014, p. 
13). What is interesting is that Erdoğan gave a certain struggle against the 
representatives of traditional disciplinary power since 2001 and seems to win it. But the 
only resistance against these policies did not come from the bureaucratic/military elites 
but like in Gezi protests, from a significant majority of the society. In these protests, 
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Keskin emphasises, what is protested is not only a particular urban regulation but a 
general political rationality governing the country (Keskin, 2014, p. 14).  
Last but not least, Keskin interprets all these contemporary developments as a kind of 
re-emergence of sovereign power through which the sovereign’s first priority becomes 
his security and it places itself in a paradoxically transcendental position. In this picture, 
governmentality and sovereignty works hand in hand and Keskin states, this is not only 
true for Turkey but also for Russia, Hungary, the US and so on. He also interprets the 
Brexit and the refugee crisis with reference to this constellation of power based on 
Foucauldian triangle (Keskin, 2014, p. 15). In this regard, Keskin presents a 
Foucauldian reading of one of the populist-authoritarian regimes and thus exemplifies 
how it is possible to write a history of the present.  
All in all, he concludes that those regimes and contemporary crisis of liberal 
democracies originate from a marriage between sovereign and governmental powers in 
the body of strong leaders all around the world. Even if we give the example of Turkey 
for a Foucauldian analysis of power of strong leader regimes, this does not mean that 
“populist-authoritarianism” takes the same form in all of the mentioned countries. 
Rather, their history and how at different times “sovereign form of power is tamed” or 
become more dominant or how governmentality takes different forms in different 
contexts would change their actual situation (Altunok, 2016, p. 5).  
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7.4 From Derrida to Foucault 
As stated in the introduction, the story of this research started with Jacques Derrida and 
now ending with Michel Foucault. This part of the conclusion chapter focuses on the 
voices of these two thinkers whom I listened throughout this research. Their unique 
voices surrounded almost the whole of this research even if another voice was around. 
This is not to say that any other thinker is insignificant compared to them, but 
sometimes we hear someone’s voice and remember the other’s as is the case with the 
Giorgio Agamben. Agamben’s misleading and problematic reading of Foucault as well 
as Judith Butler’s contribution to the history of the present was important for opening 
the way to Foucault. Or else, when Guy Debord was in the focus it was because to 
understand and open up the way Derrida speaks about media-theatricalisation of 
September 11. In any case, Derrida and Foucault are the main figures of this research 
and it is now turn to look at them head on. 
If Foucault is the philosopher of ‘how’ of the power, Derrida is the philosopher of 
paradoxes, aporias, and undecidable situations. The work of Jacques Derrida as a whole, 
just from the beginning to the end, brings us to the dead ends of our thought and even, 
language. His relatively narrow political writings, which mostly appear as the last works 
of him, are also in this category and mostly found flamboyant, jargon-ridden and 
idealistic/dreamy by political scientists. It would not be correct to say that he was a 
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radical, but he was not a simple, low-profile public intellectual either. His arrestment in 
Prague (1982) in solidarity with Czechoslovak intellectuals, visit to Nelson Mandela’s 
jail cell and writings on racism, and his roots in colonial Algeria are only a few remarks 
about his biography, which show how his interest in politics started well before the 
writing of The Spectres of Marx as is mostly claimed.  
It is in this regard Wendy Brown argues that the deconstruction of sovereignty starts 
with early writings of Derrida, which seem to have nothing to do with politics or 
sovereignty (Brown, 2009, p. 114). These interpreters who tend to read seemingly non-
political as political also claim that deconstruction itself is political in itself to the extent 
that Derrida would claim “Deconstruction is justice”. In any case, while Derrida is an 
important political philosopher for some commentators, he has not much to say about 
politics for some. Nonetheless, it is obvious that he is not a mainstream political 
philosopher or thinker, and politics in Derrida’s oeuvre works as an extension of his 
general thinking. Not only he inevitably uses the same or similar concepts, he also 
utilises the same, similar tools to explicate the political phenomena. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that he does not have a contribution to the field of 
politics, particularly to sovereignty. From hospitality to forgiveness, he has a particular 
ability to use some concepts combining both ethical and political realms because of a 
certain debt to Emmanuel Levinas. Sovereignty, however, seems to be a life-long 
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occupation for Derrida since it is both true that one can follow its traces to the very 
earlier works of Derrida, and it occupies a very critical place throughout his thinking. 
Even though this makes his work significant for the aims of this research, some 
interpreters harshly criticise this over-generalisation of the concept of sovereignty.  
Indeed, for Derrida, as we see in Chapter 4, sovereignty is a very general concept that 
does not only cover familiar power relations but also the self, the reason, the subject and 
the God. In this regard, sovereignty is more a metaphysical concept than a political one, 
which should be deconstructed accordingly. This means that Derrida would use his 
concepts, arguments and aporias utilised in his early writings on metaphysics, language 
and literature also in his ethico-political writings. That is, his quasi-transcendental 
infrastructure is again at work when it comes to hospitality or democracy. 
Friedrich Balke describes Derrida’s sovereign as such: “We all are sovereigns, without 
exception, insofar the sovereign function is nothing but the rationale of all metaphysics, 
anchored in a certain capability, in the ability to do something, in a power or potency 
that transfers and realizes itself, that shows itself in possession, property, the power or 
authority of the master, be it the master of the house or in the city or state, despot, be it 
the master over himself, and thus master over his passions which have to be mastered 
just like the many-headed mass in the political arena (Balke, 2005, p. 71).” This 
description is not only quite explanatory but also covers many dimensions Derrida’s 
Sovereign Power After September 11 
 
 
240  Emre Barca - June 2020 
 
 
conception of sovereignty entails. The basic, understandable criticism of Balke and 
many others about this conception is the lack of a history of sovereignty in Derrida’s 
thinking but instead of it, there is an onto-theology transcending the history or a history 
opening itself upon an onto-theology. This fact, for Balke, diminishes or at least limits 
the political value of Derrida’s thinking on sovereignty: The over-generalisation 
inevitably ends with a restriction in utility. 
Alongside sovereignty, the conception of ‘rogue state’ can be an example to this 
problem. As will be seen in the Chapter 4, Derrida reaches to a conclusion that ‘all 
states are rogue’ but the discussion starts with American government’s definition of 
some states (Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Syria and so on) as ‘rogue states’. Derrida 
opposes this blame and offers that the real rogue states are the ones who does not obey 
the decrees of international law and provisions of international institutions, that is, the 
ones who blame the other with roguishness. What is striking, however, he rapidly 
concludes that all states are rogues. It is reasonable to think that as a heir of Benjamin, 
Derrida speaks on monopoly on violence, being-outside-the-law and so on but he does 
not prefer to openly attack the state institution head on anarchistically. So, the argument 
somehow suspends in the air and the reader does not know what to do with it. As stated 
in the introduction, this is why this research’s focus shifted from Derrida to Foucault. 
Foucault, however, was a philosopher who critically works on philosophy’s traditional 
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critical project through history with the methods of archaeology and genealogy. Even 
though there is a tendency to divide his work to different periods, it seems that his main 
aim is to understand and explain the human subjectivity and the processes of 
subjectification in all his works. If Georges Canguilhem or Friedrich Nietzsche have a 
place in his thought, Immanuel Kant, too, is an important figure for Foucault. And all 
this historical perspective and archaeological/genealogical effort focus on human and 
social sciences in general. In this regard, Foucault’s both works and methods are useful 
and fruitful for social sciences and humanities. His earthly and non-hyperbolic approach 
is much more explanatory than his colleagues of the time and this is why this research 
was directed to his works. 
Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France were posthumously published against the 
will of Foucault but enormously influenced the Foucault scholarship in many ways. In 
this regard, Security, Territory, Population of 1977-1978 had a special place for this 
research, in which Foucault not only clarifies the concept of governmentality but also 
emphasises the relations between the modes of power, that is, the Foucauldian triangle. 
Even if Foucault insists on the theory of sovereignty more in Society Must Be Defended 
of 1975-1976, in Security, Territory, Population he clarifies that sovereignty is not a 
concept limited with kings and princes but still at work even if the age is defined with 
governmentality. This was important for this research from two angles: First, 
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Agamben’s criticism of Foucault is unnecessary and since he built his basic arguments 
upon this criticism, he cannot be fruitful in a reading on post-September 11. Even if his 
‘whole’ argument is not based on his supposedly “correction” or “at least completion” 
of Foucault and he develops his thinking with Walter Benjamin and Carl Schmitt, his 
over-generalisation of the concept of exception and his metaphysical understanding of 
sovereignty prevent one from interpreting Post-September 11 historically. Instead, he 
seems to have mostly darks hyperbolic interpretations and descriptions insufficient to 
explain power relations after September 11. 
Secondly, Foucault’s intervention on the relations between the modes of power in 
Security, Territory, Population clearly explains the post-September 11 state violence 
and against Agamben as well as some Foucauldians, it becomes possible to rethink 
sovereignty in the contemporary context. In terms of an analytical ‘tool’, Foucault’s 
approach to the relations between the modes of power offers a real alternative to 
historical teleological models as well as metaphysical and onto-theological 
hyperbolisms. This is why the journey of this research starts with Derrida, continues 
with Agamben and ends with Foucault. In this regard, the last words of this research, 
which are also one of the most critical among the others, will be Foucault’s: “The 
problem of sovereignty is not eliminated; on the contrary, it is made more acute than 
ever (Foucault, 2007, p. 107).” 
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